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Abstract 
The Anxiety of Confluence is the first truly concerted attempt to theorise some of 
the major issues facing the discipline of Creative Writing today. Taking as its 
basis the meta-Creative Writing discourse – that body of texts written by 
Creative Writing academics reflecting upon their own discipline – it identifies 
three significant points of anxiety which have arisen as a result of Creative 
Writing’s relatively recent entry into the academy: authorship, the supplementary 
discourse, and research. A chapter is dedicated to each of these issues, each time 
beginning with a broad analysis of the discourse in order to identify the specific 
locus of the anxiety as represented by Creative Writing’s own practitioners, and 
then re-approaching that anxiety through the theoretical work of Roland Barthes, 
Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Gerard Genette, in order to find new ways 
of thinking about and understanding what happens when Creative Writing is 
undertaken as an academic discipline. While this discourse analysis is wide-
ranging and interested in finding commonality, the theoretical response restricts 
itself to one or two texts at a time, as rather than instituting points of contact 
between Creative Writing and theory as whole bodies of work, the aim in each 
chapter is to develop in some detail a theoretical account which resonates 
specifically with the discipline. At the same time, however, it comes to be seen 
that much of Creative Writing’s anxiety is presaged by analogous tensions in 
literary theory and criticism, and that the barrier between these terms is not as 
strong as people on either side of it may believe. The fourth chapter therefore 
breaks with this methodology in order to performatively explore, in a creative 
critical mode, the potential interfusion of Creative Writing, criticism, and theory 
which the previous three chapters have created a space for. 
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Introduction 
What is creative writing? 
Like “English” it is a term that may not be universally admired, but it is 
pretty widely understood. “It is called ‘creative writing’ in most places,” 
Richard Hugo said with some impatience. “And you know what I’m 
talking about.” 
But do we? Creative writing refers to two things: (1) a classroom subject, 
the teaching of fiction- and verse-writing at colleges and universities 
across the country and (2) a national system for the employment of 
fiction writers and poets to teach the subject. (Myers xi) 
So runs the opening definitional statement, from the preface to The Elephants 
Teach: Creative Writing Since 1880 (2006), for what D. G. Myers considers to be this 
thing called creative writing. Writing a history of American creative writing 
which is now so well-regarded as to approach canonicity, Myers chooses to 
problematise the subject as one operating under ‘academic and literary’ pressures, 
running like a river through the history of twentieth-century American literature 
banked on one side by the pedagogic concerns of the academy and on the other 
by the social, economic, and intellectual needs of the writers who staff it (xi). 
That The Elephants Teach is, in his own words, ‘history proper: history in its 
traditional form’, intended before anything else to ‘establish the series of events’, 
necessitates this definition of creative writing as a ‘two-backed thing’, in that 
telling its history in this way depends upon the histories of everything and 
everyone it came into significant contact with over this period (xi-xii). 
This is not, however, the only way to define a thing: if we want to define a 
table, we are unlikely to begin with the ur-history of tables, with early man 
placing items on the surfaces of relatively flat rocks. Partly because The Elephants 
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Teach and other scholarly works have illustrated at some length and detail the 
history of the subject, my concern in this thesis will be with creative writing now, 
creative writing as it exists in the academy today for thousands of students and 
academics. Do we, in fact, know what Richard Hugo is talking about? Beyond 
Myers’ two-point definition, the term ‘creative writing’ always carries a serious 
risk of confusion between process and product: it is easy to elide the difference 
between the work of creative writing (attending contact hours, administrating 
modules, applying for grants, writing impact reports) and works of creative 
writing (novels, poems, plays, and all the variegated manner of literary work 
besides). To indicate the specifically disciplinary aspect of this topic, the process 
side of that equation, I will be using the capitalised Creative Writing, as in ‘an 
MA in Creative Writing’, in distinction from creative writing, the broader 
category of all that that term might indicate. It is reasonable, then, to ask the 
question ‘what is Creative Writing?’ without necessarily expecting the response to 
fully incorporate the ancillary concern of ‘and how did it come to be this way?’ – 
though some brief, indicatory comments regarding that history are necessary. To 
begin again: 
What is Creative Writing? If it has a single feature which makes it itself, an 
identifying mark which sets it apart from the various subject areas it intersects 
with, it is the workshop. The workshop is, for Michelene Wandor, ‘the 
institutional distinctiveness of CW as an academic discipline […] the sine qua non 
for creative writing itself’ (120). Myers suggests that the key importance of writers’ 
colonies in the history of creative writing is in the fact that they became ‘a model 
for subsequent attempts to devise an artists’ alternative to professionalism - 
including the writers’ workshop’ (82). Andrew Cowan writes in an article on the 
workshop that in ‘certain recent critiques, the term ‘workshop’ has been used to 
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describe almost every aspect of our discipline’s pedagogy’ (‘A life event’).* Dianne 
Donnelly reports of a survey of American Creative Writing teachers that, out of 
167 respondents, ‘only 10% define their [pedagogical] model to be markedly 
different than the traditional workshop’ (3). 
And yet, even though the workshop has been the discipline’s ‘model of 
instruction [for] over a hundred years’ (Donnelly 6) – and so since before the 
University of Iowa officially adopted the term ‘Writers’ Workshop’, thereby 
baptising it into the academy (Wandor 41) – none of the above writers give a 
precise definition of what the contemporary workshop actually consists of. 
Although Myers suggests that the ‘method of communal making and communal 
criticism is the workshop method’ (118), there is a fair distance between this and 
an explicit statement of normative pedagogical practice, of which Donnelly says 
that ‘there is little agreement as to what constitutes the workshop practice in 
creative writing classrooms internationally’ (2).  
There is therefore something of a paradox here, in that the very thing which is 
held to constitute the sine qua non of Creative Writing seems to lack a sine qua non 
of its own. One might object that the identity of the workshop is held in its 
common sense meaning of students coming together to discuss their writing, but 
on these grounds the workshop model becomes distinguishable from the standard 
academic seminar only on the basis of topic; one might as well hold the sociology 
seminar and the English seminar to be separately formulated pedagogic tools. In 
short, there is something more, or at least something else, at work in the 
workshop. After supplying a list of varying ‘workshop praxes and teacher 
                                                             
 
* TEXT, the journal which published Cowan’s article, is an online-only 
publication which will be referred to frequently in this thesis. Along with 
certain other online journals, its articles are presented without pagination, and 
so will be cited throughout without page numbers. 
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perspectives’, Donnelly suggests that some of the inherent difficulty here lies in 
the fact that ‘the workshop is a process, and as such, its ‘plasticity’ conforms to 
individual manipulation’ (8-9). Perhaps the workshop thus indicates an outlook, 
or a set of principles, rather than a certain praxis of set behaviours. 
Part of the reason for the workshop’s lack of precise definition might be the 
variance and complexity of the history of Creative Writing. The Elephants Teach 
covers a narrative from around 1880, through the founding of the Iowa Writers’ 
Workshop, to the discipline’s contemporary incarnation. Along the way Myers 
covers the rapid expansion of the U.S. College system at the turn of the 20th 
Century, the shifting tides of Classics, Philology, Rhetoric, Composition and 
English as academic subjects, the post-World War II G.I. Bill, the founding of 
writers’ colonies in the first half of the twentieth century, William Hughes 
Mearns’ progressive education movement, and the views and voices of writers 
from Henry Wadsworth Longfellow to Saul Bellow, amongst other things. 
Wandor’s book The Author is Not Dead, Merely Somewhere Else (2008) also 
constitutes a history of Creative Writing, although this time from a British 
perspective and – as the subtitle ‘Creative Writing Reconceived’ suggests – with 
more polemical fervour than Myers’ historical account. Even so, Wandor’s history 
takes in a largely dissimilar set of historical influences with a similarly broad 
range: the Workers’ Educational Association, the Open University, the Oxbridge 
tutorial system, gender politics, writing as therapy, the new British universities of 
the 1960s and 1990s, the music conservatoire, and more. What Jacques Barzun 
suggests in the foreword to The Elephants Teach also pertains to Wandor’s account: 
the history of Creative Writing seems to involve ‘the story of a great part of our 
culture since the turn of the [twentieth] century’ (ix). Between them, these 
histories suggest something of the enormous variance in preconceptions a 
Creative Writing tutor might bring to bear on the inherent ‘plasticity’ of a 
workshop which is held at the confluence of a centuries-long academic narrative, 
of economic eddies buoying the academy up and down, of extra-academic 
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political considerations of voice and identity, of a transnational trans-
germination of ideas, of the progress of literary history, and of other factors 
besides. 
This complication in positioning Creative Writing is reified in the shelves of a 
university library. In the University of East Anglia’s library, organised by the 
Library of Congress Classification System, there are at least three major locations 
in which Creative Writing books aimed at students might be found: PE1404-08, 
PN145-175 and PN3355-3365. At each shelf mark these books are collocated with 
books on Creative Writing pedagogy aimed at academics and books about 
writing creatively aimed at non-academic audiences, but also with books less 
related to the discipline. PE1404-1408 features books on improving academic 
writing, style guides, and reference works, as well as works of research on 
composition and rhetoric. PN145-175 likewise mixes style guides and works on 
rhetoric in with Creative Writing handbooks, but also features volumes of 
interviews with writers (PE designates English language, PN English literature). 
PN3355-3365 contains the greatest density of Creative Writing material, but here 
again the variance in the types of book present is notable. Guides intended to 
work in tandem with university curricula are joined by works for a general 
audience on becoming a writer, works aimed at specific generic writing like 
erotic and horror, theoretical works by the likes of Roland Barthes and J. Hillis 
Miller, literary reflections on writing by the likes of Umberto Eco and Milan 
Kundera, books on the practical aspects of publishing literary work, and critical 
volumes with titles like Theory and the Novel and The Spatiality of the Novel. 
Of course, the simple reason that there is no dedicated Creative Writing shelf 
mark is that the LoC system was first devised at the turn of the 20th Century, 
whilst the term ‘creative writing’ was first used in its modern sense, according to 
Myers, in the 1920s (101). However, what these shelves, along with the sundry 
other odd places where relevant books might be found, show at a glance is some 
of Creative Writing’s intellectual and social heritage. Moreover, they underline 
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the fact that this history still pertains today, that the student arriving in the 
contemporary writers’ workshop is still affected by, albeit perhaps subtly, the 
knock-on effects that rhetoric and composition, theory and postmodernism, 
popular fiction and progressive education have all had on the subject. 
This history is not, of course, Creative Writing’s heritage exclusively. Just as a 
particular view of literary history might influence a tutor’s idiosyncratic 
interpretation of the workshop, the factors suggested at the end of the preceding 
paragraph are all also elements in the institutional history of English. Indeed, 
these two histories are complexly intertwined in a way that can form the basis of 
an argument for seeing Creative Writing primarily as a component of English 
rather than as an academic discipline in its own right. Seeing it in this light 
allows us to see it as another in a long line of paradigms in English, each 
displacing the last, which Gerald Graff identifies in his institutional history 
Professing Literature (1987). In his introduction, Graff sketches out a series of 
moments of change within English wherein each new approach has been met with 
a similarly suspicious reaction and suggests that it is ‘worth pondering that 
traditional humanists of [an earlier] era indicted research scholarship for many of 
the very same sins for which later traditionalists indicted the New Criticism and 
present day traditionalists indict literary theory’ (4). That was in 1985, and the 
position of Creative Writing in the academy today is similarly fractious, with 
Paul Dawson in his 2005 study Creative Writing and the New Humanities depicting 
the current relationship as ‘a major source of consternation’ and as a kind of 
stand-off between ‘the garret and the ivory tower’ wherein neither Creative 
Writing nor English wants the other (14). 
However, if placing Creative Writing squarely within English’s ivory tower is 
a source of consternation, it also enables an approach to its definitional anxieties 
which operates via arguments already developed in the debate around the place of 
English in the broader academy. In ‘Literary force: institutional values’ (1999), 
Timothy Clark suggests that  
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One of the distinctive features of literary criticism is that its status in the 
university has always been controversial, if not precarious. Throughout 
its history it has tried to answer accusations of being little more than a 
professionalised hobby, a dilettante subject, the poor man’s classics, or an 
amateurish cultivation of taste and connoisseurship. If one reads the 
various histories of English that are now available, such as the work of 
Franklin E. Court (1992) or Brian Doyle's English and Englishness (1989), 
one is struck by the way in which changes in conceptions of the subject 
and of ways of teaching it are invariably driven by internal, university 
pressures, especially the need to conform to models of disciplinary 
knowledge regarded as established in other areas. […] There is no history 
of English with the same inherent rationale as the history of physics or 
sociology, working out various theories and conflicting claims around a 
common object. 
As an exercise, reread the above paragraph whilst making the appropriate 
substitutions to make it about Creative Writing. If you start by reading ‘Creative 
Writing’ for ‘literary criticism’ or ‘English’, and then replace Court and Doyle 
with Myers and Wandor, you will find that there is little else to be done: Creative 
Writing is accused of dilettantism, is under pressure to conform to external 
models of knowledge, is without inherent rationale, just as English was and still 
is. Wandor performs a similar exercise in the epilogue to The Author is Not Dead, 
weaving the language of Creative Writing into a quote from Terry Eagleton in 
order to form an ‘intertextual manifesto’: 
‘Like all the best radical positions, then, mine is a thoroughly 
traditionalist one. I wish to recall literary criticism (creative writing) from 
certain fashionable, new-fangled ways of thinking it has been seduced by 
– “literature” (creative writing) as a specially privileged object (separate 
from the study of literature), the “aesthetic” (self-expression, genius, 
inspiration, the imagination) as separable from social determinants, and so 
on – and return it to the ancient paths (the study of the histories of 
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literature, the close study of literary texts and their contexts, the study, 
understanding and practice of language through different forms of writing, 
literary and non-literary, discursive and imaginative, figurative and literal, 
fiction and non-fiction) which it has abandoned…. I do not mean that we 
should revive the whole range of ancient rhetorical terms (or deny the 
relative autonomy of creative writing and other writing studies, or merely use 
writing as an adjunct to literary studies, although it can clearly be that too) 
and substitute these for modern critical language (which would consist of a 
study and understanding of the history and concepts of literary criticism and 
literary theory; a writerly study, understanding and practice of discursive and 
imaginative writing, alongside usefully traditional and reader-based literary 
studies, effecting a rapprochement between them all)….’ (229-30) 
Wandor’s increasingly intrusive parenthetical emendations here speak to 
something about the relationship between Creative Writing and English. Trying 
on the one hand to maintain the point of contact between Creative Writing and a 
capacity to study literature which has long been the domain of English, and on 
the other to maintain for Creative Writing a sense of autonomy and specificity, 
her insertions rewrite themselves even as they rewrite Eagleton, denying that the 
subject is separate from ‘the study of literature’ even as it is forbidden to be ‘an 
adjunct to literary studies’, and then, in the same breath, saying that ‘it can clearly 
be that too’. While The Author is not Dead is, in many ways, a meritorious study of 
the discipline, what this exercise speaks to above all is an unresolved anxiety 
about the discipline’s status. 
This may be in part due to the fact that, as Clark states, English itself does not 
enjoy an ‘inherent rationale’. His argument moves through two significant stages, 
first analysing the study of literature in terms of various conceptualisations of the 
university which have circulated during the history of English (these being the 
‘institutional values’ of his title), and then suggesting that the particular 
sensitivity which English seems to have to its institutional context is a necessary 
consequence of its object of study (that being the ‘literary force’). 
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In the first half of this argument there are three major ‘ideas of the university’ 
in play. First is what he terms, following Bill Readings’ monograph The University 
in Ruins, the ‘University of Reason’. Here, in a formulation established by 
Immanuel Kant in The Conflict of the Faculties, the university is given absolute 
freedom to ‘legislate in all matters of knowledge’, such that it constitutes an 
institution in which ‘reason gives itself its own law’ in indifference to external 
political and cultural pressures. However, it is nonetheless ‘subordinate in power 
to the state’ in that this freedom is permitted on the basis that the university 
trains a professional class of workers and therefore ‘enables a peaceful diffusion of 
enlightenment throughout the state’. When the legislation of knowledge is an 
entirely intra-university affair, the recognition of certain work as being ‘of’ a 
certain discipline can only be performed by those who are already ‘of’ that 
discipline, and therefore there is a felt pressure for a discipline to ‘discern or 
isolate some object able to underwrite or guarantee a self-contained disciplinary 
space’ which justifies that recognition. While this task is performable in relatively 
simple ways by history or biology – disciplines with ‘inherent rationale’ – 
literature’s quality as something which crosses disciplinary boundaries, which can 
concern, in principle, any topic, makes this a problem for English. 
The second idea of the university in Clark’s account has its source in Wilhelm 
von Humboldt’s University of Berlin, established 1810, and is termed the 
‘University of Culture’. This model, ‘distinct in idea if not in practice’ from the 
University of Reason, simultaneously integrates the work of teaching with the 
work of research whilst also integrating the principle of reason with a principle of 
‘custom’. Rather than enjoying a fiefdom over reason and knowledge for the 
ultimate benefit of the state, this model directly attends to the culture of the 
state; it is ‘the embodiment of culture (Bildung) as an archive or repository and the 
agent of Bildung as the process of individual and communal self-development’. 
This creates for English a potential situation where, instead of trying to pin down 
‘literature as literature’ or finding some other way of making-exclusive its object 
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of study, it can look to the development of people more broadly as ‘the site for a 
liberal education, specialised but not specialist, academic but not narrowly 
technical, addressed not just to the intellect but to general cultural skills’. 
Between these two ideas Clark sees an explanatory model for much of the 
controversy in the history of English, with that long line of paradigms which were 
identified by Graff now being viewed as a negotiation between Reason (which 
might be indicated by drives towards formalism) and Culture (which might be 
indicated by broadly historicist schools of thought). The third idea, the 
‘University of Excellence’, I will not take up in detail just now, save to say that it 
interrupts both of the above models and seems to have attained dominance over 
the contemporary university scene. 
Having demonstrated how the constitution of English is highly responsive to 
its institutional context, the second half of Clark’s argument takes up this idea of 
‘inherent rationale’ and shows how the discipline’s lack of such is not down to a 
weakness or a vagueness, but is in fact inherent to the study of literature. 
Through four topic headings, he shows how literature resists being rationalised, 
such that any study of it forms ‘an unstable and invaluable place of intersection 
and contestation between various other disciplines, and spaces outside the 
academy’. To gloss just the first of these: Clark suggests that literature generates 
an ‘aporetic relation between the singular and the universal’, in which the 
‘difficulty is that of distinguishing the ‘conceptual’ from the ‘merely verbal’. Using 
Hamlet as an example, he lists every use of the word ‘visage’ in the text and asks if 
it is possible to decide whether each of these is ‘to be taken under some more 
general conceptual framework’, or whether each ‘is relatively insignificant’, just a 
repetition of a word with no greater import. Concluding that this question ‘puts 
to work an undecidability about the status of [the text’s] language’, he argues that 
if no ‘procedural rule can be formulated as to how to read it’ then ultimately the 
study of literature can neither be held down to a distinct object of study, nor 
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attend to the holistic, liberal education of its students, for the text always 
contains the capacity to be read otherwise. 
If English is thus conceived of as a discipline in which the object of study at 
every moment turns against its own disciplinarisation, Creative Writing’s 
definitional anxiety is twofold. First, it too is (and I hope this is an 
uncontroversial proposition) a means of studying literature. That it is concerned 
with a practice of writing over a practice of reading, and will therefore feature a 
distinct body of concerns and principles, is clear, but teaching and research 
regarding the writing of literature must be concerned with identifying the 
literary to the same degree as teaching and research regarding the reading of 
literature. Second, even while it negotiates its own definition internally in terms 
of literariness and externally in terms of the university more broadly, it must also 
negotiate, in an odd mid-space between those two sites, with another discipline 
which it is at once aligned with (in terms of subject) and orthogonal to (in terms 
of approach). Indeed, the fact that that difference in approach is displayed by the 
workshop, and that literature’s quality of undecidability makes the workshop no 
more stable a construction than that of the study of literature in English, may 
explain why Creative Writing so persistently turns to it as a source of definition 
in spite of its instability. To even speak of Creative Writing as having a sine qua 
non is to ignore its doubly-undecidable institutional context. 
 
We have arrived, in a manner of speaking, at defining Creative Writing for the 
purposes of this thesis as the specifically institutional and disciplinary aspects of 
the subject, but with an awareness of the deep difficulties which the phrase 
‘institutional and disciplinary’ smuggles into the conversation. Having thus 
excluded much of what might accumulate under the phrase ‘creative writing’, it is 
worth taking a moment to outline something of what else this thesis is not 
concerned with. 
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First: history. The work of historicising Creative Writing is by no means over: 
in a 2016 article, ‘Myth maker: Malcolm Bradbury and the creation of creative 
writing at UEA’, Lise Jaillant explodes in fine style many of the misconceptions 
which circulate around the genesis of Creative Writing in the UK – it did not 
start in 1970, it did not start at UEA, Ian McEwan was not, in any real sense, the 
country’s first Creative Writing student – and shows how this traditional 
narrative was constructed and reinforced by the university’s PR department and 
Bradbury himself as a way of gaining students for one and status for the other. 
Challenging the slightly misty-eyed view of Creative Writing as a meteoric 
literary success in the face of an increasingly indifferent or even hostile culture is, 
I think, vital for the future of the discipline. However, as this thesis proceeds 
towards its object via a different method, which I will argue lends itself to a 
clearer illustration of what Creative Writing is today, to flag up in endless asides 
the historical valence of certain issues would be more distracting than 
enlightening. 
Second: interviews. In the process of doing this research at the University of 
East Anglia, finding myself in inevitable social proximity to Creative Writers at 
MA, PhD and staff levels, what I have been asked more than any other question is 
‘why haven’t I heard of you?’ – or sometimes, more bluntly, ‘why aren’t you talking 
to us about it?’ – with the implication that the first person to ask for insight on 
Creative Writing should by rights be a Creative Writer. To gain insight on the 
discipline through a process of surveying and interviewing those who are engaged 
in it directly is, again, important work which must be pursued. I would like to 
briefly offer two slightly conciliatory justifications for why this is not that work. 
The first is that there is now, as we will see, a very large corpus of work written 
by Creative Writers about Creative Writing; composed thoughtfully over time, 
and published via refereed journals and academic publishing imprints, I am 
taking this corpus to be a fair representation of Creative Writing’s self-
conceptualisation which does not carry the risk of self-misrepresentation which 
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on-the-spot responses to questioning might generate. The other is that my aim in 
this thesis, as the above definition of Creative Writing shows, is to consider the 
discipline institutionally, with the contexts of criticism and theory made present, 
and as my access to those subjects is (obviously) textual, the written expressions 
of Creative Writing academia lend themselves to this study more readily than 
their spoken equivalents. 
Third: geography. Which is to say, if an additional reason for largely 
overlooking history and avoiding field work is that the breadth of my topic 
necessitates delimitation somewhere, another way of doing this is to identify a 
particular geographical area. Academic work on Creative Writing as a discipline 
tends to happen in three main areas: to list a few examples, The Elephants Teach 
and Mark McGurls’ landmark book The Program Era (2012) both emerge from the 
American context; Wandor’s The Author is not Dead and the journal New Writing 
from the British context; and Dawson’s Creative Writing and the New Humanities 
and the journal TEXT from the Australian context. In terms of work coming out 
of Creative Writing I draw freely from these contexts, but in my analysis I am 
predominantly concerned with the British scene of Creative Writing. There are 
any number of comparisons and distinctions to be made across these zones – 
Jaillant shows both how American Creative Writing had a formative influence on 
its British counterpart and how the British university system necessitated major 
changes in how Creative Writing operates (352-6) – but broadly they are not so 
different as to make thoughts from one irrelevant to another. In this way, I hope 
that my analysis of specifically British institutional pressures – such as the 
Research Excellence Framework – has valence in other contexts. There has been, 
as far as I know, no truly thorough and rigorous work conducted on Creative 
Writing as a global scene of production; Harry Whitehead’s 2016 article ‘The 
Programmatic Era: Creative Writing as Cultural Imperialism’ shows us that this is 
important work which must look beyond the borders of the ‘Global North’ if it is 
to avoid inadvertent cultural imperialism (359). 
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Having outlined some exclusions, we might turn back to the argument presented 
above about the definition of Creative Writing, this time not for its content, but 
as a model for this thesis’s methodology. My opening position, that the workshop 
is broadly seen as Creative Writing’s key marker of differentiation, was drawn 
from four academics who write from or about Creative Writing: D. G. Myers, 
Michelene Wandor, Andrew Cowan, and Dianne Donnelly. Texts like theirs 
constitute what this thesis refers to as the meta-Creative Writing discourse; 
writing which is generated by Creative Writing, but which is about the discipline 
rather than being itself the creative product of the discipline. The production of 
this writing in large quantities is, even by the standards of Creative Writing in 
Britain, a relatively recent phenomenon: two major sources of it are the journals 
TEXT and New Writing, which were founded in 1997 and 2004 respectively, and a 
large number of meta-Creative Writing monographs and anthologies are put out 
by the British publishing house Multilingual Matters, which began its Creative 
Writing Studies list in 2007. Similar work has been published in lower 
concentrations by larger publishers including the Cambridge University Press 
and Routledge, as well as in various other (usually literary studies-oriented) 
journals. The usefulness of this work lies in the opportunity it provides to read 
across the positions, opinions and analyses of large numbers of people working in 
Creative Writing, allowing an analysis to be performed in which commonalities 
around the kinds of anxieties which Creative Writing experiences as a discipline 
may be identified. Each of the first three chapters begins with such an analysis. 
That those four examples of the meta-Creative Writing discourse were set 
against a single, fairly short critical-theoretical text, ‘Literary force: institutional 
values’, is also to be taken as indicative of my methodology. This thesis is, in part, 
undergirded by a belief that theory can engage in a mutually beneficial 
relationship with Creative Writing, but that the way to do that is not to attempt 
to overpower the meta-Creative Writing discourse with a more illustrious, more 
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canonical mass of theory. To merely draw connections wherein this Creative 
Writing thing is reminiscent of that theory thing is not a persuasive move for 
workers on either side of the divide when they each already have their own 
distinct methods of doing work. Instead, theory must be shown to have the 
capacity to deliver substantive and transformative insights into what Creative 
Writing is and what it does, just as it has for the literary criticism it developed 
alongside. Therefore, each of the first three chapters engages with one or two 
particular theoretical texts slowly, patiently, and at length, in attempt to arrive at 
a detailed and complex response to the anxieties identified in the analysis of the 
meta-Creative Writing discourse. 
Finally, my definition of Creative Writing ultimately consisted not of a 
concrete statement, in the style of Myers’ ‘two-backed thing’, but with a new 
understanding of why the question is difficult to answer. As we will see, the 
topics dealt with in this thesis are similarly not squared away: there is, each time, 
complication and nuancing of the issue, but if we are taking the meta-Creative 
Writing discourse as indicative of the discipline’s constitution, then it can only be 
through that discourse that full responses to the questions I raise here will arrive. 
As we will see, the anxieties found in the meta-Creative Writing discourse have, 
in important ways, antecedent representations within English, and the 
conversation about what English is and does is certainly not squared away. I, 
meanwhile, am not a Creative Writer: my disciplinary position, in training, in 
outlook, and in method, is critical and theoretical, and as such, my anxiety is to 
speak as far as I can, but no further, and I do so on three main issues. 
Chapter one concerns the issue of authorship. Beginning with some 
observations regarding Creative Writing’s proximity to English, and therefore to 
theory, it then finds in the meta-Creative Writing discourse a repeated move 
whereby (a) theory is represented in synecdoche by Roland Barthes’s essay ‘The 
Death of the Author’, and then (b) dealing with that essay is taken to be sufficient 
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Author’ in some detail, alongside Michel Foucault’s ‘What Is an author?’, in order 
to elaborate a theory of how authorship operates and why this operation might 
present a particular challenge to Creative Writing. Finally, it broadens this 
theorisation of authorship to include writers of criticism as a means to suggesting 
potential directions towards resolving Creative Writing’s author-anxiety. 
Chapter two is interested in the supplementary discourse, those texts which 
are written by Creative Writing students, usually for the purposes of summative 
assessment, and which have a relationship to their creative work, but which are 
not themselves creative. If this seems to be a somewhat round-about way of 
describing the chapter’s topic, it is only as a reflection of the chapter’s opening 
position, which reads the meta-Creative Writing discourse in order to identify 
the various instantiations of this text and the many, many names it goes by. The 
chapter then argues that the closest analogue for the supplementary discourse 
outside of Creative Writing is the preface to a literary work; Gerard Genette’s 
Paratexts and Jacques Derrida’s ‘Outwork’, which is the preface to his 
Dissemination, are introduced in order to think in detail about prefacing and 
supplementarity, leading to a theoretical clarification of the supplementary 
discourse’s status as a text. 
Chapter 3 turns to the idea of research as something potentially particularly 
vexing to Creative Writing in its apparent discordance with the idea of literature; 
the contemporary British academic is compelled, at various points, to justify their 
work as constituting research, leading to anxious questions along the lines of 
‘what knowledge does a novel contain?’. This chapter, therefore, puts alongside 
the meta-Creative Writing discourse on the topic a detailed analysis of Creative 
Writing submissions to REF2014, the most recent governmental research 
assessment exercise, in order to find out what work is being submitted as research 
and how it is framed as such. The chapter then turns to Derrida’s ‘Psyche: 
Invention of the Other’ as a way of turning this problem away from one of 
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knowledge towards one of invention, and thereby suggesting something about the 
peculiar dynamic of Creative Writing REF submissions. 
Each of these three chapters also features an ulterior argument that, as is 
shown when we try to define Creative Writing via Timothy Clark’s account of 
literary force, the relationship between Creative Writing and English is not 
simple, is not reducible to the kind of mutual antagonism which Dawson depicts. 
To observe the co-implication of these two disciplines is nothing new: one of the 
significant interventions made by Myers in The Elephants Teach is to locate a 
shared point of origin for them in the late-nineteenth century academic scene, in 
which the sudden and explosive growth of the university system made possible 
new and disruptive forms of research, scholarship, and teaching (15-34). My 
analysis, by contrast arriving at this co-implication via a theorisation of Creative 
Writing, suggests that the two disciplines must reckon with one another in 
principle, and not just due to the happenstance of shared histories. I therefore try 
to perform something of this reckoning in the fourth chapter, in which my 
methodology is substituted with a fragmentary form of writing which intends to 
erode any sense that I, as critic and theorist, have any analytical mastery over the 
discipline of Creative Writing, in a way which also provides an opportunity to 
think forward, beyond the limits of my own methodology. 
 
Confluence: a flowing-together, a meeting point, especially of two streams and/or 
rivers. Heraclitus notwithstanding, a river strikes me as a much more stable, 
identifiable thing than either English or Creative Writing, the streams of work 
which my title suggests are meeting. Arguments abound regarding the 
appropriate delimitations of the study of literature; standing on London Bridge, 
you can see no river but the Thames. 
The confluence itself, however, is much more difficult to locate. Where do 
two rivers begin to meet, and at what point along the watercourse can we say that 
they have now met? Does the confluence change shape with the strength of the 
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rivers’ flowing, growing when snow melts, shrinking in times of drought? Can we 
do anything but identify a convenient centre point and make a gesture towards 
its instability? 
A confluence is a chaotic thing, responsive to the changing of the seasons and 
the changing of the climate, forming at every moment an unrepeatable 
configuration of whirls and eddies. Tomorrow, under a new government, or an 
alternative academic paradigm, the anxiety of this particular confluence may 
show a fresh face; to restructure the funding of British universities on grounds 
other than centralised assessment, or to move the study of literature finally 
beyond what we today think of as theory, would change it in unknowable ways. 
The intention of this thesis, however, is to apply serious, extended thought to 
the confluence as it seems to exist today, in today’s university, through the loci 
within it which seem to garner and merit particular attention, Balkanising the 
disciplines at hand only to the extent that it helps us to understand their 
interaction, and then creating space for a cross-disciplinary thinking, in a way 
which has not been done before. 
We will begin, however, with an afterword. 
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Chapter 0: Afterword 
0.1: Making Trouble 
The paperback edition of Nicholas Royle’s first novel, Quilt (2010), announces on 
the back cover that the volume also contains an ‘AFTERWORD: Author essay 
‘Reality Literature’’. This afterword begins self-reflexively, observing that there is 
‘at once something comforting and strange’ about afterwords before qualifying 
this by saying that 
A number of questions nonetheless linger and complicate this enterprise. 
Does the afterword truly come after the novel or before, especially given 
its apparent concern with why or how the work came to be written? Is 
the author of the afterword simply the same as the author of the novel? 
What happens if he begins by solemnly declaring that he is not? (I hereby 
promise: I am not.) What happens if he starts talking or writing like one 
of the characters or narrators in the book and gradually convinces us 
that this is in fact who he is? Or if he steadily persuades us that he (or 
she) is a quite new and different being, but no more or less real than 
anyone we encountered in the preceding pages? Are we so sure, after all, 
that what we were reading was a novel? And is it so certain that the 
afterword is not a peculiar continuation of it? (152) 
This barrage of questions ultimately proves to be Royle’s way into the 
announcement of a project: ‘the strangeness of the afterword as a genre’, it turns 
out, ‘might even seek to inaugurate a new kind of writing and give it a name: 
reality literature’ (153). From this point forward the afterword drops the question 
of its own genre and attempts to perform that inauguration, but a lot is raised in 
the two pages it spends coming to this point. Of course, while Quilt is Royle’s first 
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novel, it is not his first book: he is the co-author (with Andrew Bennett) of two 
undergraduate introductions to literary theory and criticism and the author of a 
prominent monograph on the theory of the uncanny, among other things, but the 
novel form constitutes new territory. It is then unsurprising that in writing an 
afterword (which carries, according to ‘Reality Literature’, the ‘expectation of a 
certain earnestness and authenticity’) he begins by exercising concerns which are, 
broadly speaking, theoretical (153). 
A range of issues is raised in this paragraph of seven questions and the page-
and-a-half of discussion which follows it, all of which derive from the simple fact 
that Quilt by Nicholas Royle is being followed (in the now of the reader’s reading) 
by ‘Reality Literature’ by Nicholas Royle. First there is a problem of temporality. 
He observes that in the eighteenth century novels were typically accompanied by 
prefaces rather than afterwords and that we now ‘tend to take the playfulness of 
such prefaces for granted’, whereas in the modern preference for afterwords the 
‘potential of a preface to mislead the reader is dispatched; the afterword seems a 
more restrained, less worrying genre’ (152-3). Of course, the key word here is 
‘seems’, and Royle is here questioning whether the afterword really comes after 
the novel given that it discusses things – the whys and hows of writing – which 
seem like they might come chronologically prior to the writing of the text. For 
both the preface and the afterword, the chronological relationship between it and 
the text might not necessarily correspond to the chronological relationship 
between a person’s writing of a text and the point at which they explicate that 
writing. 
By the same note, the apparent unplayfulness of the afterword is also queried. 
The eighteenth century preface is now taken as playful insofar as nobody today 
would take its truth-claims at face value – any assertion regarding the factuality 
of the ensuing novel is taken as a transparently fictional conceit. Royle suggests 
that the afterword is interpreted in a precisely inverse manner: in addition to 
coming at the end rather than at the beginning, any truth-claims it might make 
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(for instance, regarding the circumstances of, manner of and reasons for the 
novel’s composition) are by default taken at face value. However, there is no 
necessary reason for the afterword to behave in this way, and such assumptions 
about its sincerity suggest only that ‘we have not yet really begun to think about 
the strangeness of the afterword as a genre […] a quite crazy thing in which 
anything could happen’ (153). This, then, is the second issue being raised: if we 
know that these two adjacent texts were written by the same hand, why should 
we take one as reliably fictional and the other as reliably factual? 
The third issue might be developed from this by underlining the phrase ‘by 
the same hand’. Whilst the note on the back of the book assures us that ‘Reality 
Literature’ is an ‘Author essay’, the author of the essay himself does not seem so 
sure. The bracketed performative regarding whether or not the author of the 
essay is the same as that of the novel – ‘(I hereby promise: I am not)’ – raises the 
possibility that there is some difference between the figure to whom a reader 
ascribes the origin of the text and the person who gets the royalty checks in the 
mail. In this case the latter person is, for both of these texts, Nicholas Royle, but 
the afterword seems to claim an origin distinct from that of the novel. This 
difference is not fully elucidated – this section is, after all, only a few hundred 
words long – and the very act of making a promise in the first-person which 
assures us that the very first-person seemingly making the promise is not who we 
think it is is loaded with irony. Even so, the suggestion of an afterword written in 
the voice of a character while still being signed by the author briefly sketches out 
one possible way in which such a difference could work. In fact, the potential for 
a difference in the origin still holds if the afterword is not written in a fictional 
voice – when indicated by a promise, perhaps, or even when not indicated at all. 
Placing this kind of question mark over the author would have the effect of 
destabilising our relationship not only with the afterword but also (in terms of its 
fictionality) our relationship with the novel itself: this apparently factual text 
written in what turns out to be a fictional voice might conversely imply that the 
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voice being imported from the novel is itself only apparently fictional, and so 
querying the origin of one must also query the origin of the other. This 
problematisation corresponds with the type of writing Royle calls reality 
literature: that is, literature which exists not as a discrete artistic object but 
something which aims to ‘make trouble in and with’ the language we use on a daily 
basis (155). Between them, these issues raised by Royle’s ‘Author essay’ form a 
matrix in which the stuff of this thesis might be found.  
The literary-theoretical base camp for this kind of thinking about the author 
– and the one theoretical text Royle makes reference to – is Roland Barthes’s ‘The 
Death of the Author’. The afterword’s treatment of Barthes’s endlessly referenced 
1967 essay plays on a suggestion that there is a popular scepticism about ‘The 
Death of the Author’ and its ramifications: ‘we like to suppose the author 
recovered. False alarm, folks – and, if you want evidence of the author’s vitality 
and genuineness, one of the first places to look is the afterword to the novel!’ 
(153). Of course, the strangeness of the genre of the afterword which ‘Reality 
Literature’ tries to convince us of would also suggest that things are not quite as 
settled as all that. Even while he is ventriloquising this light-hearted dismissal of 
Barthes, Royle is providing us with all of the prompting we could need to reply 
which author’s vitality? and what kind of genuineness? and should we really be looking at 
the afterword first? One common response to ‘The Death of the Author’ is to assert 
that the very fact that a text exists means it must have some kind of source, and so 
the very concept which Barthes’s essay works to introduce is a complete non-
starter. We will come onto this debate in more detail later, but what the opening 
pages of ‘Reality Literature’ suggest is that turning to the afterword (and, by 
extension, any other peripheral output from an author such as essays and 
interviews) as evidence of the author’s vitality is really no better than just turning 
to the work itself, and that turning to such peripheral output might in fact 
confirm that there is something non-simple about our idea of the author. Either 
way, problems of authorship remain. 
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Even so, there is no definite stance on those problems to be found in ‘Reality 
Literature’. Here, where the theoretical problems of authorship would seem to be 
at their very keenest – in an afterword written by a theorist who has also just 
entered the category of literary author – Royle instead chooses to let the 
problems and possibilities float. He suggests that an afterword might ‘go 
anywhere’ or ‘turn out to be longer than the work preceding it’, but in ‘inaugurat[ing] 
a new kind of writing’ his afterword has its own agenda, and so turns out to be 
very much shorter than the novel, and going to a very specific place (153). 
Likewise, it does not turn out to be written by one of his characters, or written in 
any obvious way in some unexpected voice. What it does turn out to do is remind 
us that this book is not, in any straightforward way, an inauguration for Royle at 
all. While Quilt is his first novel, the playful qualities of its afterword reciprocate 
the style of writing found in The uncanny. There, a work which is framed as an 
academic monograph – its blurb proclaiming that this ‘is the first book-length 
study of the uncanny’ – turns out to be something which seems to want to ‘go 
anywhere’. By stretching the possibilities of bullet points, by enclosing sections of 
text in the outlines of coffins, by renaming certain notes sections ‘Closing 
Credits’ and ‘Side Tunnels’, by taking as his subject for one chapter a novelist who 
is also called Nicholas Royle, The uncanny arrives at something like an uncanny 
resemblance to academic writing (112-32, 155-7, 82, 252, 187-202). Against the idea 
of an afterword which is longer than the work preceding it, here is a monograph 
featuring a chapter which is easily excerptible in its entirety: 
– Did you say something? 
– I heard a voice. 
– In your head? 
– No, in yours. (107) 
The fact that ‘Reality Literature’ has a stylistic precedent in The uncanny as 
well as a chronological precedent in novel portion of Quilt does little, however, to 
dispel its difficulties. The uncanny is, for all its disruption of the genre, a work of 
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criticism, and as such it proceeds always via readings of texts: using small black 
stars in place of bullet points speaks to the Research Assessment Exercise’s notion 
of research as ‘starred items’; coffins enclose readings of ‘a literary preoccupation 
with being buried alive’ from Chaucer to Beckett (112, 155). In Quilt the difference 
is immediately obvious: the textual origin of this critical work is by the same 
writer as that work, and bound in the same volume, and this strange collocation 
also drives what Royle says in the afterword, even after it drops the question of its 
own genre. A two-page discussion of the role of the telephone in literature, for 
instance, which takes in the work of Frank O’Hara, Shakespeare, and Lewis 
Carroll, ends with two paragraphs of one short sentence each: 
When do you get the call? 
These things happen from time to time. (157) 
The first sentence here refers to the first sentence of the novel, in which a 
telephone rings, and the second is the novel’s first line of dialogue. As such, they 
suddenly disrupt the relatively ‘safe’ feeling of criticism which the preceding two 
pages provided: we are now made aware that all of this telephone-talk returns the 
body of the novel back to us, to be further explicated or understood in a new way 
or, possibly, to be understood for a first time. Of course, authors writing about 
their own work is nothing original (this is, after all, an afterword), but here we 
have a critic and theorist bringing the manner of his acclaimed academic work to 
bear on his own text. What does it mean for a critical writer to write about their 
own creative writing under such an academic aegis, and what is the relationship – 
chronological or otherwise – between the various creative and non-creative works 
that are thus produced? 
Finally, then, the issues raised at the beginning of the afterword are kept 
present, and in a potentially more troubling way, by the afterword’s performative 
quality. Whereas an obviously signalled deviation such as the use of a character’s 
voice would at least give the reader an interpretive toehold, performativity makes 
29 
 
this afterword strange without giving much away: in a manner akin to the phrase 
‘I hereby promise: I am not’, the afterword as a whole is made ironic, ambiguous, 
problematic by its intersecting with the preceding novel. Having recalled to the 
reader the line ‘These things happen from time to time.’, the essay closes with ‘a 
final parenthetical pouch’ which discusses the title of the book – which is ‘perhaps 
the true afterword here’ despite being the text’s absolute first word. Dipping back 
into the punning, linguistic texture of the text of the novel, this ‘pouch’ discusses 
the title’s ‘meanings, associations and sounds (quilt, quill, will, kill, ill, kilt, wilt, quit, 
it)’ – one might add that in all of these there is also an I which may or may not 
correspond to the author – before, finally, it asks us to ‘turn and begin again, this 
time without stopping: In the middle of the night the phone rings, over and 
over…’, thereby returning us to the opening line of the novel (159, 3).  
In this way, problems of fictionality, problems of supplementarity, problems 
of authorship float through the afterword, rubbing up against a drily-raised idea 
of the novel as ‘a mere product’ of either ‘the creative writing workshop’ or ‘the 
inexorable machine of the publishing industry’. When it announces a new genre, 
‘Reality Literature’ turns out to be, as well as an afterword and an ‘Author essay’, 
something of a manifesto. Every manifesto must have some notion to set itself 
against: here it is the novel as ‘part of the ubiquitous programme’, only acceptable 
‘so long as it doesn’t interfere with the running of the programme […] so long as it 
passes through without making any real trouble in and with language’. The 
programme, as is in the television programme which floats into our homes on 
unerring radio waves whether we want it to or not. The programme, as in the 
computer program composed of instructions which permit the operation of 
silicon just so and in no other way. The programme, as in the Creative Writing 
programme, the programme of Mark McGurl’s The Program Era, the programme 
delineating methods and modes of creative composition to travel along or aspire 
towards. From Bennett and Royle’s An Introduction to Literature, Criticism and 
Theory: ‘Look at me, come and write literature here, come and experience the 
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literary, it’ll be fun! This way to the creative writing class!’ (88). The programme 
which tells of what will happen before it has happened, as though it were possible 
to preordain an experience, the programme which through its power of managing 
expectations very often does preordain an experience – at the theatre, at a concert, 
at a funeral. 
Is a Creative Writing programme programmatic? Here I will not take up the 
obvious problem which this question implies, which is one of the relative quality 
or dullness of work which enters the world precisely when it is peeled out of 
Creative Writing’s mould; that question has taken up before, explicitly by 
McGurl, but also by Michelene Wandor, and by D. G. Myers, and by, at some 
level of subtlety or another, much of what is written about Creative Writing. I am 
interested in Creative Writing as a discipline, with all the qualities of discourse, 
praxis and activity that word can imply, and not as appellation, origin, or 
symptom of some body of literary work. Even while Quilt tries to make trouble in 
and with language, its afterword tries to make trouble in and with our idea of 
creatively written books. Perhaps there is also, then, an implication that, along 
with the afterword as a genre, there is a zone in which Creative Writing itself is 
unexamined – specifically that, in its failure to make trouble, Creative Writing 
itself has a strangeness which is ‘effectively neutralised’ and ignored (154). 
There is, in truth, a degree of hubris in Quilt’s afterword in that, as this thesis 
will demonstrate, there is an extensive literature examining Creative Writing as a 
discipline and as a phenomenon which it chooses not to respond to. Nonetheless, 
in its serious play, in its performative dislocation of expectation, in the stream of 
questions which seem to emit from the slight gap between it and Quilt itself, it 
efficiently sets in motion the conversations which this thesis will trace, even as 
‘Reality Literature’ steps ahead of them and invents something new. 
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Chapter 1: The Creative Writing Author 
1.1: A subheading involving some kind of pun referring to ‘The Death of 
the Author’ 
Nicholas Royle is (to simplistically employ the very kind of formulation which 
‘Reality Literature’ queries) an academic who has turned his hand to writing 
literature, and one who has done so in an institutional context – the University of 
Sussex – with a vigorous culture of Creative Writing. While this might not be an 
uncommon occurrence, there is a greater and growing number of people either 
making the movement in the other direction, or else establishing themselves from 
the outset as residents of both camps. The discipline of Creative Writing is an 
academic subject which, while it has been present in the academy in one way or 
another since at least the second half of the twentieth century, has emerged in the 
last decade or two as a significant growth area within the field of English Studies. 
In the UK this growth has been marked by The Quality Assurance Agency for 
Higher Education in its 2007 ‘Subject Benchmark Statement: English’, which says 
that ‘The marked increase in the number of creative writing courses, strands, and 
modules since the original subject benchmark statement was published [in 2000] 
provides an excellent example of the vitality of English and its related disciplines’ 
(2). A look through the prospectuses of the UK’s top fifty universities according 
to the 2018 Guardian university league tables will reveal that forty-six of them 
offer either credited modules or whole degree courses in Creative Writing, and 
that thirty-nine of those place Creative Writing in the same school or department 
as English. In the introduction to Key Issues in Creative Writing, published in 2013, 
Diane Donnelly and Graeme Harper report that ‘79 undergraduate and graduate 
creative writing programs recorded [in the US] in 1975 pale in comparison to the 
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reported present figure of 813 […] tens of thousands of students enter and 
graduate from the programs each year […] what began as a ‘single, experimental 
course’ in the UK, has developed ‘in the space of 40 years to 139 institutions’’ (xiii). 
In ‘The Rise of Creative Writing’ (2018), Andrew Cowan surveys statistics on 
Creative Writing’s growth from a number of sources before identifying as the 
starkest data the fact that ‘in ten years in the UK the number of HEI’s offering 
BA courses (in a variety of combinations) rose from 24 to 83, while the number of 
MA courses rose from 21 to 200, and the number of PhD programmes from 19 to 
more than 50’.  
One could continue listing evidence for the rise and rise of Creative Writing 
for some time, but it seems reasonable to take it as read that the subject is now a 
core component of the modern English department which attracts funding, 
publishes work and teaches students. More interesting than what this evidence 
shows, however, is what it does not address. Creative Writing is now part of the 
academy, but we might ask in what manner it is part of the academy, given that 
this influx, if we may call it that, is coming into contact and interacting with an 
already well-established field of study. A much fuller account of the growth of 
Creative Writing in the American academy (it is a complex and convoluted 
history) is given in D. G. Myers’ book The Elephants Teach (2006). The title of the 
book comes from a possibly apocryphal anecdote in which, upon hearing that 
Vladimir Nabokov was to be appointed as a Professor of English at Harvard 
University, Roman Jakobson replied ‘What’s next? Shall we appoint elephants to 
teach zoology?’ (vi). Whether or not the story is true, the stance it displays is clear: 
before Creative Writing, novelists and poets were the subjects of a study, not the 
studiers of a subject. Of course, this is not entirely true: plenty of those subjects of 
study – Edgar Allan Poe; E. M. Forster; Eliots both George and T. S.; Nabokov 
himself – could fairly be described as conscious studiers of the subject, but the 
implication of Jakobson’s response here is that the academic subject of English 
writes about literature, but does not write it. 
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As a phrase, ‘the elephants teach’ neatly encapsulates a shift which occurs 
when we consider removing the preposition about: it marks the collapse of an 
ontological differentiation between the subject and the object of study. Even 
where academic critics of literature have also written it, activity in the academy 
has historically been one of writing-about, whilst the writing-of has been an 
extra-academic affair which has taken place (for at least as long as English has 
existed as an academic subject) primarily in the context of the commercial 
publishing industry. This industry and Creative Writing are raised in ‘Reality 
Literature’ as the contexts in which literary production typically occurs, and in 
these three zones (academic writing, Creative Writing, and publishing) we might 
see a kind of schema for both the move which Royle makes by choosing to write a 
novel and the inverse one which those in the field of Creative Writing make. If 
academia and literary publishing are typically distinct institutional contexts, then 
Creative Writing is a potentially awkward middle ground between them in which 
there is always a but also. Whether that is thought of as ‘literary author but also 
academic’ or ‘academic but also literary author’, a situation is created in which 
practice and study coincide and, as with Royle’s afterword, it may become 
unclear which comes first. 
More importantly, at least for my concerns in this chapter, it also raises a 
potential question around the identity of the author in each aspect. Again we can 
paraphrase ‘Reality Literature’: is the author of the academic paper simply the 
same as the author of the novel? What happens if he begins by solemnly declaring 
that he is? And what difference does it make when, as is often the case for 
students of Creative Writing, the academic and literary work is bound together 
in the same document with one referring to the other, like a novel and its 
afterword? All of this production, whether academic or artistic, is textual, and in 
this way Creative Writing might be distinguished from other professional artistic 
training: a visual artist’s exegesis on their own work at least holds the comfort of 
arriving in a different medium. Perhaps even worse, what difference does it make 
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to our idea of the author when a single text is positioned as both academic and 
literary output? Jeri Kroll’s article ‘Uneasy Bedfellows’, published in TEXT in 1999, 
suggests that at an undergraduate level it is common for ‘the creative product [to 
be] weighted at 60% and the critical 40%’ whilst higher levels of study are likely to 
be weighted more heavily towards the creative portion, which suggests that rather 
more than half of Creative Writing students’ academic output is in a literary 
mode. In the context of our current concerns regarding the nature of the author 
in Creative Writing, this state of affairs raises certain questions. How does this 
hybrid author fit into the traditional models which establish a gap between 
production and reception? And what kind of author are they? One way of 
approaching this is to look at the way in which Creative Writing academics have 
adapted or worked with or responded to literary theory. 
In order to do this, we can draw on the extensive and growing body of 
academic material which has emerged alongside Creative Writing’s establishment 
of itself as an institutionalised, self-reflective, and increasingly mature discipline: 
the two major journals of Creative Writing, TEXT and New Writing, and 
monographs and essay collections from various publishers, most notably 
Routledge and the Creative Writing-centric New Writing Viewpoints series. In 
looking for points where this work touches literary theory, the immediate 
conclusion is that Barthes’s ‘The Death of the Author’ looms extremely large. One 
can spread a wide net in the sea of meta-Creative Writing discourse and come up 
with rather more references to Barthes, largely regarding ‘The Death of the 
Author’, than to any other theorist. 
This pattern seems to have been instituted, in fact, before Creative Writing 
even came close to the current condition in which it enjoys its own, bespoke 
meta-discourse. In the British context, the discipline arguably arose as a 
phenomenon contemporaneously with the so-called ‘Theory Wars’: certainly the 
predominant (though not entirely accurate) narrative is one in which Creative 
Writing was born in 1970, at the University of East Anglia, under the inspiration 
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and guidance of Malcolm Bradbury (Jaillant 350). In his introduction to Class 
Work (1995), an anthology of short stories published to commemorate twenty-five 
years of Creative Writing at UEA, Bradbury repeats this time and place as being 
the genesis of British Creative Writing and outlines some of what it was that he 
and fellow UEA academic Angus Wilson were responding to in their decision to 
establish the MA course. Alongside factors such as the decline of the literary 
magazine and the widely-announced ‘Death of the Novel’ was the fact that to him 
and Wilson, who were ‘both novelists as well as teachers of literature, it seemed 
somewhat strange for us to be announcing the Death of the Author in the 
classroom, then going straight back home to be one’ (vii-viii). He also describes 
how ‘criticism, stimulated by the new thoughts of France, was undergoing a vivid 
resurrection, emerging in the new guise of Literary Theory’, before naming 
Roland Barthes and Marshall McLuhan, seemingly as representative examples of 
the trend. 
This observation of a disjunct between ‘The Death of the Author’ and the 
clear existence of very much not dead authors is repeated when Jeri Kroll argues 
in ‘The Exegesis and the Gentle Reader/Writer’ (2004) that it is theory which has, 
more than anything else, abrogated the author’s ‘authority to speak for their 
artform as well as for themselves’, and for her argument it is this essay (along with 
Barthes’s ‘Writers, Intellectuals, Teachers’) to which she turns, without 
mentioning any other theorist. While the latter essay is presented as a neutral 
exposition of those three categories, which Kroll suggests are simultaneously 
inhabited by the Creative Writer, ‘The Death of the Author’ is presented as the 
origin of an ultimately malign force which ‘excludes authors’ and drives Creative 
Writers to seek ‘sanctuary’. Another essay by Kroll is actually called ‘The 
Resurrected Author’ (2004) and similarly employs Barthes’s essay in terms of its 
role in making Creative Writers seek sanctuary in the critical portions of their 
work, whilst briefly also mentioning ‘What Is an Author?’, Michel Foucault’s 1969 
response to Barthes. Likewise, Michelene Wandor’s 2008 monograph on Creative 
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Writing is called The Author is not Dead, Merely Somewhere Else. In this book she 
attacks Barthes’s ideas (along with those of other, sympathetic theorists) as 
‘ridiculously manipulative’ in their de-emphasisation of the role of authors in the 
creation of literary work (164). When arguing that ‘cohort-based supervision 
further dislodges our idea of the unified author’, Stuart Glover reaches out to 
‘Barthes’ enunciation of the death of the author and Foucault’s elaboration of the 
author function’, finding in them an ally for the ‘critique of Romantic discourses 
of literary production’ which is implicit in ‘group processes of review, discussion, 
commentary and revision’ (134). ‘The Death of the Author’ is also the sole citation 
Robert Miles employs when discussing how ‘creative writing finds itself 
paradoxically situated in relation to contemporary theory’ (35). 
Whilst Annette Comte’s essay ‘Hyperfiction: A New Literary Poetics?’ (2001) 
refers to a number of theorists, she opens her argument by saying that the idea of 
‘a fixed immutable message, the author’s, has been losing favour since Roland 
Barthes’ ‘Death of the Author’ and Derrida’s dichotomous oppositions of 
‘différance’’, thereby positioning these as the origins of a theoretical consensus 
which hypertextual writing particularly responds to. In ‘The Robust Imagination’ 
(2006) Enza Gandolfo also covers various thinkers other than Barthes, but only 
after first feeling the need to disclaim that ‘Barthes’ announcement of the death of 
the author […] is not one I want to take up here’; that Gandolfo feels the need to 
explicitly put Barthes to one side in this way demonstrates the insistency with 
which his essay makes its influence felt within Creative Writing. Mike Harris 
follows a combative line in his essay ‘‘Shakespeare Was More Creative When He 
Was Dead’: Is Creativity Theory a Better Fit On Creative Writing Than Literary 
Theory?’ (2011), which follows its titular reference to Barthes by dismissing his 
‘celebrated (if silly) announcement of the author’s ‘death’’ as part of a broad 
project to entirely eliminate the role of the writer and install a ‘Readerist’ theory 
of literature (173). Here, ‘The Death of the Author’ is presented at the midpoint of 
a line of thought stretching from ‘the ‘New Criticism’ of the 1940s, 50s and 60s’ to 
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J. Hillis Miller, thinking to which Harris responds with a blunt ‘Reading isn’t 
writing’ (173). Creative Writing’s impulsive identification of theory with Barthes 
is parodied in Paul William’s fictocritical piece ‘The Absence of Theory’ (2012), 
where a Creative Writing tutor’s discussion of the authorial ‘I’ is interrupted by a 
student: ‘This is theory, isn’t it? […] This ‘‘I’’ and ‘‘cultural perspective’’ and ‘‘author 
is dead’’ business. Barthes. Derrida. That stuff.’ (221). The list could go on. 
So there are occasional theoretical notes being struck beyond ‘The Death of 
the Author’. A little Foucault or Derrida, or maybe other texts from Barthes, are 
not so uncommon, while Mike Harris, for one, reaches out to the creativity 
theory of Mihaly Csikszentmihayli. But with occasional exceptions – Milly 
Epstein-Jannai, for instance, brings a diverse crowd of theorists into an article 
about automatic writing while avoiding ‘The Death of the Author’ (2010) – the 
idea of the death of the author is omnipresent, and its dominance in Creative 
Writing discourse which approaches theory seems fairly evident. To ask why this 
might be the case is to ask a complicated question. One aspect of the answer 
might simply be that Creative Writing academia, when it engages with theory at 
all, tends to engage with a relatively well-known and apparently digestible 
instance of it; Gayatri Spivak refers to ‘The Death of the Author’ as an essay so 
well circulated that its contents have turned ‘metropolitan aphorism’ (104). This 
would be to view ‘The Death of the Author’ as a kind of synecdochic statement 
standing in for the genre of theory as a whole, where to reference it is to pay lip 
service to an established body of work. But, putting aside any slight against 
Creative Writing this might constitute, it seems that there must be more to it 
than that, for there is no obvious reason why the lip service would so consistently 
be performed via one text. If the academic merely wishes to make some brief 
reference to theory, that reference could just as easily be Derrida’s ‘différance’ or 
Stanley Fish’s reader-response theory or Deleuze and Guattari’s rhizome or 
whatever. What might it be about the death of the author specifically? 
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A further thought might be that there is something especially needling about 
an essay which appears to be calling for the personal deaths of authors who are 
now a part of the academy, which seems to be the stance taken by Harris and the 
one implied by the title of The Author is not Dead, Merely Somewhere Else. However, 
I would like to suggest that there might be a deeper reason for this fascination 
which is mirrored in ‘Reality Literature’, a reason stemming from the fact that 
crossing the wires of literary production and literary criticism does something 
strange to our sense of what it is to be an author. When a writer transgresses the 
boundary between literary and academic production they threaten to collapse any 
sense of ontological distinction between the-writing-of and writing-about 
literature, and insofar as these are different kinds of writing produced by 
different kinds of writer, one of the central tensions or anxieties produced by this 
transgression is around the status of the author and the idea of authorship. When 
Creative Writing approaches theory, therefore, the most insightful or inciteful 
material is that which pertains to the question of authorship. 
Of course, the history of the question of authorship goes back rather further 
than mid-twentieth century literary theory. In his 2005 monograph on the 
subject, The Author, Andrew Bennett asks ‘Who was the first author in the 
Western or European tradition? Was it Homer or Hesiod (both living in c.700BC, 
if they really existed)[?]’, before sketching out a line of potential answers through 
Pindar, Virgil and Petrarch, and discussing ancient Greek theories of authorship 
(29, 31-38). However, his book does not begin here: after an introduction which 
draws on the 1999 film Shakespeare in Love, the opening chapter discusses ‘The 
Death of the Author’. Likewise, the introduction to the anthology What is an 
author?, edited by Maurice Biriotti and Nicola Miller, argues that there is ‘nothing 
new in the idea of the disappearance of the author’, citing Biblical scholarship for 
its lack of dependence on ‘a monolithic authorial source of meaning’, but 
nonetheless begins with the sentence ‘Roland Barthes announced the ‘Death of 
the Author’ in 1968’ (1-2). In this way, Barthes’s essay constitutes a kind of ground 
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zero for the modern debate about the author. Authorship is today a 
fundamentally theoretical issue: regardless of whether Creative Writing sees 
literary theory (like Comte) as an ally or (like Wandor) as an enemy, one cannot 
speak on a topic like the author, in the university, amongst English academics, 
and feign unawareness of theory. If ‘The Death of the Author’ really has become a 
metropolitan aphorism, it has done so by enjoying a perpetually current position 
in the conversation. 
In which case, is there anything particularly wrong with Creative Writing’s 
theoretical monomania? Is to focus on ‘The Death of the Author’ not to strike at 
the heart of the debate rather than skirt around it? Are there better ways of 
interrogating the issue of authorship in Creative Writing? To answer this, we 
must ask questions about what Barthes’s essay actually is, what the essay actually 
says, and how the essay is utilised in Creative Writing. 
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1.2: Synecdoche twice over 
Before discussing what ‘The Death of the Author’ actually is, it is worth saying 
that it might be almost easier to state what it is not. In ‘1967: The Birth of “The 
Death of the Author”’ (published in 2013 with yet another title which puns on 
Barthes’s) John Logie helpfully clears up a number of misapprehensions about the 
text. For one thing it was not, contrary to popular belief, published in 1968: first 
appearing in the American avant-garde magazine Aspen: the magazine in a box in 
1967, it also handily predates the events of May 1968 to which the essay is often 
connected (see Burke 20). This also means that, perhaps uniquely in Barthes’s 
bibliography, the essay’s first publication was not in French; Logie argues that 
‘Despite the misplaced emphasis on the 1968 French publication date, the urtext 
is, in this case, the English text. [Richard] Howard’s translation of Barthes in 
Aspen 5+6 is–unequivocally–primary. In terms of “The Death” in publication, 
Barthes’s own French text is both chronologically and contextually secondary.’ 
(510). It is partly on this basis that Logie argues that the best version of the essay 
to read, study and teach is not the later translations in The Rustle of Language or 
Image-Music-Text, or even the French version, but the original English translation 
as reproduced, along with the rest of the contents of Aspen 5+6, on UbuWeb. 
Of course, in suggesting the primacy of the initial English publication Logie is 
implicitly raising a whole raft of questions around authorship and translation, the 
implications of which are both numerous and, in the present context, besides the 
point. However, even if we put questions of chronology and language to one side, 
the context of the essay’s initial publication is significant. Aspen was not an 
academic journal but an avant-garde art magazine; other contributors to issue 5+6 
included William Burroughs, John Cage and Marcel Duchamp, whilst other issues 
featured input from John Lennon, Andy Warhol and Timothy Leary. That this 
was not quite a typical academic milieu is made more significant by the fact that, 
according to Gwen Allen, ‘The Death of the Author’ was ‘Commissioned 
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specifically for Aspen 5+6 [and] must be understood as a deeply site-specific piece 
of writing, informed by and meant to be read alongside visual art, music, 
performances, and texts’ (qtd. in Logie 502). Commissioned to be placed within a 
collection of avant-garde artwork, it seems reasonable to suggest a further 
negative: ‘The Death of the Author’ is (maybe) not even a theoretical text in any 
strict sense. As Logie has it, it was never the academic essay it is often presented 
as – it ‘was an essay, to be sure, but one calibrated to the specific context and 
artistic culture that Aspen cultivated over the course of its preceding four issues’ 
(509). 
Returning to the actual text of ‘The Death of the Author’ can confirm that 
impression. It is less than two-and-a-half-thousand words long, split over seven 
paragraphs, each divided from the next (if UbuWeb’s rendering is to be believed) 
by three dots. The essay was published in a pamphlet with two other essays on 
unrelated topics: a similarly short piece by George Kubler and a rather longer one 
by Susan Sontag. Within the essay the paragraphs themselves are sufficiently brief 
and self-contained that one might reasonably be excerpted in its entirety, with 
the dots marking clear a disjunct between the paragraphs in a way which 
reprinted versions such as that in The Rustle of Language fail to do. Several things 
might be adduced from this scholarly excursion. First, the marked tendency in the 
meta-Creative Writing discourse is to use the synecdoche of ‘The Death of the 
Author’ to stand in for an abstract ‘theory’, and so to juxtapose this with a lived, 
existentially attested-to ‘practice’. To consider the circumstances of the writing 
and publication of Barthes’s essay calls that tendency into question; this is a text 
with a material history, a specificity of time and place and production – the 
result, in short, of practice. Second, and relatedly, it invites us to consider the text 
of the essay itself not simply as a purveyor of ideas, but as writing, which 
therefore needs to be understood not only in terms of its ‘content’ but also in 
relation to its performance and the workings of its style. 
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It is worth briefly outlining the concerns of each of these seven paragraphs in 
order to bring the essay, and not just its title, more fully into view. In the first 
paragraph Barthes discusses a quotation from Balzac’s Sarrasine, which he would 
later analyse with at length in 1970’s S/Z, and asks of it ‘Who is speaking in this 
way?’. This opens the question of authorship and voice, to which question Barthes 
replies that ‘writing is itself this special voice, consisting of several indiscernible 
voices’. The second paragraph is a potted history of the ‘modern figure’ of the 
author, moving from what Barthes casually calls ‘primitive societies’, through the 
invention of the author in ‘English empiricism, French rationalism and the 
personal faith of the Reformation’, to the contemporary magazines, manuals and 
monographs where the ‘author still rules’. The third suggests a rough chronology 
of anti-authorial sentiments in Mallarmé, Valéry, Proust, Surrealism and 
linguistics and, although a little longer, it shares with the previous paragraph an 
absence of evidence or argument to underpin its historical outlook; instead, 
Barthes merely presents it as ‘doubtless’ that Mallarme originated this anti-
authorial sentiment, that Valery ‘unceasingly questioned and mocked the Author’, 
and it ‘is clear that Proust himself’ picked up this line of thought. The fourth 
establishes a relationship between the absence of the Author and a new 
conception of literary chronology which ‘utterly transforms the modern text’ by 
replacing a ‘a before and an after’ in which ‘the Author is supposed to feed the 
book’ with a situation where ‘the modern writer (scriptor) is born simultaneously 
with his text’. The fifth paragraph features some of the more popular quotations 
from the essay – ‘the “message” of the Author-God’, ‘the text is a tissue of 
citations’ – in a passage which touches on ideas around intertextuality which 
might be traced in contemporary work by others (Hird 296-7). The sixth discusses 
the relationship between the Author and the critic, arguing that, as the figure of 
the Author implies that the text might have a stable meaning, it functions as a 
boon to critics who make it their work to uncover that meaning, suggesting that 
there is a degree of complicity between critics and the Author-figure. Finally, the 
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seventh returns to the Balzac quotation and links it to the ‘constitutively 
ambiguous nature of Greek tragedy’ where multiple meanings are allowed to 
stand, before concluding with a proclamation that ‘the birth of the reader must 
be ransomed by the death of the Author’. 
To run through a précis of the essay’s contents in this manner underlines the 
fact that this is not an essay with a strong core argumentative line running 
through it. Rather, Barthes chops and skips through various ideas which together 
form a kind of constellation orbiting around his concerns regarding the idea of 
the author. This lack of a single, well-elaborated theoretical argument perhaps 
explains why Creative Writing typically takes a fairly light touch when engaging 
with the essay. For instance, despite referencing Barthes in the title, Kroll’s essay 
‘The Resurrected Author’ makes only a few references to his actual text, stating 
early on that Barthes ‘announced that authors were dead, or irrelevant, which is 
the same thing in cultural terms’ (which misses the essay’s future tense), then 
quoting a little from paragraph five, then asking of Creative Writing students 
‘How do they conceive of themselves as authors if their position has slipped away 
in Barthesian terms?’ (90, 96). Whilst the last one is actually a rather good 
question, this does not constitute sustained engagement as it is typically 
understood. Elsewhere, Michelene Wandor claims that ‘the central contradiction 
in Barthes’ thesis’ is that the author’s ‘necessary presence was reaffirmed by the 
very theory which sought to abolish him/her’, essentially on the basis that the 
existence of the theoretical text implicates an originating author, and later refers 
to ‘Barthes’ disingenuous intellectual embroidery which plays with the idea of no 
text at all’ (160, 188). This kind of criticism pulls even further back than Kroll, 
working essentially with the title of (or one might even think of it as the meme 
of) ‘The Death of the Author’. Of course, such issues are easy to resolve: Andrew 
Cowan manages to do so neatly in one shortish footnote in his 2011 Creative 
Writing handbook The Art of Writing Fiction: 
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In announcing the death of the Author, Barthes was writing figuratively. 
He meant a particular concept of the Author (hence the capital A) rather 
than individual, empirical authors. After all, he himself was an author 
and very much alive when he wrote those words. What he meant was 
that we couldn’t take the author as the sole source of a work’s meaning. 
The reader had a role, too. And the social and historical context will 
produce different readers, and different readings, at different times. This 
wasn’t such a new idea, just expressed more provocatively than 
previously. (148) 
But, what such comments suggest most of all is that engaging with ‘The Death 
of the Author’ often means engaging with the concept rather than the text, and 
neither concept nor text comprise a thorough argument regarding authorship. 
Strike one against approaching the issue of authorship purely through ‘The Death 
of the Author’ is simply this: even if the essay/idea is the cultural ground zero of 
the modern authorship debate, it is not its alpha and omega. Whilst it might be 
made to operate as a synecdoche for theory, it is in itself barely a theoretical 
statement, never mind a sufficient stand-in for the entire field. 
This is not to say, however, that the essay is also slight in all other regards. 
Indeed, part of its vitality lies in the very fact that its paragraphs chop and change 
in their focus, for through their variegation Barthes reaches out to and gathers 
together a range of influences and ideas which were present in the mid-sixties, 
and which to a large extent also form the backdrop for theory as a whole. In his 
introduction to What is an author? (1993), Maurice Biriotti suggests that the 
‘success of the declaration of the Death of the Author can be traced to a number 
of interrelated but different, and not necessarily complementary, developments 
in late twentieth-century thought’ before breaking down six of those 
developments (2). First there is the breaking down of authorial intentionality 
performed by Wimsatt and Beardsley’s 1954 essay ‘The Intentional Fallacy’, which 
worked against ‘Romantic notions of the individual and of the creative genius of 
the author’. Second is the structuralist project which followed the work of 
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Ferdinand de Saussure, which ‘insisted on’ the arbitrariness of both linguistic 
signs and social structures, both of which ‘had obvious implications for 
approaches to authorship’ in that such arbitrariness must also destabilise any 
direct causal link between authorial intention and reader interpretation. Third, 
the essay can ‘be read as part of a general move towards reader-based studies of 
texts’ wherein ‘the processes of interpreting the text’ become the focus of critical 
attention. Fourth is another move in which the reader (or, in Barthes, the critical 
reader who asserts a certain reading) is also bracketed, leaving a writing which is 
‘slippery and evasive of any one stable meaning’ as the focus – this move relates 
especially to Derrida and deconstruction. Fifth are the political concerns which 
accompany the debate, given that ‘Authors come to acquire authority’, and so an 
attack on the author might also constitute an attack on authority. Finally there 
are the ‘problems thrown up by contemporary debates in psychoanalysis’ in which 
the ‘notion of a single intending psyche [i.e., an author] which exists before and 
beyond language now seems hopelessly inadequate’ (2-5). 
This set of concerns is, as Biriotti qualifies, a ‘not exhaustive’ list of those 
present in the essay – the already-mentioned issue of intertextuality would be 
another. But just from this we can see that ‘The Death of the Author’ might be 
thought of as an extraordinary crossing point for numerous strands of the 
intellectual milieu which bore theory. In this way, the essay is really synecdoche 
twice over: as well as being a motto which can be made to stand in for the 
theoretical scene, it gathers in 2500 words the intellectual preconditions for that 
theoretical scene. This aspect also contributes to the essay’s vitality in another 
way, in that its chopping, changing, weaving, ducking fashion functions as 
something of a performative demonstration of the very kind of writing – 
decentered from the individual author, deeply intertextual – which the essay 
seems to either prophesy or demand. Barthes’s views in this essay ultimately look 
forward to a ‘new writing’ and a belief that ‘to restore to writing its future, we 
must reverse its myth: the birth of the reader must be ransomed by the death of 
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the Author’, and the nature of that new writing might be that ‘the text is a tissue 
of citations, resulting from the thousand sources of culture’ – a phrase which 
might be questioned in the abstract, but which aptly describes ‘The Death of the 
Author’ itself.  
However, all of this does not quite answer the question of why this synecdoche 
is used with such consistency amongst so many potential alternatives. On the one 
hand, ‘The Death of the Author’ appears to be, in a number of ways, the perfect 
synecdochic object, operating as origin, crossroads and figurehead all at once. On 
the other hand, the point at which Creative Writing experiences its anxiety most 
deeply – the issue of authorship – is also the point at the heart of ‘The Death of 
the Author’. Just from this the marriage between the two seems perfectly natural, 
and any given interaction between a Creative Writing essay and ‘The Death of 
the Author’ might be well explained by looking at how that essay figures its 
concern with authorship and how ‘The Death of the Author’ is used to justify that 
concern. But the sheer frequency of reference to ‘The Death of the Author’ 
suggests that authorship is not the concern of a merely coincidental cluster of 
Creative Writing essays, but a broader institutional anxiety. Whilst Barthes 
makes intimations regarding an institutional basis for the way in which the 
author operates – referring specifically to the genesis of modern authorship in the 
intellectual movements of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries – he does not 
attempt an analysis of how and why authorship changes with regards to its 
context; for that we must turn to Foucault and the concept of the author-
function. 
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1.3: What is an author-function? 
So ‘The Death of the Author’ can be seen as a vital text which, regardless of its 
overall worth in the Barthes canon or that of theory as a whole, still has the power 
to fascinate and incite reaction nearly fifty years after its initial publication. For 
all its merits, however, one thing which it does not constitute is a coherent 
theoretical position on authorship; rather, it lays out much of what might be at 
stake in any such theoretical position. It does so within a polemic which works 
against what Barthes seems to regard as the given or de facto position or positions 
on authorship: for instance, he identifies the concept of the ‘Author’ with a belief 
in ‘God and his hypostases, reason, science, the law’, or else as ‘the Author-God’, 
and asserts that ‘recent criticism has often merely consolidated’ the concept, with 
‘the reign of the Author [being also] that of the Critic’. In other words, in ‘The 
Death of the Author’ Barthes is working with popular, inherited ideas of what an 
author is – or, at the very least, what seemed to him to be the popular conception 
of the day. Indeed, the very title ‘The Death of the Author’ rhetorically casts the 
author as something which, if it might die, can reasonably be construed as 
sufficiently stable and unified enough to be thought of as alive – a singular, 
monumental idea which might be counterbalanced or countervailed with that of 
the reader. 
In this way the titles of the texts mark a difference in the approach of ‘The 
Death of the Author’ as against Michel Foucault’s ‘What Is an Author?’ (1980). 
Where Barthes assumes some degree of common understanding of what is meant 
by the word ‘author’ – a type of person who came to be named in the English 
empiricist and French rationalist periods – Foucault begins by saying that ‘the 
“author” remains an open question’ (113). In other words, while Barthes carries out 
a polemic against the category of ‘author’, Foucault is interested in probing that 
category itself. 
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His motive for doing so is quickly announced: the second paragraph discusses 
how his previous book, The Order of Things, aimed to ‘analyse verbal clusters as 
discursive layers which fall outside the normal categories of a book, a work, or an 
author’ but, while it performed an analysis of some such discursive layers, it 
‘neglected a similar analysis of the author and his works’. As a result, Foucault 
feels that the book used authors’ names ‘naively’, ‘allowed their names to function 
ambiguously’, and as such opened itself up to criticisms of handling authors’ 
works inadequately or reading disparate authors together in a counter historical 
way (113-4). As such it is clear that, despite a series of allusions to Barthes in its 
opening paragraphs (see Wilson 344-8) ‘What Is an Author?’ is not, contrary to 
how it is popularly presented, a response, rejoinder or even companion piece to 
‘The Death of the Author’ – or at least, not in any simple way. Logie both repeats 
and debunks this stereotype, calling it ‘Michel Foucault’s 1969 rejoinder’, but also 
quoting Jane Gallop saying that Foucault ‘insists that the theme of the author’s 
death is not his’ (494, 509). 
This is important because, as with ‘The Death of the Author’, context informs 
the direction and tenor of Foucault’s piece in a significant way. Early on he places 
to one side some of the concerns of ‘The Death of the Author’ – ‘sociohistorical 
analysis […] how the author was individualised […] the conditions that fostered 
the formulation of the fundamental critical category of “the man and his work”’ – 
in order to focus purely on ‘the singular relationship that holds between an 
author and a text’, and in doing so answer some of the criticisms of The Order of 
Things (115). As such, Foucault’s piece is in some ways the inverse of Barthes’s: 
where the latter is short but expansive, the former is rather longer but much 
tighter in its scope. This, along with the essay’s thematic and temporal closeness 
and its passage regarding ‘the link between writing and death’ 117), may explain 
why it is generally regarded in such close proximity to Barthes’s essay. However, 
in attempting to ‘reexamine the empty space left by the author’s disappearance’ 
(which may or may not be taken for granted, depending upon one’s proclivities), 
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Foucault provides a theoretical attention to the category of author which is 
absent in Barthes (121). 
In pursuing a project of analysing ‘discursive layers’, Foucault rests his analysis 
of the author principally upon observations regarding how an author’s name is 
used. In doing so, his marks a distinction between the name of the author as a 
historical personage and the name of the author as the designated origin of a text. 
The former of these operates in a manner similar to any other name, whilst the 
manner in which the latter operates is mediated by what Foucault terms the 
‘author-function’. In his analysis he arrives at the four ‘characteristics of the 
“author-function”’ which to him 
seemed the most obvious and important. They can be summarized in the 
following manner: the “author-function” is tied to the legal and 
institutional systems that circumscribe, determine and articulate the 
realm of discourses; it does not operate in a uniform manner in all 
discourses, at all times, and in any given culture; it is not defined by the 
spontaneous attribution of a text to its creator, but through a series of 
precise and complex procedures; it does not refer, purely and simply, to 
an actual individual insofar as it simultaneously gives rise to a variety of 
egos and to a series of subjective positions that individuals of any class 
may come to occupy. (130-1) 
To take each of these observations in turn: first, the author-function is a legal 
and institutional phenomenon in that it represents a ‘form of property’, meaning 
that the author has a freedom to control and benefit from the text they own. 
However, that freedom comes on the condition that the author might be subject 
to punishment as a result of the text, depending on its position ‘in a bipolar field 
of sacred and profane, lawful and unlawful, religious and blasphemous’. Whilst 
punishment has always been a potential consequence of discourse, its attribution 
to the author-function came about through the establishment of ‘a system of 
ownership and strict copyright rules’ at the turn of the nineteenth century, before 
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which the discourse was an ‘action’ rather than ‘a thing, a product, or a possession’ 
(124-5). The second observation strikes a complementary note: just as a legal 
institution transformed an act into a product, literary work was once ‘accepted, 
circulated and valorised without any question about the identity of their author’, 
whilst the authority and authenticity of a scientific text was marked by an 
author’s name in statements ‘on the order of “Hippocrates said…” or “Pliny tells us 
that…”’. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this formula was reversed, 
with scientific texts being verified and ‘accepted on their own merits’ and literary 
discourse being ‘acceptable only if it carried an author’s name’. In this way, the 
type of author produced by the author-function may vary over time (125-7). 
Third, the author-function is not a simple linkage between text and name, but ‘a 
complex operation whose purpose is to construct the rational entity we call an 
author’, and this operation varies ‘according to the period and the form of 
discourse concerned’. As such, the author-functions of philosophers and poets will 
be constructed differently, as will those of eighteenth and twentieth century 
novelists. The author-function constructs a ‘rational entity’ in that it groups 
multiple texts under a single name; Foucault uses the example of the Christian 
exegesis of Saint Jerome, who attempts to validate or invalidate certain texts as 
being by a particular author via criteria other than the name written on or 
associated with the document, which may mislead in various ways. Foucault sees 
in Saint Jerome’s criteria, which include coherences of quality, doctrine and style, 
the antecedents of contemporary literary criticism (127-9). Finally, the author-
function gathers not only various texts under a single name, but also ‘a variety of 
egos’ and ‘a series of subjective positions’. By this Foucault is referring to the fact 
that ‘personal pronouns, adverbs of time and place, and the conjugation of verbs’ 
– aspects of a text which refer to the context of the text’s composition – ‘have a 
different bearing on texts with an author and those without one’. For example: in 
a letter, the composer of which might properly be called the writer rather than 
the author, they refer to the actual circumstances of composition, whereas in a 
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novel ‘they stand for a “second self” whose similarity to the author is never fixed’. 
If it is understood that the ‘I’ in a novel does not refer to a historical personage, it 
‘would be as false to seek the author in relation to the actual writer as to the 
fictional narrator’; the rational entity constructed by the author-function 
‘operates so as to effect the simultaneous dispersion’ of the plural subjective 
positions indicated by the text under a singular author name (129-30). 
The dramatic usefulness of Foucault’s formulation of the author-function to a 
discussion of how authorship functions in Creative Writing lies in the fact that it 
ties any thinking of authorship to a consideration of the institutional context in 
which the individual author is operating. In doing so, Foucault opens up a space 
for thought which is flexible and reactive without being chaotic or ungrounded. 
Even while he maintains that there are trans-historical aspects which guide the 
author-function, his attention to how changing institutional contexts affect the 
nature of authorship allows room for precisely the kind of shift we might see as 
Creative Writing confronts the distinction between critical and literary modes of 
authorship within the specific institutional context of disciplinarity within the 
academy.  
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1.4: John Locke: critical darling/international bestseller 
Just as it would be naïve to take ‘The Death of the Author’ as theory’s last word 
on authorship, ‘What Is an Author?’ is by no means an all-encompassing and self-
sufficient statement on the issue. This is attested to by the fact that people have 
continued to think and write about authorship in Foucault’s wake, and often 
building on Foucault’s work; as Adrian Wilson puts it, ‘Foucault posited the 
author-figure as a construct of the reader; and the interpretative space which he 
thereby opened […] only became thinkable thanks to Foucault’s essay’ (343). This 
space has since become occupied by work specifically aimed at the issue of 
authorship – Wilson cites Alexander Nehamas, Gregory Currie and Jorge Gracia 
– as well as those stances on authorship as developed in discussions of literature 
by any number of theorists and critics, and an increasing amount of secondary 
analytical work on the subject, including that of Seàn Burke, Andrew Bennett 
and Wilson himself. 
The ongoing nature of this debate suggests that there is much that is 
contestable in Foucault’s formulation of the author-function, and Wilson in fact 
views ‘What Is an Author?’ as ‘a radical failure, at several levels’ (360). His analysis 
of the essay runs on twin tracks, examining both its rhetorical style and its 
philosophical content, as Wilson attempts to show how the former masks failings 
in the latter, and his critique, while not always convincing, is instructive. At the 
heart of his contention with Foucault are two issues: what he terms as the 
‘aporetic quality’ of Foucault’s usage of the figures of ‘the text’ and ‘the author’s 
name’, and the lack of definition given to the author-function, which he views as 
having ‘no consistent meaning’ (356, 360). Wilson constructs his argument by 
tracing how the implied meanings of these terms mutate over the course of the 
essay and ultimately contradict one another. 
For example, in looking at the relationship Foucault constructs between the 
text and the author, Wilson perceives four successive formulations: (a) Foucault 
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marks his area of interest as ‘the singular relationship that holds between an 
author and a text’ (Foucault 115), suggesting to Wilson an implication that all 
texts have authors; (b) Foucault asserts that ‘the name of an author is a variable 
which accompanies only certain texts to the exclusion of others’ (Foucault 124), 
contradicting the reading of the first formulation; (c) Foucault states that, for all 
that it ‘is assigned a ‘realistic’ dimension’, the author-figure’s qualities are 
‘projections […] of our way of handling texts’ (Foucault 127), making the author ‘an 
interpretive construct’ which derives from reading rather than from the text, such 
that ‘the link between text and author has been broken’ (Wilson 350, 352); and (d) 
Foucault refers to the grammar of a text as bearing ‘a number of signs that refer 
to the author’ (Foucault 129) in a way which ‘restor[es] the bond between text and 
author which had just been dissolved’ (Wilson 353), albeit now with the caveat 
that these signs operate differently ‘on texts with an author and on those without 
one’ (Foucault 129). 
Wilson’s similarly patient analyses of other aspects of the essay suggest that 
the concepts of the ‘work’ and the author’s name undergo similar shifts, whilst the 
author-function is presented variously as the cause or the consequence of the 
qualities of authorship which Foucault is analysing. This tension may have been 
felt in the summary of Foucault’s essay in the previous section of this chapter, in 
which the author-function is variously possessed by institutions, authors and 
texts. At the centre of Wilson’s essay both chronologically and conceptually is a 
passage in which he re-presents what he sees as the signal success of ‘What Is an 
Author?’ – the observation that the named author and the historical originator of 
a text are non-identical – in terms which make no recourse to Foucault’s essay. 
This he achieves by suggesting that, because one is a work of political philosophy 
and the other is a work of philosophy of knowledge, the ‘Locke’ named as the 
author of Two Treatises of Government and the ‘Locke’ of An Essay concerning Human 
Understanding are two differently-construed authors, and therefore neither can be 
identical to the historical and undoubtedly singular John Locke (351). 
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To persevere, for the moment, with the four points summarised above, it must 
be said that one could begin to rebut Wilson’s analysis on his own terms. For 
instance, if formulation (a) is taken to mean that all authors must have texts and 
not the other way around, then it is perfectly congruent that only some texts have 
authors. However, I would suggest that there is a deeper reason for Wilson’s 
disagreement with the essay which stems from a misreading. The upshot of all of 
this for Wilson is that analysing the aporia of Foucault’s essay supports the 
argument of Seán Burke’s The Death and Return of the Author in that it ‘bears out 
Burke’s principal thesis: ‘the principle of the author most powerfully reasserts 
itself when it is thought absent’; ‘the concept of the author is never more alive 
than when thought dead’’ (Wilson 362). Of course, this conclusion relies on a 
belief that Foucault’s essay holds the author to be absent or dead. It appears that 
for Wilson this assertion of absence comes when Foucault ‘replac[es] the 
conventional figure of ‘the author’ with what he called ‘the author-function’’ (341). 
In fact, it is not at all clear that Foucault intends to perform such a replacement. 
In discussing his third characteristic of the author-function, Foucault says that it 
‘results from a complex operation whose purpose is to construct the rational 
entity we call an author’, suggesting in reasonably clear terms that there is a non-
identity between the author-function and that ‘rational entity’ which might carry 
a name like Locke (127). By holding this non-identity in mind we might begin to 
clear up some of the contradictions Wilson finds. For instance, formulation (c) 
might be glossed as suggesting that whilst qualities of a rational authorial entity 
are projected by our reading of texts, the author-function, which pertains to that 
process of projecting, pre-exists the moment of reading and therefore the text-
author link is not truly severed. Moreover, the apparently contradictory 
relationship between author and text might be brought into line if we understand 
that, while all texts have an origin, the author-function only operates to create the 
kind of rational entity Foucault is describing in relation to certain texts at the 
expense of others. Whilst he may not explicitly provide a clear heuristic for 
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delimiting texts-with-authors from texts-without-authors, he does make a 
number of intimations regarding the two categories: the category of ‘all discourse 
that supports this “author-function”’ includes texts we would describe as literary, 
but also scientific papers and mathematical treatises, whilst texts such as ‘a 
private letter […] a contract […] an anonymous poster’ do not, for Foucault, have 
authors (130, 124). From the claim that ‘the function of an author is to characterise 
the existence, circulation, and operation of certain discourses within a society’ we 
might broadly surmise that texts which support the author-function are those 
which circulate publicly, and which are necessarily read and understood with 
reference to the name attached to them (124). 
Wilson is justified in paying close attention to Foucault’s rhetoric: as a model 
of philosophical clarity the essay leaves something to be desired, and there is, in 
truth, expansive room for confusion regarding the precise natures of and 
relationships between the various terms it employs. However, to suggest only a 
reading and not the definitive reading, Foucault’s formulation of the author-
function might be rephrased as follows: texts which have an author only do so 
within the context of broader institutional frameworks, and the negotiation 
which must occur between text and institution in order to establish the author 
may be termed the author-function. Note that this abbreviated rephrasing does 
not stipulate precisely how the author is established – though much of ‘What Is 
an Author?’  may be read as an attempt to interrogate that negotiation – because 
what the phrase ‘author-function’ identifies and names is not the nature of that 
negotiation but the fact of its existence. The final sting in Wilson’s argument is a 
version of the aforementioned idea that the anti-authorial essays of Barthes and 
Foucault are undone by their having and referencing authors: because ‘named 
authors were invoked at the strategic sites of [Foucault’s] exposition’ (359-60) the 
argument therefore calls on the very thing it is attempting to absent. On the 
contrary, in invoking the names of authors Foucault is calling on the very thing 
he is attempting to explicate the existence and nature of. Indeed, Wilson’s own 
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attempt to clarify Foucault’s observations through the test case of John Locke 
relies on an author-function. If we accept that the Locke of the Two Treatises and 
the Locke of the Essay are construed as two different authors, the only possible 
cause for that fact is the differing institutional contexts of those texts.* They share 
an origin in the historical personage of John Locke (albeit at slightly different 
points in time), and the names of their authors are identical; the only difference 
marked by Wilson is that one is a work of political philosophy whilst the other is 
a work on the philosophy of knowledge. That being the case, there must be a 
process via which the nature of the author attached to those texts is affected by, 
in this case, the philosophical institution which holds these to be separate 
disciplines; this process is what Foucault names the author-function. 
This distinction is worth elaborating in the present context because it 
underlines two things about Foucault’s approach to authorship in this essay. First, 
it makes clear that the key variable with regards to how an author is constituted 
is the institutional context in which the text is circulating. The mutability of the 
author-figure comes only as a consequence of changing context, whilst the 
author-function is constituted in the fact of the negotiation between text and 
context, which itself exhibits certain qualities. Second, it makes clear that there is 
no substitution or suppression of the individual, historical author at hand in this 
discussion. Rather, what is being discussed is the grounds of possibility for the 
                                                             
 
* In fact, it seems doubtful to me that people do commonly treat these two 
author-figures as being separate entities, and there are surely better ways of 
illustrating the non-identity of historical origin and author-figure. One of the 
qualities of the author-function outlined by Foucault – as illustrated by the 
example of Jerome, as well as a brief discussion on the authorship of the works of 
Shakespeare – is that it gathers under a single name multiple texts of potentially 
differing types. 
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author qua author, for the way in which the name of a writer of literature 
becomes attached to a text and codified as the author’s name.  
With regards to Creative Writing, this then clarifies our line of inquiry. The 
question is not about what kind of author-function is at play in Creative Writing 
for, as Foucault suggests, the author-function is that negotation which makes 
authorship possible. If the Creative Writers within the Creative Writing 
classroom are operating as authors in the sense of authorship which Foucault 
constructs, then the author-function must (already) be in play. And it seems 
impossible that Creative Writers are not also authors – or, to state it with a little 
more nuance, that the texts produced by Creative Writing are not also 
engendering author-figures whose specific function we might analyse. If we recall 
the schema earlier suggested wherein Creative Writing obtains an awkward 
middle ground between the academy and commercial publishing, each of those 
feature a structure of text-and-institution which creates the space necessary for 
the author, and it is hard to see how that space might evaporate simply because 
the demands of both are simultaneously in play. Or, alternatively, one might 
identify a series of points at which Creative Writing texts circulate publicly as 
authored entities, whether that be with the historical originator present in the 
workshop, amongst examiners for assessment (where authorial identity may be 
hidden, but the fact that the text is singularly-authored is vital), or (a potential 
endgame for any creative work emerging from Creative Writing) in the realm of 
commercial publishing. 
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1.5: Interregnum 
As we have seen, antagonistic responses to ‘The Death of the Author’, especially 
in Creative Writing, often rely upon a naïve reading of the essay in order to 
construct a riposte in which an author might insist upon their own fleshly, 
corporeal nature, beat their chest and ask if they do not bleed, and thereby prove 
themselves uncut by Barthes’s guillotine. It is no great hyperbole to see in this 
position a sense of Barthes (or his critical inheritor) as executioner, a malign 
influence stalking the author and waiting to see them off. When ‘The Death of the 
Author’ is taken as such an existential threat, it is one thing for a literary critic to 
casually, aphoristically assert that the author is dead, and has been for fifty years. 
The claim starts to feel rather more pointed if the critic sees authors in the 
corridor every day, or even shares an office with one. It might therefore come as 
some relief to all concerned (if mutually assured destruction is comforting) to 
hear that if the author is dead, then so too is the critic. 
When Mike Harris, in his article ‘Shakespeare Was More Creative When He 
Was Dead’, sets out the stall of ‘readerist’ literary theory, he identifies readers, 
critics and theorists as sharing space on one side of dichotomy, arranged in 
opposition to writers on the other side. There can be no productive relationship 
between the two sides, according to Harris, because theory does ‘not seek an 
alliance with writing but rather Anschluss’; from the New Criticism of Wimsatt 
and Beardsley to the ‘poststructuralism’ of Barthes, Stanley Fish and J. Hillis 
Miller, 20th Century literary studies is presented as a concerted effort to rob 
authors of the credit for their creative effort and grant it to the critics (173). 
However, Barthes’s essay (once again) turns out to be more subtle than all of 
that. While he does indeed conclude that ‘the birth of the reader must be 
ransomed by the death of the Author’, and while one can see how someone like 
Harris might interpret this less as a philosophical statement and more as a 
regicidal call to arms, the reader Barthes wants is not on the same side as the 
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figure of the critic. Rather, the idea of the Author ‘perfectly suits criticism’ 
because 
once the Author is discovered, the text is “explained:’ [sic] the critic has 
conquered; hence it is scarcely surprising not only that, historically, the 
reign of the Author should also have been that of the Critic, but that 
criticism (even “new criticism”) should be overthrown along with the 
Author. 
For Barthes, observing the literary-critical landscape in 1967, the Author and the 
Critic are not warring factions, but allies on the wrong side of the debate. 
The death of the Critic, however, along with the overthrowing of criticism, 
must be subjected to the same interpretive asterisks as those of the Author and 
authorship. The suggestion that criticism must be overthrown is the more 
immediately unstable of the two. ‘The Death of the Author’ begins by offering 
upon a line of Balzac five possible answers to the question ‘Who is speaking in 
this way?’, ranging from the narrative voice of ‘the story’s hero’ to the ideological 
voice of ‘romantic psychology’. Barthes immediately qualifies that ‘It will always 
be impossible to know’ and that the voice which speaks the line is ‘several 
indiscernible voices’, but to suggest possibilities – even a casual list of those which 
seemed most readily apparent at the time – is already an interpretive act and so, 
by being written, a critical one. 
This is not to hoist Barthes by his own petard: to return to regicide for a 
moment, when a monarch is overthrown they are done so (nine times out of ten) 
in readiness for the next one, and there’s no hypocrisy in overthrowing criticism 
by means of criticism, but by drawing attention to the position ‘The Death of the 
Author’ takes with regards to criticism we might reorient how we read his final 
clarion call for the birth of the reader. 
We have already seen how, broadly speaking, ‘The Death of the Author’ is 
taken by Creative Writing to be emblematic of literary theory as whole, often as a 
rhetorical means for putting it to one side and moving forward without it. It is 
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therefore interesting that literary criticism has such a different relationship with 
the essay, even though Barthes calls for the Critic’s downfall in the same breath as 
the Author’s. Again, one reason why Creative Writing can use ‘The Death of the 
Author’ in this way is that the essay has such currency in literary criticism and 
theory and was already synecdochic for a broader set of texts and ideas. Of 
course, the essay’s reception was far from one of universal agreement, though it 
would be impossible to discuss its place in the history of criticism without 
opening up what are often called the theory wars of the Seventies and Eighties, 
which is beyond my present scope. Instead we might ask, for those critics who 
broadly agree with the body of thought that ‘The Death of the Author’ has come 
to represent, how does one continue to write criticism in its shadow? 
Or rather, how does one continue to write criticism without the Author? 
Because this is the heart of the challenge Barthes lays down to criticism as it 
stood: ‘the explanation of the work is always sought in the man who has produced 
it’, and so without ‘the “message” of the Author-God’ to uncover, ‘the claim to 
“decipher” a text becomes quite useless’; without an Author, the man who the 
critic seeks in the text is no longer there – and what then can they look for? 
In light of Foucault, Barthes’s capitalisation of ‘Author’ suddenly becomes 
radically useful in its inaudible signification of the fact that, not only should we 
not take this word to denote the historical personage who produced the text, we 
should not even take it as an abstraction of author-figures in general. Foucault’s 
four characteristics of the author-function make clear that there are any number 
of potential instantiations of the author-figure, each taking on some combination 
or other of the possibilities indicated under the domain of each characteristic. For 
instance, the first characteristic, in which the author-function creates a property-
relationship between a text and its author, could indicate at one extreme the 
author’s right to control who might have use of the text, while at the other 
extreme it could indicate the author’s right to be identified in connection with 
the text, but not necessarily to have any more substantive ongoing control over it. 
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The real world existence of the former possibility is demonstrated by the film 
industry’s activity (under the guise of being a proxy for filmmakers) regarding 
copyright law and piracy, while the latter is found in copyleft institutions such as 
Creative Commons, which aim to minimise obstructions to intellectual property 
sharing (‘DMCA’, Electronic Frontier Foundation; ‘Arts & Culture’, Creative 
Commons). For ‘The Death of the Author’ we might therefore gloss, albeit quite 
anachronistically, that the target is the author-function as Barthes saw it 
operating at the time of writing, in which the property rights granted to the 
author extend beyond control over dissemination and the accrual of reciprocal 
benefits and into an ownership of the very meaning of the text. 
The same argument has significance for the inaudible capitalisation of ‘Critic’. 
While Barthes uses the word ‘author’ thirty-one times and capitalises nineteen of 
those instances, the essay’s only two uses of ‘critic’ appear in the phrase ‘the critic 
has conquered; hence it is scarcely surprising not only that, historically, the reign 
of the Author should also have been that of the Critic’. With one instance of the 
word capitalised and one not, what separates the two critics here is precisely the 
moment of conquest: once the critic has ‘conquered’ the text by discovering the 
Author within it they become the Critic, who operates in terms of an author-
function which makes the meaning of a text as much a matter of property rights 
as the text itself. 
However, if the meaning extracted from a text (in this model of criticism) 
therefore remains the property of the author, then that necessarily has a 
consequence in terms of the critic’s own instantiation under the author-function. 
For critics, as much as authors, operate under the author-function’s four 
characteristics: they have property rights with regards to the texts they produce; 
their discourse undergoes an interesting combination of being verified by the 
writer’s name and on its own merits in the spheres of public circulation and 
academic refereeing respectively; they have been variously construed at various 
points in the history of criticism; and they have the option of writing in a 
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subjective position (just as I have been using ‘I’ or ‘we’) which is understood to be 
non-identical to the historical circumstances of composition. In short, the critic 
too is an author-figure. 
Moreover, the critic is an author-figure whose construction under the author-
function depends, at least to some extent, on that of the literary author-figures 
whose texts they discuss. This we have just seen: if Barthes’s phrase ‘Author-God’ 
is taken to imply an author-figure who, in an omnipotent fashion, continues to 
exert control over a text’s meaning even as its reader is reading it, then that 
ownership continues into the meaning as reproduced by a critic. Conversely, for 
critics to function in the way we now commonly understand them to function, 
providing readings and interpretations which can and even should cut across 
both the received opinion around a text and its author’s stated intention 
regarding it, there must be a contestation of the site of meaning, in terms of who 
is responsible for a text’s meaning and who has rights over it. A literary author-
figure free to assert meaning and a critical author-figure free to unboundedly 
interpret cannot co-exist. 
Framed as such, this contestation is not so much theoretical or moral as it is 
legal. In extreme examples this is strictly the case: in 2018, Mark Meecham was 
tried for hate crime after posting a video online in which he repeatedly uses the 
phrase ‘gas the Jews’ while teaching a dog to perform a Nazi salute. His defence 
was one of authorial intent, in that he wanted to make the dog ‘seem like the least 
cute thing he can think of’. While this position was accepted by many, for some of 
his critics this intent was less important than the interpreted fact that 
broadcasting the phrase ‘gas the Jews’ to millions of viewers necessarily incites 
hatred. The judge, ultimately, decided that ‘the context was irrelevant’ and found 
him guilty (Baddiel). In effect, with both media commentary and the law itself 
being a matter of written record, this was a legal decision which hinged on 
deciding how to allocate ownership of meaning between the creative author-
figure and the critical (or reading, or interpretive, or hermeneutic) author-figure.  
63 
 
It would perhaps be a far-fetched hypothetical in which the judicial machine 
springs into action in order to adjudicate what kind of author a Creative Writer 
is. Nonetheless, the binarism of this literally legal example demonstrates the 
seriousness and irreconcilability with which the Creative Writer casts two 
shadows from the spotlight of the author-function. First, there is a broad cultural 
assumption (as the general reaction to the Meecham case demonstrates) that an 
author does in fact have a say in the meaning of their production. Then, in the 
academy, this position cannot co-exist with that of the critic, whose functioning 
depends upon an author-figure who is severed from the meaning of their text. 
Finally, the author will potentially be asked to account for the meaning of their 
text after all, whether as a teacher, or as a critic, or (as we will see in chapters two 
and three) as a producer of auto-commentary. 
Is the issue of authorship in Creative Writing really as irreconcilable as all 
that? Perhaps not: people working in Creative Writing do, after all, successfully 
operate as academics and authors, just as some professional literary critics also 
produce their own literature. Further, this theoretical model might be used to 
persuasively sketch out a potential future in which the author-function adapts to 
the realities of Creative Writing, abrogating (for instance) the idea of meaning as 
property and settling upon alternate grounds for identifying the illegality of a 
text, leaving authorial and critical statements on even ground when it comes to 
the question of meaning. 
Perhaps less radically, we might turn this model towards the prognostications 
Paul Dawson makes in his 2005 monograph Creative Writing and the New 
Humanities, in which he sketches out a future for Creative Writing as an integral 
component of a humanities reoriented and redefined in response to broad 
changes occurring at the level of the academic sector and of Western culture as a 
whole. In the chapter ‘What is a literary intellectual?’, Dawson situates Creative 
Writing – or at least its recent upsurge in popularity and prominence – as 
contemporaneous with a ‘posttheory generation’ which is marked by a ‘sense of 
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belatedness in regard to the baby-boomer excitement of the 1960s’, wherein 
theory provided a new intellectual and ideological rationale for the work of the 
humanities, as well as ‘the ‘down-sizing’ mentality of increasingly corporatised 
universities’, wherein well-paid long-term jobs are increasingly being replaced by 
precarious and part-time contracts (181). This situation has led, in Australia, to a 
thinking of ‘the New Humanities as a move beyond Theory’, which carries the 
promise of ensuring the survival of the humanities by making it more public-
facing, more openly accessible, and more indispensable to the world beyond the 
academy. Dawson sees a tension between this move and Creative Writing’s 
practice of providing students with a space which is buttressed against that 
outside world, in which aesthetic value might be learnt and practised: ‘a site of 
withdrawal from politics and society’ (183-4). In order for Creative Writing to 
‘assume a non-antagonistic institutional position within the New Humanities’, 
therefore, it must have the capacity and authority to speak of literature and 
culture beyond the walls of its workshops, which means we must ask ‘to what 
figure in the academy has literary authority traditionally accrued, and how can a 
vision of authorship be elaborated in relation to it?’ (185). 
Over the following pages, Dawson outlines a history in which that literary 
authority has increasingly accrued to the figure of the critic, a history which, 
taking place over a period of time in which Creative Writing was either unheard 
of or inchoate, took place without the same intensity of anxiety I have been 
discussing in this chapter, and a history which, at each turn, might be understood 
as a contestation over the site of meaning between critical and literary author-
figures. The intellectual ground zero for this contestation, for instance, can be 
taken as Matthew Arnold’s call for a criticism which is ‘aloof from thoughts of 
practicality, and untouched by the political concerns of the review pages’; this 
criticism was academically formalised by degrees, through the work of T. S. Eliot, 
I. A. Richards, F. R. Leavis, and Austin Warren, into a ‘practical criticism’ which 
‘became an indispensable pedagogical device’ with the capacity of ‘promoting the 
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transformative power of imaginative literature’; and practical criticism then made 
way for an ‘oppositional criticism’, characterised here by Edward Said, Terry 
Eagleton, and the Birmingham School of Cultural Studies, which ‘sees this textual 
critique as the base for social change, rather than cultural defence’ (186-9). Or, 
against a background in which John Dryden termed criticism as ‘the art’, 
practised by writers, ‘of judging the qualities of a literary work, rather than the 
practice of censuring it’ (185), the site of meaning was first moved, by Arnold, out 
of the hands of interested writers, then changed, by practical criticism, into a 
transmissible skill which inaugurates certain people as having responsibility for 
that meaning, then launched, by oppositional criticism, as a platform from which 
to speak to (and against) the world at large. As a result, in terms of literature the 
role of ‘public intellectual’ as one whose position and learning authorises 
intervention in politics and culture has, by the time of the posttheory generation, 
fallen squarely within the domain of the critic, leading Dawson to ask if it is ‘any 
wonder that Creative Writing has not claimed a position of literary authority in 
the New Humanities if it cannot elaborate a more forceful figure of the writer’ 
(188). 
However, this collocation of the role of public intellectual and the practice of 
oppositional criticism has, in Dawson’s analysis, been made vulnerable by 
developments which have occurred alongside the emergence of a posttheory 
generation. Internally, the fact that ‘Theory has become fragmented and applied 
to areas and applied to areas such as Cultural Studies and Race Studies’ has 
decentred the literary object as oppositional criticism’s locus, and in particular it 
has moved ‘beyond theoretical rereadings of the literary canon’ and into applying 
its critical mode to a much more broadly defined ‘text’, such that there is ‘no 
specific figure of literary authority in the New Humanities, no critic to proclaim 
upon literature as a distinct realm’ (180, 201). Externally, a wave of ‘backlash 
against the infiltration of radical Marxist views into university curricula’, a 
backlash which operated in the 1990s via the synecdoche of ‘Political Correctness’, 
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has left oppositional criticism culturally embattled, such that it has the defensive 
task ‘to popularise academic cultural criticism rather than to generate new 
theoretical paradigms’ (197-9). 
Those anti-Political Correctness pressures have metamorphosed into 
something quite different in the fifteen years since Dawson published his 
monograph – a fact for which the Mark Meecham case might operate as a 
portrait-in-miniature – but Dawson’s conclusion is still valent. With Creative 
Writing having firmly ensconced itself within academia, and with criticism 
having loosened its role as the creator of the ‘specific figure of literary authority’, 
Dawson identifies the space for Creative Writing to ‘elaborate a figure of the 
writer as a literary intellectual’ who can ‘act as a medium between the academy 
and the public sphere’, but this specific formulation of the public intellectual 
operates ‘not necessarily as a model which individual academics can aspire to and 
train students to take up, but as a zone of contestation, as a discursive site’ (201-3). 
On the one hand, Dawson is here questioning and problematising the critical 
author-figure’s claim to a contested site of meaning over and above the literary 
author-figure’s, but more importantly, his analysis effectively recasts the anxiety 
which plays out between these two author-figures in order to make a virtue of it. 
In the very fact of stepping into this publicly intellectual position, a step made 
possible by Creative Writing’s entry into the academy, a writer might make that 
anxiety the very grounding of their public status, as the position from which they 
conduct their discourse, answering Dawson’s demand that ‘a new vision of 
authorship needs to be elaborated, where literature is an intellectual practice 
alongside other non-literary discourses in the academy, and where the division 
between fiction and non-fiction still exists, but in a non-hierarchical relationship’ 
(194). 
This is not the only potential future behaviour for the author-function in 
Creative Writing. Indeed, Dawson explicitly marks one alternative by claiming 
that in pursuing the model of the literary intellectual, Creative Writing ‘will 
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claim a stronger disciplinary position within the New Humanities than it will by 
perpetuating a theory/practice divide or by evading it with hybrid forms of 
writing’ (201). Here, ‘hybrid forms of writing’ signals the potential for a model 
which, rather than renegotiating the state of play between critical and literary 
author-figures, dissolves that binary entirely, producing works which might 
variously be termed hybrid, creative-critical, fictocritical, or post-critical. As of 
yet, no one option has established itself at the centre of things as Creative 
Writing’s new de rigueur modus operandi. 
Even before any such prognostication, however, this super-positioning of 
mutually exclusive author-figures engendered by an author-function working 
against itself does constitute a readable, understandably anxious situation which, 
if nothing else, serves to explicate Creative Writing’s fascination with ‘The Death 
of the Author’. 
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Chapter 2: The Supplementary Discourse 
or: exegesis; reflection; response; self-assessment; critique; commentary; 
journal; poetics; critical commentary; self-reflective essay; self-
commentary; critical preface; reflective element; synopsis; gnosis; self-
reflexive commentary; critical essay; reflective essay; critical/reflective 
essay; reflective commentary; critical response; critical contextualising 
essay; personal writing project; self-evaluation document; 
2.1: Names 
The Creative Writing MA courses at the universities of Birmingham, Kingston 
and Sheffield all call it a ‘critical essay’. The corresponding MA at the University 
of Exeter goes a step more elaborate with the term ‘critical contextualising essay’. 
Bangor University’s BA dissertation calls it ‘criticism in practice’. The University 
of Leicester’s BA refers to it as a ‘critical reflective essay’, while the University of 
Warwick’s BA adds a comma with ‘critical, reflective essay’. ‘Reflective’ rears its 
head elsewhere, too, in ‘reflective essay’ at Bath Spa and Birkbeck, ‘critically 
reflective essay’ at Lancaster University and ‘reflective commentary’ for MAs at 
London Metropolitan University. The University of East Anglia’s BA programme 
specification stipulates a ‘critical commentary’, its MA a ‘self-commentary’, and 
the course description for its MFA in Creative Writing refers to a ‘reflective self-
commentary’. 
This list is far from exhaustive: these are just a few examples drawn mostly 
from public-facing documents – prospectuses and, where available, course or 
module descriptions. What’s more, actual usage amongst academics and students 
in these institutions may (and, given the multitude of available alternatives, 
probably does) vary. Such variation might pose few pragmatic problems for day-
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to-day usage, but if one wants to approach this text in a theoretical mode, the 
above situation is clearly untenable. 
‘This text’. What is this excessively named (and so ironically un-named) text I 
am trying to talk about? Is this text even to be thought of as a text – or is it a 
genre of text, or an institutional practice which generates many different types of 
text? In amongst these terms given to this text there is an instinctive sense that 
there is some unity amongst their profuse variety, both for thematic reasons (this 
text criticises, this text reflects, this text essays) and for what they are not (above 
all, this text is not creative). In Creative Writing it is common for there to be 
work being produced besides the ‘creative’ writing itself. The Creative Writing 
Subject Benchmark from the National Association of Writers in Education 
(NAWE), a British academic body, suggests that it is  
normal practice that, in addition to producing a piece or pieces of 
writing for assessment, students will also write an accompanying critical, 
reflective or contextualizing piece. Recent research in the UK reveals a 
wide variety of names and forms for these non-creative elements, 
including reflection, response, self-assessment, critique, commentary, 
journal, poetics, critical commentary, self-reflective essay, and critical 
preface. (9) 
A similar sentiment is expressed by the UK’s Quality Assurance Agency for 
Higher Education, which categorises Creative Writing as an element of the 
discipline of English; in its 2007 ‘Subject Benchmark Statement: English’, it 
suggests that Creative Writing should be assessed not by creative works in 
isolation, but by ‘portfolios of creative and critical writing (which may include 
fiction, drama, and poetry; reflective journals; essay plans; annotated 
bibliographies; critical reviews; and electronic materials such as websites and 
blogs)’ (9). The Creative Writing equivalent of that Benchmark Statement, 
published 2016, provides a list of potential components to a submission including 
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‘a critical commentary, critical reflection or preface to the creative work 
discussing creative context, influences, and process’ (16). 
In these policy documents we thus find yet more potential names for this text, 
from ‘journal’, which implies that a particular style and form will be used, to ‘non-
creative elements’, which perhaps implies only that this text is not that other text. 
However, although one might expect these benchmark statements to identify a 
best practice for this text, or hope that they will, both of them instead refer to a 
number of extant practices without either censure or recommendation. Neither 
document suggests a universal name for this text, nor any guidelines about what 
its nature, execution and function are, nor what, in an ideal scenario, they would 
be. 
Here I have suggested two different questions about this text: what is it? what 
should it be? The latter, of course, carries with it an ethical and normative 
implication. To ask what it should be is to ask what would be best, for whom, and 
why. Or to put it another way, the question ‘what should it be?’ carries with it a 
pedagogical inquiry about what ‘good’ teaching looks like and why, as well as a 
political inquiry about what form of this text would be best for the discipline at 
large, and a pragmatic inquiry about what kind of work load the academics 
involved can bear. 
As a phenomenon, this text has not gone undiscussed, but the discussion 
around it has generally paid more attention to this question of what it should be 
than that of what it is. Early on in her 2004 TEXT article on the topic, ‘What Does 
it Meme?’, Estelle Barrett suggests ‘a number of key questions relating to creative 
arts research generally, and to the exegesis in particular’ (‘exegesis’ here being yet 
another term for this text, this one drawn from the Australasian scene of Creative 
Writing) which need to be answered: 
* What is it? 
* Why do we need it? 
71 
 
* What can it do within the context of a knowledge economy? 
* How do we judge its success and value? 
These questions match the is/should division I have already suggested, involving 
both the nature of this text and its implications, but Barrett moves swiftly from 
the former to the latter. Her analysis is based on Richard Dawkins’ idea of the 
meme – that is, an idea which replicates itself by being expressed through cultural 
artefacts such as literature. In answering her first question Barrett thus suggests 
that ‘the exegesis may be viewed both as a replication or re­versioning of the 
completed artistic work as well as a reflective discourse on significant moments 
in the process of unfolding and revealing’, which is to say that the exegesis re-
expresses the creative work’s memetic idea in a new artefact, whilst at the same 
time explaining how the creative work came to express that memetic idea. 
One immediate query one might have regarding this is what it means for the 
relationship between this text and the creative work it accompanies: if the 
creative work needs another text to explain its memetic content, and that other 
text does so by replicating the meme, then why doesn’t that other text itself 
demand a further text explaining it?; and if this is not the case, if the other text 
can stand alone in its expression of that memetic content, then doesn’t that imply 
that it is itself superfluous to the creative work’s memetic value in the first place? 
If one role of this text really is to re-express the meme in a different form, then it 
must be to some degree either insufficient or superfluous, and the question then 
might be how this text operates in spite of this fact – for people clearly continue 
to write it regardless. 
Rather than venture into this relationship, however, Barrett moves on to how 
this view of the exegesis justifies it as a better ‘valorisation’ of creative writing as 
opposed to traditional means of valorising art such as publication and reviewing. 
By valorising she means assigning a positive social and cultural value to the 
artwork, and she suggests that, for instance, hanging a painting in a gallery 
valorises it via a decontextualisation of it, cutting it off from the creative 
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processes which created it and thus treating it as a finished, unified product. The 
exegesis, by contrast, valorises the work via a weaving of it back into the processes 
which created it, and as a consequence can create a validation for the work as an 
academic research output rather than just as a finished artistic product. As such, 
Barrett suggests a powerful justification for this text, which might be especially 
useful for researchers attempting to justify their discipline to the wider academy 
and academics attempting to launch and run Creative Writing courses, but in 
doing so glosses over more fundamental questions about what this text looks like 
and how it works. 
A similar movement from what this text is to how it should be can be found 
in two TEXT articles which attempt to present miniature taxonomies of this text: 
‘“Exit Jesus”: Relating the Exegesis and Creative/Production Components of a 
Research Thesis’ by Barbara H. Milech and Ann Schilo, and ‘The Problem of the 
Exegesis in Creative Writing Higher Degrees’ by Nike Bourke and Philip Neilsen 
(both 2004). In ‘Exit Jesus’ Milech and Schilo describe the exegesis as the ‘written 
component’ of a higher degree in Creative Writing as opposed to the (creative) 
‘production’. They then outline three models for this written component: the 
‘Context Model’, which ‘rehearses the historical, social and/or disciplinary 
context(s) within which the student developed the creative or production 
component’; the ‘Commentary Model’, which works ‘as an explication of, or 
comment on, the creative production’, in the form of either criticism or a 
research report; and their favoured ‘Research Question Model’, in which ‘both the 
exegetical and the creative component of the research thesis hinges on a research 
question posed’, and thus work in tandem towards a common, cross-referenced 
goal. These three versions of this text correspond to ‘what appear to be the 
dominant models for the exegesis at Australian universities’, based on the authors’ 
personal experience and what they refer to as a ‘local history’ of the discipline, 
and as such should not be taken as attempting anything like a systematic 
typology. 
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Milech and Schilo wittily note that demands for Creative Writing to produce 
two texts are ‘Solomonic: they divide the “baby” in half, but do not indicate how 
the baby might live as a whole’; their solution is the ‘Research Question Model’, 
which also has similarities with Barrett’s memetic account of the exegesis, in that 
the two texts involved jointly approach something which is external to both – 
though Barrett’s abstract ‘meme’ is here replaced with the more familiar ‘research 
question’. However, even though Milech and Schilo dismiss the ‘Context Model’ 
and ‘Commentary Model’ on grounds that they do not properly explicate the 
relationship between the creative work and the exegesis – the former leaving 
‘unresolved the questions of why there are two parts’ involved and the latter 
problematically designating the exegesis as secondary, and so potentially as no 
more than an intellectually superfluous exercise in ‘compliance with the 
requirements of contemporary academic structures’ – the relationship portrayed 
in their favoured model is only a little clearer than Barrett’s. They envision theses 
in which the two components ‘are substantively integrated, form a whole’, and 
having each component respond to the same question(s) seems a satisfying way of 
achieving that, but even if the texts are two halves of a whole, that still leaves a 
question of the relationship between the two halves. If Barrett’s justification of 
this text seems to make it fall on either one side or the other of being a necessary 
and sufficient addition to the creative text, Milech and Schilo’s doesn’t seem to 
explain why the ‘Research Question Model’ makes this text necessary in the first 
place. They explain that ‘each component of the thesis is conducted though the 
“language” of a particular discourse’, but not why a Creative Writing research 
question demands to be answered twice or, more importantly, what each answer 
does which the other does not – and so are themselves no less Solomonic. 
For their part, Bourke and Neilsen approach the issue in a more systematically 
taxonomical way, collecting eighty exegeses from two Australian universities and 
placing them into one of four categories: ‘First Order Journal Work’, ‘Second 
Order Journal Work’, ‘Literary Theory’, and ‘Cultural Studies’. From their 
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categories alone it is clear that Bourke and Neilsen’s approach shifts the question 
of the exegesis somewhat: whilst all of these terms might suggest something about 
the form of the exegeses in question, what they are primarily interested in is the 
degree and kind of academic discourse being employed. Briefly, they define First 
Order Journal Work as a diaristic and anecdotal account of the work’s creation; 
Second Order Journal Work as a more reflexive account which analyses the 
processes behind the work’s creation; and Literary Theory and Cultural Studies 
work as more traditionally academic approaches which draw from those 
respective fields. Importantly, these categories can hold regardless of form: an 
instance of this text which is essentially anecdotal despite looking like an essay 
rather than a diary would still count as First Order Journal Work. The 
methodology behind these categories is not fully explicated, but more significant 
is the fact that, like Milech and Schilo, the authors employ this taxonomy not for 
its inherent significance, but as a means to proposing an argument. Students who 
‘desire only to write in the creative mode and do not wish to pursue an academic 
career’, they conclude, ‘struggled with the writing of their exegetical work, lapsing 
frequently into First Order Journal Work’, whilst students who ‘are interested in 
the option of an academic career […] were more likely to be confident and 
intellectually adventurous in their exegeses’, by which they mean they tended to 
use more literary theory and cultural studies. While they ultimately make a series 
of recommendations regarding who should have to write exegeses and what 
theoretical approach is most appropriate, Bourke and Neilsen’s apparently more 
concrete taxonomy does not say much more about the nature of the exegesis and 
its relationship with the creative work. 
One more contribution to the ‘what should this text be?’ conversation can be 
found in Jeri Kroll’s 2004 article ‘The Exegesis and the Gentle Reader/Writer’. 
After saying that the ‘variety of terms employed to describe the academic part of 
the thesis reveals the slippery nature of the beast’, Kroll interestingly suggests that 
candidates ‘often blend tones and styles in an eclectic melange’ and are ‘aware 
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that since they are creating a new type of discourse that addresses a complex 
audience they have to consider, in a way no straight academic MA or PhD does, 
how they position themselves as narrators’. In this she not only positions this text 
as the ‘academic part’ of a thesis, but also suggests that it will by necessity deviate 
from typical forms of academic discourse. This effectively dispenses with any idea 
that this text need follow in the formal footsteps of, say, literary theory or 
cultural studies, even while demanding that it do academic work, suggesting that 
its form could be sui generis for each instantiation of this text and we should 
instead focus on its function. 
After a discussion regarding how ‘the impulse for a writer or artist to explain 
their work and set it in a cultural context is not new’, but rather in line with a 
tradition of authors’ ‘musings, forewords, afterwords, essays, interviews, 
conversations, letters and notes’ which ‘range from the highly theoretical to the 
off­the-cuff comment; from the letter to the apologia’ – a suggestion we will 
return to shortly – Kroll discusses what that function might be. Citing Barthes, 
she wonders how students and academics involved in Creative Writing engage 
with the fact ‘that postmodern literary theory has called the whole idea of the 
“author” into question’, given that the discipline asks them to perform as both 
author and (potentially) theorist. If being a Creative Writing author-academic 
means attempting to accept a responsibility (for a text and its meaning) which 
theory has already delegated to the reader, Kroll sees ‘the exegesis therefore as a 
protest of sorts, the authorial voice once more demanding to be heard, to be part 
of the communication equation’. Of course, theory is here an already-academic 
component of an equation which includes a creativity traditionally located 
outside of the university, and this fact informs Kroll’s version of what I am 
referring to as the ethical view of this text: by protesting theory’s view of 
authorship, it creates space for authors to ‘speak [the universities’] language’, 
whilst at the same performing something similar to Barrett’s idea of valorisation 
in its ability to relate the creative text to the literary canon. 
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My implied criticism in response to each of these articles – that they move too 
swiftly from what this text is to what it should be – is perhaps unfair. After all, it 
is the natural progression of an academic article to outline and define its topic 
and then attempt to effect some change in its reader’s view of that topic. 
Moreover, each of these articles is written in order to advance the status and 
quality of a relatively young discipline, and so even when survey-based they have a 
polemical quality which an article written in the context of a more mature 
discipline might not. A polemic is always also personal and subjective, and it is 
therefore natural that each article’s definition of this text is, as with Milech and 
Schilo’s ‘local history’, effectively just what it seems to the authors to be. Within 
the confines of such subjectivity, each article does suggest something interesting 
about the relationship between this text and its creative counterpart in ways in 
which we will return to, but this polemical projection of a particular ideal for this 
text under the guise of analysing it is not the only way of approaching the issue. 
One alternative is found in J. T. Welsch’s ‘“Critical Approaches to Creative 
Writing”: A Case Study’ (2015), which offers a brief history of this text in terms of 
a more fundamental division which operates between notions of creativity and 
criticality – a topic we will return to, in a different way, in the next chapter. 
Having historicised that dynamic, Welsch goes on to give an account of an MA 
module he developed with the aim, in part, of ameliorating that creative/critical 
division such that ‘critical and creative practices might co-exist’. One of the key 
innovations for this module was the introduction of a manifesto as part of the 
programme of assessment. Here, ‘manifesto’ is not (quite) another item to add to 
the long list of names which have attached themselves to this text; as a mid-
semester assessment, it coexists with an end-of-semester instance of this text, 
which itself sits alongside the creative text it refers to. As such, the manifesto 
doesn’t precisely accompany the creative text, but in its name there is an 
anticipation of at least a resonance with the creative text, and thus it has a stake 
in the textual relationship I am exploring. One reason why Welsch’s intervention 
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is of interest here is that the term ‘manifesto’ itself resonates with the meta-
Creative Writing discourse I have discussed so far in this chapter: if the attitude 
to this text, on the level of the individual academic, is often ‘here is what I think 
this text should be’, the framing of a manifesto devolves that prerogative down to 
the student level: ‘what do you think your text should be?’. As Welsch notes, 
besides implying a sense of agency over the student’s eventual creative 
production, the manifesto itself ‘integrates critical and creative processes on a 
deeper, formal level’. This is seen in its history as a form variously construed in 
distinctly creative ways by F. T. Marinetti, William Carlos Williams, and 
Guillaume Apollinaire, amongst others, and therefore eases a sense of absolute 
distinction between this text and the creative work it relates to. The other key 
interest of Welsch’s intervention is in its flagging up of the fact that, faced with 
various and contradictory accounts as discussed above, or, in his case, faced with 
with the various institutional edicts sent forth from the Arts and Humanities 
Research Council, the National Association of Writers in Education, and the 
Quality Assurance Agency, there is an opportunity to put forth new 
configurations which reorient how Creative Writing does work. The lack of a 
clear, authoritative line ‘leaves us free to define [Creative Writing’s] spectrum of 
practice’ – or, more effective interventions might be made by simply owning that 
sense of intervention, polemic, or manifesto. 
This future potential nonetheless proceeds from a current position which 
might be better understood. In ‘Supplementary Discourses in Creative Writing 
Teaching at Higher Education Level’, a 2003 report from the UK-based English 
Subject Centre which is cited by NAWE’s benchmark, Robert Sheppard and 
Scott Thurston deliver some of that understanding by taking a survey-based 
approach in order to explore ‘the varieties of discourse that creative writing 
tutors ask higher education students (from BA levels 1, 2 and 3, M level to 
postgraduate research) to produce to accompany, complement and/or supplement 
writing’ (3). Hence, they also supply yet another term for this text: ‘supplementary 
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discourse’. Sheppard and Thurston start from an anecdotal observation that ‘there 
is little uniformity over the value, principles, aims, techniques, level descriptors 
or assessment patterns and weighting, or even amount, of this writing’ and ‘no 
uniformity of view as to the influence of this (usually) separately assessed 
discourse on the reception and assessment of the creative elements’ and then give 
an account of a three-stage methodology designed to ‘determine the range and 
extent of [supplementary discourses]’ and ‘evaluate the functions of such 
discourses in terms of pedagogy and level’ (3). 
Whilst the report does make recommendations regarding how supplementary 
discourses should be implemented, this is, unlike the articles from TEXT, kept 
separate from the initial data-gathering process, which itself was conducted 
according to a clear methodology. As such, a large part of its interest comes from 
its quantitative evidence, especially as it gives a British account of a subject which 
has primarily been written about from an Australasian context. As such we learn 
that, for instance (circa 2003): almost all students are asked to produce 
supplementary discourses (5); there are indeed any number of different names for 
it (5); the weighting of marks between supplementary discourse and creative work 
can range from 67:33 to 20:80 respectively (6); more than three quarters of tutors 
see its function as helping them to ‘assess students’ creative products and 
processes’ (7); tutors tend to feel that it also functions for the student to both 
explain their work and learn about literature (8); an important extra audience for 
the supplementary discourse is internal and external moderators (9); some 
consider that it also operates as a defence mechanism to prove that the subject is 
sufficiently academic (9-10); there is little agreement regarding how and to what 
extent it influences the marks given to creative work (10-11); and the majority ‘of 
practitioners see a link between supplementary discourses and literary-critical 
and/or theoretical discourses’, though the nature of that link is contentious (17). 
All of which, perhaps encouragingly, suggests that the British situation is not so 
different from that of the academics writing in TEXT. On the one hand, the 
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supplementary discourse is endemic in Creative Writing, being present far more 
often than not, and there seems to be a broad acceptance of it amongst 
academics. On the other, there is no clear consensus about its form, function or 
audience – regarding each of which there are a number of often contradictory 
responses.  
Besides this reassurance that the British scene is not so different, the report 
provides some interesting additional ideas about this text – primarily, the very 
name it gives to it, which is useful for two reasons. First, it identifies it distinctly 
without either delimiting the form it might take or privileging the terminology of 
one institution or group of institutions; compare the Australasian term ‘exegesis’, 
which implies some similarity with or echo of the very specific tradition of 
biblical exegesis. In ‘Preface as Exegesis’ (2002) Nigel Krauth explores the history 
of the word ‘exegesis’ and points out that its use here carries certain ironies. 
Because the traditional exegetical form is written with reference to the Bible, the 
word contains ‘the idea of there being a canonical text that the exegesis supports: 
i.e. a canonical text that needs explanations’ which is, for one thing, diametrically 
opposed to any notion that the creative writer’s text might be still in progress and 
ripe for improvement. The term ‘supplementary discourse’, meanwhile, is 
apparently used by no institution and echoes no particular tradition. 
Beyond this, it suggests something interesting – or at the very least 
provocative – about the relationship between this text and the creative text it 
accompanies. This is addressed briefly in the report, with one tutor responding to 
Sheppard and Thurston’s neologism by saying it is ‘not supplementary. The study 
of writing is, and should be, on an equal par with the practice of writing’ and 
another that they ‘place a VERY strong emphasis on reading, research and 
scholarship equal to the so-called creative process. The discourses, for us, are in 
no way “supplementary”’. Two other tutors likewise suggest that the word 
‘supplementary’ itself ‘might be better replaced by the term ‘complementary’ or 
even ‘symbiotic’’ (12). When these respondents rail against the idea of this text 
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being a supplement, they appear to be thinking in terms of the OED’s definition 
1.a. of that word: something ‘added to make good a deficiency or as an 
enhancement; an addition or continuation to remedy or compensate for 
inadequacies’. Which is to say, this text should not be thought of as 
supplementary because suggesting that this text exists to make good an 
insufficiency elsewhere damages the sense that it is valid and important in itself, 
that it might have its own inherent merit. Just as damagingly, this insinuates that 
the creative text is somehow incomplete or unable to stand on its own merits – 
which are not qualities any writer of literature would presumably desire, 
especially when aiming for a passing mark. 
However, the alternatives offered here – the idea that this might instead be 
thought of as a complementary or a symbiotic discourse – carry their own 
insinuations. The OED’s first definition of ‘complementary’ says that it means 
‘completing, perfecting’ something else, whilst the second suggests that when two 
or more things are complementary they are ‘completing each other’s deficiencies’; 
its biological definition of ‘symbiosis’, meanwhile, suggests organisms which ‘live 
attached to each other, or one as a tenant of the other, and contribute to each 
other’s support’. In either case, there is still in these words a suggestion of 
insufficiency in isolation – indeed, a similar sense to the OED’s definition 1.b. of 
‘supplement’, a ‘part added to complete or extend a literary work’ (emphasis mine). 
None of these descriptors quite manage to position this text as something which 
is intimately related to the creative text without implying that the creative text is 
incomplete when left to its own devices. This problem is not simply for lack of a 
better word: the fact that the respondents in Sheppard and Thurston’s survey 
picked up on the word ‘supplementary’ and attempted to replace it suggests some 
anxiety about the relationship between these two texts. The word ‘supplement’ 
and its derivations, of course, has a particular significance in the context of 
Derridean deconstruction. Christopher Norris explains that 
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On the one hand a ‘supplement’ is that which may be added to 
something already complete in itself and thus having no need of such 
optional extras. On the other, it is a necessary addition, one that supplies 
(makes up for) some existing lack and must henceforth be counted an 
integral part of the whole (111) 
 
We will return to this ‘double logic’ later, but suffice to say it seems to neatly 
capture the problems of these words – ‘supplementary’, ‘complementary’, 
‘symbiotic’ – used to describe the discourse of this text: the creative text must 
stand on its own two feet, but at the same time the supplementary discourse must 
needfully provide something absent from it. 
This same anxiety can be traced in articles written on the subject, and 
possibly even in those articles’ rapid movement from ‘what is it?’ to ‘what should 
it be?’. I have already suggested that Estelle Barrett’s account of how this text can 
valorise the creative work, useful as it might be, actually glosses over a knotty 
problem in her own model of this text as a carrier for a meme. In fact, looking at 
how Norris describes the Derridean supplement we might now rephrase that 
argument by saying that the same basically problematic structural relationship 
between this text and its creative counterpart holds even without the idea of 
memetic value being introduced, and her introduction of memetic behaviour 
might stem from a place more rhetorical than theoretical. Likewise, Milech and 
Schilo state that their issue with certain models of the exegesis boils down to the 
relationship they imply between exegesis and creative text. Their favoured model 
could be seen as an attempt to have it both ways: as they put it, each part is 
‘substantively integrated’ even whilst each is ‘conducted though the “language” of 
a particular discourse’, but as the part written in creative discourse is obviously 
non-negotiable in a Creative Writing submission, one might further suggest that 
the other part must be supplementary, and so the same issue appears. Kroll casts 
the relationship between the two texts in two different lights. For practical and 
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administrative purposes, thinking of the supplementary discourse as the place 
where verifiably academic work is done seems useful. Although it does suggest 
that the work being done in the creative text might not be academic as such, it is 
entirely possible that this is something that someone in the discipline would be 
willing to accept, and not take as a sign of insufficiency in that creative work. At 
the same time, that creative work is still being subjected to the same processes 
(rubrics, marking, degree-granting) as any other piece of student work, and it 
remains to be explained precisely what content, besides being written in a 
particular discourse, this text provides which the creative does not. 
Potentially more interesting is the idea that this text is not so different from 
the various ancillary texts which literary authors have long produced as part of 
the business of being an author – as Kroll puts it, ‘musings, forewords, afterwords, 
essays, interviews, conversations, letters and notes’. In both this and the 
suggestion that this text offers the writer a chance to place themselves back into a 
‘communication equation’ which Barthes’s ‘The Death of the Author’ has excluded 
them from, Kroll’s article is echoing ideas in Krauth’s 2002 article ‘The Preface as 
Exegesis’. Krauth persuasively builds two lines of argument for the idea that this 
text has its clearest analogue in the literary preface. The first is through the term 
‘exegesis’ which, whilst potentially misleading in some respects, does tie this text 
into a long history. The Bible, he suggests, has ‘a cultural excuse for this sort of 
ongoing explaining’ in that the culture receiving it is increasingly removed from 
the culture which produced it as time goes on. He locates echoes of this impulse- 
and demand-to-explain in activities writers pursue alongside writing, such as 
giving interviews and appearing at literary festivals, and then also in literature 
produced before the preface found its codified place in publishing culture, such as 
the argument in Milton’s Paradise Lost and the chorus in Shakespeare’s Henry V. 
His second line of argument, which in effect fills in the gap between these two 
historical points, explores in more detail some Victorian and modern prefatory 
work which seems to him to feel like a Creative Writing exegesis, including that 
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of Edgar Allan Poe and Vladimir Nabokov. In Nabokov, for instance, he looks at 
the afterword to Lolita and the foreword to Bend Sinister, both of which 
‘identified, emphasised and elaborated the territory of the preface as a key 
exegetical site’ in their reflexive awareness of the fact that the preface is a place 
which can be used for the kind of explanatory work normally taken on by critics. 
In just the same way, the writer of this text is effectively taking on a role as reader 
not normally available to a writer of literature. Perhaps more persuasively, 
Nabokov’s Pale Fire is cited as a novel which even ‘looks like a PhD submission’, 
consisting as it does of ‘a 999­line poem in heroic couplets followed by a 200­page 
Commentary with Index’. 
I earlier suggested that the word ‘exegesis’ would be, potentially misleading if 
taken as a model rather than just a name. However, there is no available corpus of 
examples of this text which is so broad and fairly sampled that one could arrive at 
a justifiable abstract model of it through analysis of the thing itself – and even if 
there were such a corpus, Jeri Kroll’s suggestion that writing an exegesis means 
‘creating a new type of discourse’ would give us pause over the potential results of 
such an analysis.* That being the case, it would be useful to have a comparable 
                                                             
 
* One thing we do have in this regard is Creative Writing degrees at PhD level, 
which often feature a critical component and are often made available via the 
British Library’s EThOS repository. However, such critical components don’t 
tend to partake in the kind of relationship with the creative text which I am 
here interested in. As an example, a search on EThOS for a recent Creative 
Writing thesis gives us Anna James’ ‘The Scribbler’s Tales’, and, Scribbling, talking 
and jangling: Ned Ward’s ‘The London Spy’ in the discursive spaces of late seventeenth-
century London. This rather ungainly title signifies the two sections of the thesis: 
The Scribbler’s Tales is a novel set in late-seventeenth century London, while the 
critical piece examines a periodical written in late-seventeenth century London. 
As such, the two share a thematic concern, but the one does not directly 
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kind of text through which to explore how this text might function. Krauth’s 
argument for its similarity to the preface – as well as being persuasive in its own 
right – offers that kind of model. As well as discussing certain similarities in 
terms of the contents of prefaces/exegeses and the impulses involved in writing 
them, Krauth raises an idea about the relationships between these texts and their 
literary counterparts: 
No matter what it is called, this prefacing or exegetical activity is a 
framing device positioned between the world created in the fiction (or 
play or poem) and the world the reader inhabits. It is aimed at creating a 
link between the creative work, its milieu of production, and the broader 
field into which it is projected. It is not fictocritical; it involves a 
narrative voice obviously different from that employed in the creative 
text. While it comments on the mechanisms of the main text, it is itself 
an associated site and therefore a mechanism of the main text too. It is a 
part of the main work, but apart from it. As is the case with the academic 
higher degree exegesis. 
Here, a part/apart wittily summarises the anxiety in the relationship between this 
text and the creative text which I have been discussing elsewhere, as well as 
Norris’s gloss of the term ‘supplementary’. Krauth is essentially arguing in favour 
of the value of the exegesis as a component of Creative Writing, and therefore 
does not explore the problem he tacitly raises, but it is entirely possible to 
respond by asking, well, which is it? If it is a part of the ‘main work’, what does 
that say about the literature which Creative Writing produces? If it is apart from 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
comment upon the other; the critical component operates in the mode of – and 
is in principle publishable as – a ‘traditional’ work of literary criticism. While 
this chapter does not explicitly concern that particular relationship, its direction 
might be informative for thinking about this form of Creative-Critical PhD 
thesis. 
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the ‘main work’, is it then secondary in status, or even unnecessary? Or if (as 
seems to be the case) it is both, then what does that mean for the student 
attempting to write this paradoxical text? 
Through looking at recent writing about this text I have been attempting to 
identify a particular angle on this text which seems to me to be both important 
and generally overlooked. The question of ‘what is this text?’ is particularly 
indicated by the issue of what to call it. Every institution makes its own decisions 
which contribute to its own history, and so variations in naming are not 
uncommon: a British university might call its undergraduate English course ‘BA 
English’ or ‘BA English Literature’ or ‘BA English Literature and Language’, and 
so on. However, this text is remarkable for having names so numerous and 
disparate, even whilst everybody seems to agree that they all refer to essentially 
the same thing; a rare similar situation, as we will see, is that of the preface. The 
one caveat here is that certain non-creative Creative Writing outputs, such as the 
‘step outline or planning document’ or the ‘exercise in professional preparation 
such as a mock interview or funding application’ also mentioned by the QAA’s 
Creative Writing subject benchmark statement, might be thought of as more 
general pedagogic tools rather than something particular to Creative Writing – 
but these are anyway clearly not the kind of thing which Creative Writing 
academics are so keen to discuss (16). Multiply defined, multiply named, but 
nonetheless a particular thing: that is the condition of… at this point, we can’t go 
on with the game of referring obliquely to this text as ‘this text’. The rhetorical 
point has probably by now been made, and so I will continue by referring to it as 
the ‘supplementary discourse’. This term also highlights something else about the 
angle I am attempting to identify: all of this writing about the supplementary 
discourse seems to be reliably anxious, in one way or another, about how it relates 
to the creative text it accompanies. Without a standard, or at least predominant 
discursive or formal model in place for it, it seems that any answer to the 
86 
 
question of ‘what is it?’ must start with that relationship. We will begin to explore 
it by means of the preface. 
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2.2: Paratext, function, and the supplementary discourse 
So, it might be useful to think about the supplementary discourse in terms of the 
preface. But how are we to define the preface, and how are we to think about its 
function? Any simple answer to the first question – perhaps ‘the text labelled 
‘Preface’ which is published in a book immediately before the beginning of the 
text proper’ – does not in itself get us very far in answering the second. Under 
that definition, an author in a mischievous mood could after all choose to put 
anything in that section (another fictional piece of writing, an essay unrelated to 
the main work, a shopping list) and have it qualify as a preface – and it might 
indeed qualify, but this tells us little about how prefacing works. In his afterword 
to Quilt, Nicholas Royle suggests that an afterword might ‘go anywhere’ or even 
‘turn out to be longer than the work preceding it’, and the same is surely true of the 
preface (153). What is the difference between an afterword and a preface, anyway? 
Perhaps only that the afterword is after and the preface is pre the text, though 
much might be said about the difference this might make to a reader’s experience 
of the text(s), and even the difference between words and faces. But then, for our 
comparative purposes, the supplementary discourse is neither pre nor after the 
creative text, necessarily. Through the whims of institutional practice and sheer 
chance, it might be stapled into a document before the creative text, or after it, or 
stapled separately, with the two documents in an arbitrary order, or, as is 
increasingly likely, submitted and assessed entirely electronically, such that there 
is no real before and after between the two documents.  
In the preceding paragraph I have been talking about two qualities, nominal 
and spatial. For the former quality, the supplementary discourse is only rarely 
actually called a ‘preface’, and we know that there is no settled alternative name 
for it. We might also discount the latter quality as being effectively an arbitrary 
factor, both for the above reasons and because a reader (or, more pertinently, a 
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marker or an examiner) might anyway choose to read the two texts in whatever 
order they like. What is important here is the function of the preface. 
This is what Gerard Genette addresses in Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation 
(originally published in 1987), in which he discusses a number of examples of 
what he calls ‘paratexts’; elements which form the border between a text and the 
wider world. Focussing on literary texts (although much of what he says might be 
applied equally to a non-literary work), he notes that a ‘text is rarely presented in 
an unadorned state, unreinforced and unaccompanied by a certain number of 
verbal or other productions, such as an author’s name, a title, a preface, 
illustrations’ (1). These elements, along with other paratexts such as publishing 
details, epigraphs, and footnotes, each may or may not be present with a text. 
However, a text without any of these paratexts is almost unimaginable in the real 
world: the idea suggests an completely unlabelled, unmarked volume which 
begins and ends precisely with the text. 
But, even then, factors such as the place where the volume was found, and the 
nature of its binding, and even the typography might influence how it is 
interpreted in ways analogous to the title and preface, and so might be considered 
paratextual. For instance, any reasonable reader would react to and read a stapled 
sheaf of A4 discovered in a field differently to an unlabelled leather-bound tome 
found in a second-hand bookshop – even if the texts they contained were 
identical. In just the same way, the paratexts which Genette discusses all, in 
different ways, work to condition a reader’s response to and interpretation of the 
text to which they are attached. As he puts it, paratexts are ‘always the conveyor 
of a commentary that is authorial […] at the service of a better reception for the 
text and a more pertinent reading of it’ (2); or, one of their functions is as a 
strategic point at which the author might influence the reader. 
Genette’s account of paratexts makes space for the difficulty regarding the 
supplementary discourse’s relationship with the creative work, in that a paratext 
is neither a part of nor apart from, neither inside nor truly outside the text. The 
89 
 
leather binding of our hypothetical paratext-less book would not be considered as 
being part of the text, of the same order as a sentence from within the text, but it 
nonetheless clearly influences how the text is read; likewise, Genette asks us ‘how 
would we read Joyce’s Ulysses if it were not entitled Ulysses?’ (2). The title, again, 
evidently conditions the reading of a text, but is not a necessary piece of that text 
– as further evidenced by the fact that, especially for older works, texts are often 
given titles after the fact by scholars, or given different titles in different places. 
This difficulty in assessing the relationship between text and paratext leads 
Genette to employ a variety of phrases – ‘threshold’, ‘vestibule’, ‘fringe’, ‘edge’, 
‘undefined zone’ – to express its ambiguity (2). We will return later to the 
usefulness of this slightly ambiguous language of transition for thinking about the 
supplementary discourse. 
Having brought his general topic into focus, Genette then begins to suggest 
some of the significant characteristics which a paratext might have, beginning 
with the spatial, which we have already briefly discussed for the preface, and then 
its ‘temporal, substantial, pragmatic, and functional characteristics’, or: where; 
when; how; from and to whom; and to do what, respectively (4). Rather than 
dwell on these in the abstract, we will discuss them specifically in terms of the 
preface and the supplementary discourse. It is important to note initially that the 
first four of these characteristics ‘lead to the main point, which is the functional 
aspect of the paratext’ (12). These four, according to Genette, can be described in 
terms of the options they take from a limited menu of alternatives. A title, for 
instance, might be placed (spatially) on the front cover, or withheld until an 
inside page before the start of the text, or, theoretically, announced at the end of 
a text – but not on the back of someone’s hand, or kept as a secret by the author, 
because these options would disqualify it from functioning as a title. A dedication 
might have been published (temporally) in the first edition of a book, or in a later 
edition – but can’t be published before the book is published, or relayed only in 
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private correspondence, because that would disqualify it from functioning as a 
dedication. 
These examples use the word ‘functioning’ deliberately, in that these 
characteristics work to affect the function of the paratext: a dedication added to a 
later edition of a text might well function differently, at least to its addressee(s), 
than one in the initial publication. However, they do not define the function, and 
Genette suggests that, unlike the other characteristics, ‘the functions of the 
paratext cannot be described theoretically and, as it were, a priori in terms of 
status’, which is to say that the function of the paratext is not a restricted choice 
amongst limited alternatives (12). Like the literary text itself, a title (for instance) 
might hold any of a limitless number of functions, and more than one function at 
once: it could be humorous, emotive, descriptive, hyperbolic, generic, 
intertextual; it could target a particular audience, and be inviting, or forbidding, 
or attempt to suggest that the text targets no specific audience; it could be taken 
from the text, or refer to the content of the text, and be accurate, or deceitful, or 
have no obvious relation to the text; and so on, ad infinitum. As such, the other 
characteristics of a paratext are generalisable, discussable in the abstract, but its 
function must be discussed with regards to its specific instance. 
Nonetheless, those other aspects do delimit some of the ways in which the 
paratext can or does function: a preface, by its nature, holds different functions 
from a title, or the name of an author, and an afterword enjoys a different set of 
functional possibilities to a preface. It is in this way that Genette offers a useful 
analytical route, providing language to discuss these characteristics with and 
modelling how they might affect a paratext’s function. But, is it useful for the 
supplementary discourse – or, is the supplementary discourse a paratext? 
In a moment we will (finally) come to discuss the preface/supplementary 
discourse model for which I have already made a case, but there is one more 
abstract point to be made in relation to this question. One thing which can be 
said a priori about the supplementary discourse is that, even in its loosest, least 
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self-reflexive form, it would not exist without the creative text it is written 
alongside. A ‘critical reflective commentary’ (or whatever language one chooses to 
use) without a literary text upon which it can reflect and comment is not quite a 
nonsensical idea, but it would at the very least, in referring to a non-existent text, 
itself become fictional. Indeed, these creative potentials residing within the idea 
of commentary have been exploited by literary fiction, perhaps most notably by 
Nabokov’s 1962 novel Pale Fire, in which a 999-line poem is followed by a 
significantly longer commentary which turns out to be much more than ‘just’ a 
commentary. Of course, in that novel the long poem is written by Nabokov 
precisely so that he might write a commentary upon it, but the poem still exists; 
more absolute examples of the practice might be found in the short stories of 
Jorge Luis Borges, particularly 1939’s ‘Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote’, 
which carries out a critical biography of the life and work of the entirely fictional 
Pierre Menard. That this is not just a one-off novelty avenue of creative practice 
is marked by the upcoming publication of The Anthology of Babel, edited by Ed 
Simon, which takes as its name a pun on Borges’ ‘The Library of Babel’, and which 
features twenty commentaries on non-existent authors or texts (Simon 2018). The 
contemporaneity of this anthology, which even while it nods its head to Borges 
bills itself as ‘inaugurat[ing] a completely new literary genre’, invites speculation 
as to how far the supplementary discourse and its cognates form part of its 
inspiration and genesis; in claiming to blur ‘the lines between scholarship and 
creative writing’, there is a distinct sense that this book is emerging from 
precisely the institutional conjunction of English and Creative Writing which is 
the focus of this entire thesis. However, this literary-fictional capacity of 
commentary notwithstanding, would an essay written about compositional issues 
drawing on the writer’s own practice still hold as an essay, for which academic 
credit is conferred, if that practice had never actually occurred? Probably not. In 
this, the supplementary discourse matches exactly Genette’s suggestion that ‘the 
paratext in all its forms is […] dedicated to the service of something other than 
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itself that constitutes its raison d’être […] the paratextual element is always 
subordinate to “its” text’ (12). 
Genette begins his discussion of the preface by defining the term broadly, 
noting that (in a situation which, it seems fair to suggest, mirrors that of the 
supplementary discourse) ‘the list of that term’s French parasynonyms is very 
long’ (161). The equivalent English list, whilst perhaps shorter than the French, 
might include preface, postface, foreword, afterword, introduction, essay, note, 
acknowledgements, some instances of prologue (though not Chaucer’s), some 
instances of prelude (though not Wordsworth’s), and others. In order to account 
for this multiplicity, the term ‘preface’ is, in Genette’s words, broadened to 
include ‘every type of introductory (preludial or postludial) text, authorial or 
allographic, consisting of a discourse produced on the subject of the text that 
follows or precedes it’ (161). This seems to capture the supplementary discourse, 
with the proviso of a question mark over the term ‘introductory’, which might be 
too strong a restriction on a text which can also be seen as having a number of 
other functions. From here, Genette discusses some factors which make up the 
status (that is, the condition in terms of the first four characteristics already 
mentioned) of a preface, which I will briefly summarise with reference to the 
supplementary discourse; all quoted italics are in the original. 
 
Place: I have already mentioned the issue of place a number of times with 
regards to the preface/supplementary discourse analogy. However, as well as 
reiterating the possibilities of pre- and post-, Genette here raises the interesting 
point that a preface might, after the fact, be reproduced without its reference 
text: examples might include Henry James’ essay collection The Art of the Novel 
(1934), and the four forewords reproduced in John Barth’s Further Fridays (1995). 
Likewise, a supplementary discourse might reasonably be reproduced later on its 
own – perhaps as a model text for later students or, especially in the case of 
doctorate-level work, as an academic publication in its own right. This might lead 
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us to the question of whether or not a supplementary discourse maintains its 
paratextual status even when held separate from the text to which it is para-. (172-
4) 
 
Time: Here Genette is discussing not the date of composition (which fact is 
generally invisible to the reader) but the date of publication. Although, as he 
notes, a preface might theoretically be published at any moment in the ‘ensuing 
eternity’ following publication, in practice there are ‘certain typical and 
functionally significant temporal positions’ (174). Most commonly, a preface will 
be published in the first edition of a text – ‘the original preface’, which must 
functionally anticipate the text’s reception; or, it may be published in a later 
edition, most commonly the second – ‘the later preface’, which might functionally 
respond to a reception the text has already received; or finally, it may be 
published when the work is reproduced in a new form, such as in an anthology – 
‘the delayed preface’, which functionally might respond to the fact and nature of 
the republication. Moreover, prefaces may disappear and reappear in ensuing 
editions, both ant- and posthumously, for a variety of reasons. It is clear that 
within these possibilities, the supplementary discourse is effectively an original 
preface, ‘published’ (if that term is taken as applicable to an assessment 
submission) simultaneously with its text. However, this situation may be 
complicated when the text has already been discussed in a workshop or seminar, 
in which case the supplementary discourse might respond to that earlier criticism 
in the style of a later preface, although the creative work will typically have been 
changed and edited in the intervening period. (174-8) 
 
Senders: Genette apologetically announces that this trait demands ‘a 
cumbersome typology’ because the sender of a preface is not who wrote it, but 
who appears to have written it, or the ‘alleged author’. Most commonly, the 
sender is identical to the author, which Genette terms the ‘authorial, or 
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autobiographical, preface’. However, a preface could easily be signed by a character 
from the text, which he terms ‘the actorial preface’, or by a ‘wholly different 
(third) person: the allographic preface’. Each one of these categories might then be 
further defined as being ‘authentic’, ‘apocryphal’, or ‘fictive’. For example, if an 
allographic preface is both written and signed by the same person it is authentic; 
if it is written by one person but falsely signed in the name of another real person 
it is apocryphal; and if it is signed in the name of an imaginary person, regardless 
of who actually wrote it, it is fictive. Hence, Genette creates a typology along two 
axes which cross reference into nine possibilities, although some are significantly 
more common than others. At first glance, it might seem that supplementary 
discourses could be regarded as universally authorial and authentic, in that each 
one is, by necessity, signed honestly by (the anonymised student ID of) the 
student who wrote it. However, within that bureaucratic frame it is easy to 
conjure ways in which a student might subvert this apparent authenticity. A 
supplementary discourse might, for example, successfully fulfil its commentarial 
functions while speaking in the voice of another, in the second person, to the 
author. Or, if the creative work has a certain meta quality, it may well be 
appropriate to have a character from the creative work speak of their own 
composition and development over time. No doubt there are myriad other 
possibilities raised here: I would suggest that any category in Genette’s typology 
could successfully be employed by an exegesis – except the authorial apocryphal, 
which would doubtless be deemed plagiaristic. (178-94) 
 
Addressees: The addressee – or, who the sender is sending to – has fewer 
possibilities than the sender. In the broadest sense, the addressee of a preface is 
merely whoever happens to be reading the text. Or, with slightly more nuance, 
the addressee is whoever has just or is about to read the text – depending on their 
order in the publication and the order in which the reader chooses to tackle 
them. There is, however, the possibility of a ‘relay-addressee’ to whom the preface 
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is explicitly addressed, regardless of the actual audience. For example, the preface 
might take the form of a letter to a particular person or character, but ultimately 
have the same readership as the text itself. For the supplementary discourse the 
addressee is, de facto, the examiner or marker, and it seems to me that any 
deviation from this via a relay-addressee would have effects not dissimilar from 
those of an apocryphal or fictive sender. For instance, a supplementary discourse 
might well invert the earlier suggestion of being written in the voice of a 
character and instead be addressed to a character, with similar consequences vis a 
vis the drawing in of elements from the creative text. (194-5) 
 
In any case, Genette does not account for the addressee in his final typology of 
six functional types of preface. At this point, he begins a new chapter by taking 
his earlier chart of types of senders and making ‘adjustments according to the 
parameters of place and time’ to produce a ‘strictly functional typology divided 
into six fundamental types’ which he will then spend the ensuing chapter 
justifying. This typology, he quickly clarifies, is ‘wholly operational’, not 
‘watertight’, in that it provides an equivocal means of proceeding to discuss the 
preface, rather than a stable structure into which all prefaces must necessarily fit, 
but it is via these six fundamental types that he moves from a discussing status to 
discussing function. 
At this point, it might be useful to consider what we can say about the 
preface/supplementary discourse analogy thus far. Certainly, if one were to do 
what this chapter is explicitly not doing and analyse some number of 
supplementary discourses wholesale, Genette’s language seems to provide a step 
towards that end. Thinking about place, we might discuss how the student’s 
anticipation of either the creative or the supplementary text being read first 
(whether due to submissions guidelines or personal assumptions) might affect 
how it functions. Thinking about time, the condition of whether or not the text 
has already been workshopped, and hence whether the supplementary discourse is 
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closer to ‘original’ or ‘later’ in nature, clearly affects its reflective and critical 
qualities.* Thinking about senders seems especially germane to a text which not 
only aligns with the nature of the preface in significant ways, but which is also 
being produced within the context of Creative Writing. Creative Writing does 
not primarily aim to teach the student how to write a supplementary discourse, 
but how to write literature: to say as much is both a seeming truism and 
supported by Sheppard and Thurston’s survey, in which respondents largely 
reported that the supplementary discourse only takes priority over the creative 
work in specific and exceptional circumstances (14-15). The supplementary 
discourse is thus subordinate both ontologically and in terms of importance to 
that creative work, and it therefore seems reasonable to expect creative deviations 
from the authentic authorial mode – which is to say, creative variations of the 
sender – which would likely characterise almost any other academic output. 
Genette’s typology is, however, and by his own admission, itself susceptible to 
deviation, and there are number of problems we might raise with his approach 
both in the abstract and with regards to the preface/supplementary discourse 
                                                             
 
* There is here an additional complication regarding whether the text submitted 
for assessment is strictly the same text as that which was workshopped. If one 
holds that the changes made in the intervening time mean that these are two 
separate texts with two separate identities, then the supplementary discourse 
would effectively be ‘original’; if the text’s identity survives those changes, such 
that these are two versions of the same text, the supplementary discourse is 
‘later’. Of course, the former possibility would never be placed upon a text which 
has undergone grammar and spelling corrections, while the latter would never 
be applied to a short story being rewritten as a poem. Arbitrating the difference 
between these options, effectively deciding how many changes must occur to a 
text before it is no longer the same text, rapidly approaches the condition of 
Zeno’s paradoxes, and so will not be pursued further. 
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specifically. For instance, at an abstract level, Paratexts is ambiguous about where 
we should be drawing the border between paratext and not-paratext – an 
ambiguity which gestures towards a deconstructive potential which Genette, 
given his affiliations with a more structuralist approach, does not greatly pursue. I 
will return to this shortly, but even requesting or expecting such a border is, of 
course, immediately ironic: as we have already seen, the paratext is for Genette 
the very thing which creates a border-zone around a text and ‘enables it to be 
offered as such [i.e., as a text] to its readers’ (1), and so to draw a line beyond 
which texts no longer count as paratexts would be to mark those texts 
immediately beyond the line as constituting the border, and so as paratextual. For 
example, one might (quite arbitrarily) decide that only elements published within 
the same volume as a text can be paratexts, but to draw this line is to create a 
relationship between the elements on either side of it (e.g., this title is paratextual 
as opposed to this interview, which is not), and upon entering such a relationship 
the elements on the other side of the line necessarily become paratextual. In fact, 
Genette does consider interviews to be paratextual elements; this situation is 
perhaps why he adds an additional stricture to paratext-status beyond having 
some relationship with the text by saying that this ‘group of practices and 
discourses’ will be ‘federate[d] under the term “paratext” in the name of a 
common interest […] which is characterised by an authorial intention and 
assumption of responsibility’ (2-3). 
However, this very fact, this inherent instability in the para-status of 
paratexts, raises questions Genette does not pursue. For instance, he asserts early 
on that ‘a text without a paratext does not exist and never has existed’, but 
‘paratexts without texts do exist, if only by accident’ (3-4) – his example is of titles 
which survive whilst their texts have been lost to history, but we might equally 
suggest prefaces which are read by readers who have never and will never read the 
texts they relate to, as must surely be the case for at least some readers of Henry 
James’ The Art of the Novel. In such a case, what was the paratext is now 
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functioning as a text in its own right, with its own set of paratexts (title, 
footnotes, possibly even a further preface) with respect to which it is in the 
dominant position.* This kind of shift might be replicated for any given paratext. 
From this I would suggest that (1) paratexts either can be or are always also texts 
in their own right, (2) if a paratext is also a text, it must have its own paratexts, 
and (3) if this status of text or paratext is mutable, some discourses generally 
considered texts might also be or become paratextual to some other text. Two 
pieces of writing might even function as text and paratext to one another. 
At stake in all of this is both the nature of the supplementary discourse and 
its relationship with the creative text. Recall the protests of those respondents to 
Sheppard and Thurston’s survey: the supplementary discourse is not 
supplementary, and to say it is does a disservice to both it and the creative text it 
accompanies. For all their variety and power, paratexts are evidently less read, less 
studied, and less regarded than the literary texts they frame. In Creative Writing, 
this imbalance is unacceptable to any tutor who treats the supplementary 
discourse as an important product in its own right, whether that be because it 
forces the student into intellectual contact with their own practice of writing or 
because it acts as a vehicle for creative writers to do the vital work of reading and 
digesting the practice of other writers. This imbalance would be equally 
unacceptable to any tutor who regards the supplementary discourse as 
unfortunate or superfluous due to the imputation that the forced inclusion of this 
                                                             
 
* I am here using the word ‘text’ specifically in the context of Genette’s typology, 
as opposed to as a general term for any written or printed discourse, under 
which definition all of the above could unproblematically be termed textual. 
This more restricted usage is invited by Genette’s own distinction between the 
two terms: for the time being, take ‘text’ to mean the piece of writing which is 
bordered by paratext(s). 
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lesser part makes about the self-sufficiency of literary text. For both hypothetical 
parties, and those on the scale between them, the more amorphous version of the 
text/paratext relationship I am suggesting, in which status and power are not so 
strictly delimited, offers a way out of that imbalance. 
Clearly, the relationship between these two texts is more complicated than a 
simple dominant/subordinate pairing. In ‘The Critic as Host’, J Hillis Miller 
responds to an idea of a ‘parasitical’ criticism by exploring the prefix para-: 
“Para” as a prefix in English (sometimes “par”) indicates alongside, near 
or beside, beyond, incorrectly, resembling or similar to, subsidiary to, 
isomeric or polymeric to. In borrowed Greek compounds “para” 
indicates beside, to the side of, alongside, beyond, wrongfully, harmfully, 
unfavourably, and among. (441) 
Leaving aside the negative implications of para-, we might from this come back to 
a consideration of how the preface (as a paratext) might not only be beside and 
subordinate to its text, but also resemble, reflect and (isomerically or 
polymerically) restructure it – how it might be amongst it even as it is alongside 
it. As Miller has it, the prefix denotes something which is ‘simultaneously this 
side of the boundary line, threshold, or margin, and at the same time beyond it, 
equivalent in status and at the same time secondary, submissive’*, and also ‘the 
boundary itself which is at once a permeable membrane connecting inside and 
outside […] dividing them but also forming an ambiguous transition between one 
and the other’ (441). 
These possibilities are not raised as a counterargument to Genette’s typology: 
the difficulties of this relationship which I will go on to explore do not alter the 
status of the texts on either side of the relationship. Moreover, Genette is not deaf 
                                                             
 
* The word ‘threshold’ is significant here as a word not only repeated by Genette 
but also employed in the French as the original title of Paratexts: Seuils. 
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to the issues raised by the para- in ‘paratext’: the opening paragraph of Paratexts 
describes the paratext as ‘a threshold’, ‘a zone without any hard and fast boundary’, 
‘a zone not only of transition but also of transaction’ (2). Not for nothing does he 
refer a number of times the the ‘Outwork’ of Derrida’s Dissemination (1972), a text 
which we will also be approaching (161-2, 196, 235). 
We left off an account of Genette’s typology of prefaces in Paratexts precisely 
at the point where it comes to ideas of function. At the same time as coming back 
to the issue of function in Genette’s account, it is important to be cognisant of 
the issues which are raised by a more concerted look at the relationship between 
the supplementary discourse and its creative text. I will begin the next section by 
exploring that issue. 
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2.3: A supplementary detour 
As I have mentioned, Genette refers a number of times to Derrida’s Dissemination 
(first published in 1981), specifically the opening section, which is titled 
‘Outwork’ and introduced by a page which offers, in a manner not dissimilar to 
the first page of this chapter, other names including ‘Hors d’Ouevre’, ‘Foreplay’ 
and ‘Prefacing’ (1). Although Genette does not analyse or respond to Derrida in a 
substantive way, the possibility that Paratexts was, at least in part, triggered by 
‘Outwork’ is also suggested by the text itself. Early on, Derrida asks 
But what do prefaces actually do? Isn’t their logic more surprising than 
this? Oughtn’t we some day to reconstitute their history and their 
typology? Do they form a genre? Can they be grouped according to the 
necessity of some common predicate, or are they otherwise and in 
themselves divided? (7) 
To reconstitute the history and typology of the preface and other paratextual 
devices, and pursue those questions of genre and grouping, is precisely Genette’s 
project in Paratexts, albeit in a modest form which does not claim to be rigorous 
or complete. As such, Genette is picking up a thread of thought which Derrida 
disavows by saying that these ‘questions will not be answered’ (7). 
However, even as Genette follows Derrida temporally and logically, it could 
be said that ‘Outwork’ would be better read (if one is interested primarily in what 
it has to say about the preface) after Paratexts, or at least alongside it. Still in the 
opening pages of his text, Derrida explores the chronological aspect of writing 
and reading a preface from his own vantage point of being in the process of 
writing what might be a preface. He says that if ‘Outwork’ were a preface it 
would outline ‘a general theory and practice of deconstruction’, but by being 
written (inevitably) after the main text, such an outline would conceal a ‘hidden 
omnipotent author’ announcing ‘Here is what I wrote, then read, and what I am 
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writing that you are going to read’ (6). In this, Derrida is speaking simultaneously 
of both his own situation and the general condition of prefaces. This 
destabilisation of the apparent chronology of the volume in the reader’s hands – 
the preface composed after the fact as though in advance – is then replicated in 
the reader’s reading, as ‘once having read it, you will already have anticipated 
everything that follows [i.e., the rest of the book] and thus you might just as well 
dispense with reading the rest. The pre of the preface makes the future present’ 
(7). Resisting the urge to diagram the loops and leaps Derrida is here describing, 
it is enough to say that this builds significantly on Genette’s analysis of the time 
and place of a preface. Looked at from Genette’s point of view, time is not a key 
issue for the supplementary discourse (as has been discussed), perhaps precisely 
because it is not subject to conventional codes of publication, but Derrida draws 
out the consequences that these factors might have on the content of the preface, 
regardless of when or where it was actually published: the idea that one ‘might 
just as well dispense with reading the rest’ resonates with the supplementary 
discourse. If Genette allows us to usefully speak about the preface by delimiting 
his discussion to the time of publication within the system original/later/delayed, 
then Derrida’s subsequent (to be ironically anachronous) removal of that 
delimitation opens up a different set of possible consequences of the preface. At 
the same time, Derrida is structuring his own analysis by having it respond to the 
fact that he is writing a preface to Dissemination, and as such it is doubly 
instructive, in that a creative writer must in just the same way account for the 
fact that they are writing a supplementary discourse. This again recalls Jeri Kroll’s 
observation regarding students’ awareness ‘that since they are creating a new type 
of discourse that addresses a complex audience they have to consider, in a way no 
straight academic MA or PhD does, how they position themselves as narrators’. 
This difference – wherein Genette delimits the scope of his analysis in order 
make formal statements about the preface generally and Derrida delimits the 
scope of his analysis according to its immediate occasion – continues throughout 
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‘Outwork’. While this is certainly not the only program that Derrida is following 
in ‘Outwork’, when he does ask the broader kind of questions which might also 
have interested Genette – ‘what do prefaces actually do?’, ‘does a preface exist?’ (6, 
13) – his response is generated as a preface-writer rather than as someone looking 
at the phenomenon from an external position. The latter of those two questions, 
for instance, comes at the tail end of a section which establishes the reasoning for 
Derrida’s refusal to mark ‘Outwork’ as either a preface or not-a-preface (‘this is a 
preface, this is not a preface’ (30)), saying in part that 
either the preface already belongs to this exposition of the whole, 
engages it and is engaged in it, in which case the preface has no 
specificity and no textual place of its own […] or else the preface escapes 
this in some way, in which case it is nothing at all: a textual form of 
vacuity, a set of empty, dead signs (12) 
The irony is clear when, a paragraph later, Derrida suggests that if one attempts 
to make sense of it in terms of its content and form ‘one cannot comprehend the 
writing of a preface’, that being precisely the challenge he faces – ‘But in thus 
remaining, does a preface exist?’ (13). In targeting the opposition form/content – 
alongside ‘signifier/signified’, ‘sensible/intelligible’ – as the source of confusion 
and misdirection in the attempt to make sense of the preface, Derrida is of course 
following a typically deconstructive course. We do not need to trace this 
deconstruction in full, as it is to a large extent focussed on bringing the idea of 
dissemination into view (another function of ‘Outwork’), but it is interesting to 
note that the opposition form/content might be another way of viewing the 
organisational principle Genette employs. The status of the preface, as already 
discussed, considers the issue of form; the following chapter of Paratexts, ‘The 
functions of the original preface’, considers the content of the preface, arranged 
under the groupings ‘Themes of the why’ and ‘Themes of the how’ (196-229). 
Before coming to explicitly identify this opposition, Derrida has already 
addressed the issue of content in a broad way by suggesting that all types of 
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preface ‘have always been written, it seems, in view of their own self-effacement’ 
(7). Once a preface has gathered up and presented, for instance, ‘the conceptual 
content or significance’ of the text-to-come, and ‘put before the reader’s eyes what 
is not yet visible’, Derrida reasons that ‘the route which has been covered must 
cancel itself out’ (6, 8), must be effaced if a reader is to bother going on to read 
that text which has already been accounted for and made-present. However, this 
erasure leaves ‘a remainder which is added to the subsequent text and which 
cannot be completely summed up within it’: once the reader has moved on to read 
the real thing, that reading is still marked by the reader’s having read the preface, 
even though the preface was anyway only ever an after-the-fact distillation of the 
real thing (8). Here he is specifically considering, naturally enough given the 
context, the content of a philosophical preface, but in this there is at least a 
stirring of what it might mean for the supplementary discourse to both belong 
and not-belong to the creative text as a whole. 
Arguments such as this one in ‘Outwork’ respond to both Derrida’s immediate 
task of writing a preface, but also to another programme he is following in this 
text. His negotiations with the idea of the preface also take place in the form of 
extended analyses of others’ prefacing practices: most extensively with Hegel’s 
preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit and his introduction to the Science of Logic, 
in which he finds a strange redoubling both in their joint ‘condemnation of the 
foreword’ and in the possibility that either ‘the entire Phenomenology of Spirit is in 
fact a preface introducing the Logic’ or that it ‘is in truth an endless postface’ (12). 
In this analysis, then, he is bringing in the question of the form of the preface, 
and the formal relationship between preface and text. I have already mentioned 
something of the malleability of the text/paratext formula which Genette applies, 
and we find it here again with Derrida asserting that not only does the content of 
a preface give rise to difficulties, but the location of those difficulties is unstable. 
Having shown the seeming impossibility of proceeding towards an account of the 
preface through the opposition of form/content, Derrida announces, using the 
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word which Genette would take on as the French title of his work, that we ‘have 
come to a remarkable threshold [limen] of the text’ (12). 
After working through analyses of Hegel and Marx, Derrida comes to an 
example which seems more immediately germane to the supplementary discourse. 
‘In either case,’ he says, referring to the possibilities that the preface is either 
erased by the main text or integrated into it, ‘the preface is a fiction’, but in the 
first possibility it is a fiction in service of the truth, allowing itself to be erased in 
order to bring the main text about, whilst in the second it is a fiction which 
works against the ‘teleology of the book’, disorganising the paratext/text division 
which the formatting and titles of the relevant sections attempt to enforce (28). 
His example of the latter is the ‘hybrid preface’ to The Songs of Maldoror, a 19th-
century poetic novel by Comte de Lautréamont. Maldoror, he explains, is arranged 
into six Songs, but only upon coming to the sixth Song does the reader find that 
it ‘presents itself as the effective body of the text, the real operation for which the 
first five Songs would only have been the didactic preface’ (28). Literally 
announcing in the body of the text that everything read thus far must now be 
retrospectively considered as prefatory, Maldoror again exhibits the indefinite 
nature of the threshold between preface and text, but also has a couple of other 
notable aspects. 
First, it plays with and dramatises the fact that the preface is known to be 
such because it is marked as such. When the sixth Song ‘presents itself’ as the text 
to which the first five have been prefatory, it is only through that act of 
presenting that the first five can be identified as prefatory; while this may seem 
trivially self-evident, it shows from a different angle how that particular status of 
the text cannot be analysed purely in terms of its form and/or content. Had 
Lautréamont excised this self-reflexive moment where the text discusses its own 
status, then the discussion of its status would never have arisen, as (according to 
Derrida’s account) neither the form nor the content of the first five Songs 
indicate it. This raises an interesting question with regards to the supplementary 
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discourse and the many names given to it: whilst it seems relatively unlikely that a 
student would (or, depending on the bureaucratic processes involved, could) 
attempt anything quite so radical as omitting the division between the two texts 
entirely, it is worth asking whether Derrida’s analysis of Maldoror implies that the 
name given to the supplementary discourse affects the writing and reading of that 
text rather more deeply than just by guiding it towards a particular stylistic 
model such as the essay or the journal. The effect of naming might also help bring 
resolution to the iterated problem that, in spite of their apparent impossibility, 
these texts, prefaces and supplementary discourses, nonetheless exist: in a 
moment of circular logic, they exist because they are identified as such. The other 
notable aspect is that, unlike the other examples Derrida uses and unlike 
Dissemination itself, Maldoror is a work of fiction. It is then interesting not only 
that can we see the same effects play out in a work of fiction as in a work of 
philosophy, but also that the fictional nature which Derrida ascribes to prefaces 
takes on a different tenor in the context of a work which is already fictional. Part 
of the discussion in this chapter so far has noted the distinction between a 
supplementary discourse and a traditional piece of critical work in English, but it 
is worth mentioning that the statuses of these two texts might not quite be 
analogous – the primary focus in Creative Writing must necessarily be on the 
creative work, and students in either English and/or Creative Writing are not 
generally asked to produce reflective pieces on critical essays. As such, the 
fictional nature of the preface (if the supplementary discourse does indeed share 
it) enters into the academic milieu in precisely the zone where fiction is already 
practised, in a way which we might relate back to the possibilities raised by 
Genette’s account of senders. In either case, the latter kind of fictionality – 
working against the teleology of the book – seems to be the right one to consider 
with regards to the supplementary discourse: it is hard to imagine an argument in 
favour of the supplementary discourse which is erased by the main text in terms 
of either how that would work or why one would want it to work. To rephrase an 
107 
 
earlier observation, it is not a general condition of creative literary work that it 
needs a prior text to bring it about. Or: being so desired, the supplementary 
discourse must provide something otherwise absent. 
Suppose that I were, in the manner of Lautréamont, to announce at this point 
that this section, ‘A supplementary detour’, of this chapter, ‘The Supplementary 
Discourse’, was in fact supplementary in character all along; not only a detour on 
the topic of the supplement, but also a detour which forms a supplement. I say 
‘supplement’, here, because ‘preface’ would be too restrictive: perhaps this section 
supplements the previous one, an afterword filling in the background beyond the 
edges of Genette’s schema; or perhaps it is prefatory, placed to bring into view 
some number of ideas which must be set immediately to one side once we return 
to the flow of Genette proper (as we very shortly will). Suppose that as of now, 
this whole section has always been on the other side of the threshold. What might 
we then say about it in light of ‘Outwork’? That we are no longer in a linear line 
of argument: this section sits astride those around it, bringing forward the 
content of the next ahead of itself and making the previous dispensable. That it 
features a definite lack: if it belongs to the text as a whole then it has no specific 
place of its own, but if it stands alone it becomes nothing. That it is, of course, 
only known to be supplementary because I have marked it as such: leaving open a 
question of whether, without that marking, the broader argument would be 
readable as a continuous through-line rather than one which features a flagging 
up of something deviant and circular. And that it is written to efface itself: if the 
sections it corresponds with are to be read and understood anyway, it can only be 
by way of this section’s erasure – we will after all continue to talk about the 
preface and the supplementary discourse as though they not only exist, but are 
possible. Because all of this is impossible, in a sense, but as we return to Genette 
the remainder of this section will be concerned with the fact that when a student 
sits down to write an account of the how and why of their own creative work, 
whether that be in making a case for its novelty and unity, or recalling the scene 
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of its composition, or offering up a statement of intent, they are also writing, in 
spite of impossibility, across this threshold. 
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2.4: Writing how and why I wrote 
What might a student do when they come to write a supplementary discourse? 
How might they account for and give an account of the creative text, the space 
beside which they are writing the supplementary discourse into? This is a 
different question to one of what it is that universities’ rubrics tend to request of 
students: while a rubric demands evidence of certain competencies, an actual 
piece of work will always contain something more than those competencies, if 
only in its attempts to bind them together into a cohesive text. Moreover, to ask 
what a student might do is to ask what possible array of strategies could be used 
to achieve a supplementary discourse, rather than what strategies actually do get 
used. 
In a similar way, we might imagine a scene in which a publisher says to an 
author: we need a preface for your book. Here there is certainly no question of 
rubric per se, although a publisher might have some qualities in mind when they 
make the request, and so the immediate task for the author is to find a way to 
write into the space just before (or after) the text they have already produced. I 
have already discussed the formal characteristics a preface might employ in terms 
of Genette’s typology of status, but not what those features are in service of: if an 
author employs what a follower of Genette might call an authentic actorial 
preface, the natural question is, for what? Or, in light of Derrida, the task might 
be to find a function for this preface which gives it its own place within the 
volume whilst remaining faithful to the text it prefaces, which advances the cause 
of that text without limiting its ability to perform its own function. 
Genette responds to this issue by breaking out a number of distinct functions 
he sees extant prefaces fulfilling. As ever, this list is neither exhaustive nor 
mutually exclusive: in his examples, one preface might correspond with multiple 
functions, and there is space for prefaces which do not correspond to any of them. 
A preface, after all, is a preface because it is designated as such rather than 
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because it embodies a certain form, but within this there are certain tendencies 
which come about more frequently, in response to both contemporary fashion 
and the demands a preface places on its writer. At the same time, this list is of a 
different sort to that of prefatorial status, as its members are not differentiated 
by the aspect they refer to. Any preface will by necessity have some sense of a 
sender, being composed from a certain position, or of time, being published at a 
particular date, and so these aspects must be considered in turn and individually. 
The functions of a preface listed by Genette, however, all inflect on the same 
aspect, and need not be taken one at a time: the text in question might display 
any or none of the suggested qualities. For this reason, and because some are more 
germane to the scene of Creative Writing than others, we will look at just a few 
of these functions and how they pertain to the supplementary discourse. 
The greater part of Genette’s discussion speaks particularly about the 
functions of ‘original prefaces’ – that is, prefaces signed authentically by the 
author and published concurrently with the main text – but these functions cross 
over into other types of preface. This typology is split into two broad categories, 
‘themes of why’ and ‘themes of how’, which speak to the two main overarching 
functions Genette sees the preface as fulfilling: respectively, ‘to get the book read 
and to get the book read properly’ (197). In principle it may seem that the former 
category is at some distance from the supplementary discourse. A tutor, unlike a 
general reader, must read the main text regardless of how unappealing its 
paratexts might make it seem. In practice the rhetorical attempt to demonstrate 
why one should read the book involves accounting for why the book was written 
and, similarly, rhetoric regarding how to read the book involves accounting for 
how the book was written. The preface is in part a place where the author can act 
as a reader, and so we see echoes in the ‘themes of the why’ of tactics a Creative 
Writer might pursue (198). For example, the theme of ‘importance’ appears less 
likely to be found in student work. Claims such as those cited from Thucydides, 
Montesquieu and Rousseau regarding the intellectual usefulness of their work, 
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which suggest that the reader will become a better person for having read the 
text, would be rather grand coming from an undergraduate (although some might 
make them nonetheless) (199). However, the same quote from Montesquieu 
(‘…that men were able to cure themselves of their prejudices. Here I call 
prejudices not what makes one unaware of certain things but what makes one 
unaware of oneself’) might well be found in the supplementary discourse of a 
student whose practice involves trying to write against their own type or in the 
voice of another. In other words, recast into the context of learning to write, the 
importance might be for the individual, rather than for people in general, and 
still inhabit the same form. 
A more straightforwardly relevant theme is that of ‘unity’, in which prefaces 
to collections of texts attempt to present a seemingly ‘contingent jumble of 
things’ as having a ‘formal or, more often, thematic unity’ (201). This seems to be a 
very natural, though by no means mandatory, function of those supplementary 
discourses which are appended to portfolios of short stories or poetry. This is 
particularly the case in research degrees, where there is a need to demonstrate 
that the thesis as a whole demonstrates original knowledge effectively shared, and 
its components must therefore be seen to pull in the same direction. An idea of 
unity presented in a supplementary discourse for a taught degree might be 
developmental in nature in the interest of, as with importance, providing 
evidence for a learning process: ‘in the first story I… and then in the second story 
I…’. In either case, the theme of unity gives the writer a chance to say something 
about the main text which the main text might not be able to explicitly state 
about itself, given the ontological constraints of literature. 
The section on ‘the themes of the how’ begins by observing that ‘since the 
nineteenth century the functions of enhancing the work’s value have been 
relatively eclipsed by the functions of providing information and guidance for 
reading’ (209). Given that this shift from why to how coincides with the birth and 
growth of Creative Writing, it is perhaps not entirely coincidental that these 
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themes correspond more closely with what a supplementary discourse might do. 
The theme of ‘genesis’, for instance, ‘inform[s] the reader about the origin of the 
work, the circumstances in which it was written, the stages of its creation’, 
effectively relating how the work was written in order to provide guidance on 
how to receive it (210). Put into the context of Creative Writing, this is how the 
student’s writing practice might be represented, with circumstances and stages of 
creation cast in light of the module or course structure rather than personal 
biography. The theme of ‘choice of a public’ likewise seems inherent. In Genette’s 
account this is taken to be an author effectively saying that one should read the 
book if you are or as though you were this particular kind of person – Boccaccio, 
for instance, writes a preface in which he ‘address[es] himself to “the charming 
ladies”’ (212). In Creative Writing the issue is perhaps keener, as there is always a 
non-negotiable ‘public’ in the form of the person marking the work, but in order 
to do that marking effectively it is likely that that person may need to know what 
the supposed audience is: if the dialogue in an apparently tragic tale is hilarious, 
the tutor needs to know whether the audience should ideally want to be moved to 
laughter or to tears.  
A few more of these themes have similarly simple connections to Creative 
Writing. ‘Commentary on the title’, which might inform the reader of a reference 
being made or defend pre-emptively against misreading, needs no further 
explanation, whilst the theme of ‘the order in which to be read’ may be a simple 
necessity for formally experimental works (213, 218). The theme of ‘contextual 
information’ gathers together elements in prefaces which explain to the reader a 
‘context-to-come’, whether that be the as-yet-unpublished remainder of the 
present text, or pending related texts, such as further volumes in the series (219). 
Likewise, this might be seen as a necessity if the submission constitutes a section 
of a novel or a set of stories which share a world, if the candidate wants to briefly 
explain the rest of the plot and context. 
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Rather broader is the theme of ‘statements of intent’. As Genette has it, the 
‘most important function of the original preface, perhaps, is to provide the 
author’s interpretation of the text or, if you prefer, his statement of intent’ (221). 
Indeed, it could be argued that in terms of both the preface and the 
supplementary discourse all other functions are pressed into the service of this 
one. Genette gives a number of examples, from Rabelais to Borges, of authors 
using the preface to present ‘the reader an indigenous theory defined by the 
author’s intention’, such that their ‘common theme is thus, roughly, “Here is what I 
meant to do”’. This formulation could well be used to bracket other themes 
already mentioned: ‘commentary on the title’ really being ‘here is what I meant 
the title to mean’, ‘unity’ being ‘here is the unity I intended the work to have’, and 
so on. Interestingly, Genette points out that this ‘approach is apparently contrary 
to a certain modern vulgate, formulated in particular by Valéry, which refuses to 
grant the author any control over the “real meaning”’ – which is interesting at 
least in part because it sidesteps a reference to Barthes, who formulated it in 
particular, and probably more famously, in ‘The Death of the Author’. Whatever 
Genette’s motivation was in locating this refusal specifically in Valéry’s thought, 
there is in this theme a clear conflict with the discipline of English, in all of the 
ways which were discussed in the first chapter. This quality of the preface has 
already been mentioned, but Genette’s account of the ‘original preface’ makes it 
central. At the same time, however, in the very term ‘statement of intent’ there is 
a clear echo of academic practice. In PhD applications and official documents, in 
research proposals, in the initial stages of taught-degree dissertations, and in (as 
we will see in the next chapter) Research Excellence Framework submissions, 
there are statements of intent (and cognate terms) wherein the student or 
academic must account for their literary output in much the same way. This thus 
forms a nexus where the issue of the supplementary discourse crosses over into 
the other issues addressed in this thesis: questions of how authorship is construed, 
how that construed author might account for their own writing in writing, and 
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how Creative Writing embodies research are all involved in and involve this 
problem of intent.  
Perhaps this does not directly address the central issue of this chapter, which 
is not the relationship between the supplementary discourse and the academy, 
but the relationship between the supplementary discourse and the discourse it 
supplements. However, one notable aspect of statements of intent as they exist in 
the bureaucracy of academia is that they are always provisional devices intended 
to be discarded once they have fulfilled their function – in contrast to the work 
itself, which is written to be the finished product, to exist hopefully indefinitely. 
This is uncontroversial, because why would anybody want or need to read a 
provisional, exploratory document once the project it was exploring itself exists? 
It would seem that for (let’s say) an English PhD thesis such as this one, the work 
of making a case for the importance of a topic and outlining its intellectual 
context would by nature be built into the thesis itself. In the case of Creative 
Writing, an analogous document takes on a tandem status with the finished work: 
statements of intent proper can undoubtedly be written for Creative Writing 
also, but when they are that function is frequently replicated at a later date by a 
supplementary discourse – for what? Importance, nature of the audience, reason 
for the title: if the explanations given for these things in a supplementary 
discourse were to persuade their reader and appear valid, then they must be at 
least implied in the creative text itself. This goes even for issues of unity and 
context, where I have suggested that the literary text may be unable to state its 
case directly – if a collection of poems is written with the intent of unifying 
around a theme, and if the author enjoys any success in that aim, then that theme 
must anyway be indirectly present. 
All of which makes the preface as a model for the supplementary discourse so 
close and yet so far. To briefly reiterate, all of the issues of status Genette raises 
are equally germane to the supplementary discourse, and in the case of senders 
and the possibility of fictional prefaces seem to predict some of the tactics which 
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the writer of a supplementary discourse might employ. Likewise, many of these 
themes of prefaces would be perfectly sensible and likely routes to take with a 
supplementary discourse and capture what a supplementary discourse might 
discuss. Certainly, as a pedagogical device the preface could be a way of 
explaining and rationalising to students what a supplementary discourse should 
be, do, and say: even themes which might seem specifically academic, such as a 
student’s engagement with the syllabus of a module, might be framed in terms of 
the importance of the literary text. Nonetheless, there is a point of divergence 
which we might mark between the supplementary discourse and the preface 
which is also, not incidentally, the point at which the supplementary discourse 
attains a summative quality: while a statement of intent is to be discarded, and a 
preface might well be skipped, a supplementary discourse remains, still to be 
reckoned with even though the creative work exists and even after it is read. 
What is this excessively named (and so ironically un-named) text I am trying 
to talk about? My analysis of the supplementary discourse here meets a kind of 
bifurcation. Down one path is all manner of paratextual production which 
accompanies the writing of creative work. We have been speaking of the preface 
as the most useful model for the supplementary discourse – and I think it does 
keenly capture much of what is at stake in that practice – but this production 
also ordinarily entails what Genette groups under the heading of ‘private epitext’ 
(371). These are: the writer’s ‘oral confidences’ and ‘correspondence’, which might 
map to the workshop process and the written feedback that results from 
workshopping, respectively (372-86); the writer’s diaries, in which the author 
gives ‘testimony’ of their writing process, and which is clearly equivalent to the 
journal work sometimes found in or requested of the supplementary discourse 
(387-94); and the ‘pre-texts’, which consist of those drafts, sketches, ideas and 
notes which compose the textual detritus which emerges from the process of 
writing literature, and for which occupation of the scene of Creative Writing 
makes no discernible difference (395-403). None of these categories, for which the 
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majority of their genetic structure is again shared between the work that happens 
in Creative Writing and that which happens outside it, appear to have the direct 
resonance with the supplementary discourse which the preface enjoys. And yet, 
these paratexts clearly have the potential to provide the material which actually 
makes up a supplementary discourse: nothing would be less surprising than to 
find a student discussing a moment from a workshop, or tracking the changes 
between two drafts, or recalling from their notes a particular character’s moment 
of genesis, in order to obtain whatever function they wish their supplementary 
discourse to have. 
And so, down the other path is exactly the same thing, is all manner of 
paratextual production which (unlike, for example, the title of the text) is for the 
reader in some way avoidable, with one salient difference: it gets read. Under the 
terms of that adjectival binary opposition read/unread, any amount of labour 
which would (or at least could) happen anyway becomes a site of contestation, 
from its name, to what it should consist of, to how it is weighted, to whether or 
not it should even exist. The slightness, the marginality of this distinction returns 
us to the ambiguity of Genette’s discourse on the paratext – ‘threshold’, 
‘vestibule’, ‘fringe’, ‘edge’, ‘undefined zone’ – as something which may or may not 
be, or which may or may not count as, a component of a text’s existence. 
All of which brings us to a second question. This chapter has, in a way, been 
itself a (hopefully) necessary preface. Just as Derrida’s ‘Outwork’ is a way of 
bringing into view the idea of dissemination, this chapter brings into view a 
question which it is beyond the scope and methodology of this thesis to answer, 
and which oversteps the is/should elision in the meta-Creative Writing discourse: 
what is this excessively named (and so ironically un-named) text I am trying to 
talk about for? 
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Chapter 3: Creative Writing Research 
3.1: Research as knowledge, practice as research 
The previous chapter discussed a certain kind of textual relationship between a 
supplementary discourse and the main text which it accompanies. There, the 
situation was analysed in the context of a formulation wherein the supplementary 
discourse and the literary text are presented, via a paratextual effect of titling and 
a bureaucratic effect of submission, as a single product. In this way a difference is 
marked between these supplementary discourses and other texts – including in 
Creative Writing pedagogic tools such as writing diaries and in English 
traditional critical essays – which take part in a relationship with literary texts. 
This arrangement is most typical of student Creative Writing work (in particular 
at undergraduate level) in which the supplementary discourse is employed as part 
of the assessment process under the names exegesis, critical commentary, 
reflective commentary, and so on. 
However, there is another type of supplementary discourse which might be 
found not in student work, but in the work of already-established and -accredited 
Creative Writing practitioners. Alongside the rapid growth and development of 
Creative Writing over the last three decades there has been a concurrent 
emergence, at least in the British and Australasian scenes, of national 
governmental research evaluations which are designed to periodically quantify 
the quality of research output at each institution and distribute research funding 
accordingly; in the UK this process was formerly known as the Research 
Assessment Exercise (RAE), first conducted in 1986, and is now the Research 
Excellence Framework (REF), first conducted in 2014. In brief, the REF requires 
that each full-time researcher at a university submits an allotment of their 
118 
 
research to be judged by a centralised panel so that the institution might be 
collectively scored, and research funding accordingly allocated. The existence of 
the REF points to the larger institutional contexts in which the concerns of this 
thesis are situated, in which the university is subjected to the imperatives of 
‘professionalisation’, governed by economic and political motives which it cannot 
be my business here to address. It is in this chapter, however, that their force can 
most obviously be felt. 
The REF, as with its Australian equivalent ERA, allots space for the 
researcher to accompany each of their submissions with a statement explaining 
and justifying its nature and status as research. Not all submissions from Creative 
Writing academics take advantage of this – a fact which, given how seemingly 
endemic the supplementary discourse is at the student level, is itself interesting. 
When supporting statements are given, there is a degree to which they can be 
viewed in the terms laid out in the previous chapter, in that they too seem to 
supply something which is absent from the main text and in that their presence 
might affect the meaning (in this case, for the REF auditor) of the main text. It is, 
in essence, instinctually unlikely that a member of a REF panel will react to a 
novel submitted to the panel in the same way as they would if they had read the 
same novel while on holiday; this chapter will, in part, explore what kind of 
consequences this context could have in that regard. 
However, as well as responding to a literary text in some way, these 
supporting statements are also responding to another, more direct, more 
transparent demand: they must justify that text as ‘research’, according to a 
seemingly particular definition of research. Which is to say that whilst students’ 
supplementary discourses are subjected to the familiar vagaries of rubrics and 
academic judgement, these supporting statements aim to fulfil an additional and 
highly pragmatic function of acquiring as much funding for the host institution 
as possible. To take an example from the 2014 REF, when Sarah Maitland writes 
in Lancaster University’s submission that A Book of Silence ‘represents an 
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experimental form, conflating two usually distinct genres within literary studies’ 
she is writing in a mode very much familiar from the supplementary discourse, 
but when she continues by saying that its ‘research method reflects this, 
combining as it does traditional socio-historical work into the history of silence 
with meditation and prayer, interviews and conversations’ she is writing in order 
to bring that work towards an idea of research as represented in the REF criteria.* 
We will return in more detail to the specifics of those criteria and the REF 
process later, before going on to conduct a detailed examination of the Creative 
Writing supporting statements produced during the process of submitting to it. 
First, it might be made clear that this issue of categorising a piece of work as 
‘research’ implicates the work itself as much as its supporting statement. Even for 
those outputs submitted without a supporting statement, there is an implication 
that this text is, or should be, or can be considered as ‘research’, even if it has 
already been published in a format which holds no such implication. To draw on 
the language of the previous chapter, by entering the context of the REF the 
submitted novel (or whatever the output is) is placed within a new paratextual 
frame, with all the potential effects on meaning that that entails. 
This issue also goes beyond those governmental frameworks. Although British 
academics today may be most keenly concerned – because of its importance for 
funding – with the definition of research as described by the REF, a similar 
pressure might be found in the work of a graduate student who must for the first 
time consider and justify their production of ‘research’; or in applications for 
funding from other sources which might demand a future-tense explication of 
                                                             
 
* Whilst REF output details are published online, the database containing them is 
not easily-referenceable. Output details referred to in this chapter will therefore 
be identified by title and submitting institution and may be found in full via the 
searchable database at http://results.ref.ac.uk/search. 
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‘research’ content; and most of all, in the fact that ‘research’ is a constitutional 
element in the modern formulation of the idea of the university as an institution.  
This last point is discussed at length, and particularly in terms of the British 
scene which the REF operates in, by Stefan Collini in his 2012 work What Are 
Universities For?. He suggests, contra a general belief that the founding of 
European universities in the early second millennium constitutes a genuine origin 
for today’s institutions, that ‘the modern university is essentially a nineteenth-
century creation’ dating to the ‘establishment of the University of Berlin in 1810 
by Wilhelm von Humboldt’ which placed research at the heart of the institution 
(23). This German cultural innovation had global repercussions, and ‘had 
considerable impact in Britain, too, not least in standing for an ideal of 
wissenschaftlich ‘research’, which came to be grafted onto the native traditions of 
teaching and scholarship’ (24). While ‘wissenschaftlich’ here means ‘scientific’, the 
research practices which were ‘coming to be seen as part of the defining purpose 
of the university’ at this time covered both what we would consider scientific 
endeavour and ‘those fields that were later to be designated as the humanities and 
social sciences’ (23-4). From this flash point of research being grafted into the 
British academic system, Collini lucidly traces a subsequent history involving a 
simultaneous explosion in the numbers of higher education institutions and 
expansion of governmental oversight and control of those institutions continuing 
to the present day (27-35). While research still plays a definitional role for the 
university, it has over time been drawn under the aegis of what Collini terms 
‘HiEdBizUK’, in which the agenda-setting quality of research, informing teaching, 
scholarship and the whole tenor of the university, has been gradually replaced, 
due to increasing government intervention, with an agenda set by ‘the needs of 
the economy’, and so today universities operate like businesses, thinking in terms 
of value for money (35). Collini illustrates the consequences of this for research in 
a reading of a 2003 White Paper on higher education, suggesting that its comment 
on the RAE is one of ‘bare-faced inanity’ in which the fact that ‘departments 
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receive higher ratings now than in 1986 when the system was instituted’ is taken 
as indication that research quality has improved. Calling this ‘the Fallacy of the 
Self-Fulfilling Measurement System’, Collini points out that there is a difference 
between getting better at the RAE and getting better at research itself, and that 
the former will be prioritised by universities over the latter because the former 
unlike the latter generates additional funding (159-60). It is therefore important 
to remember in this chapter that being research is never, in the contemporary 
British academy, as simple as just being research. 
This last point will be touched upon again, but it is worth first exploring how 
Creative Writing academics have already responded to the idea of Creative 
Writing as research in the abstract as well as in terms of national research 
evaluations. One thing in the meta-Creative Writing discourse is immediately 
clear: any discussion of Creative Writing Research in that discourse is 
functionally equivalent to a discussion of Creative Writing Knowledge. Such an 
equivalence is made repeatedly and even taken as a given in the opening salvos of 
relevant works of meta-Creative Writing discourse. Graeme Harper’s book 
Making Up (2013), for instance, takes the form of a novel bookended by expository 
work on the nature of Creative Writing Research and the novel’s relationship 
with it. While the literary text itself is apparently unconcerned with issues of 
academia, the introduction and conclusion frame it as being about knowledge in 
Creative Writing precisely because it is a product of Creative Writing Research. 
So, although the first paragraph of the introduction argues for this being a work 
which ‘not so many years ago would not, indeed could not, have existed’ because 
the notion of Creative Writing as research is so recent, the second smoothly 
segues into an assertion that ‘the idea that works of Creative Writing contain 
human knowledge [is] a very well-supported and ancient notion’ (1) without 
interrogating the link thus made between research and knowledge. Diane 
Donnelly makes a similar move even in the title ‘The Case for Creative Writing 
Research as Knowledge’, a chapter in her 2011 monograph Establishing Creative 
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Writing Studies as an Academic Discipline in which she conducts a literature review 
examining how the link between Creative Writing and ‘knowledge’ is perceived, 
but not the association of ‘research’ and ‘knowledge’. Jeri Kroll summarises the 
terms of the contemporary debate around Creative Writing research as ‘what 
methodologies facilitate this re-imagined species of research and what kinds of 
knowledge it can produce in the context of doctoral education’ (‘Originality and 
Research’ 150). 
Simon Holloway approaches the idea of Creative Writing Research from a 
different angle, in that his is a reflective and autobiographical account of a PhD 
in Creative Writing. He analogises the difference between an English PhD and a 
Creative Writing PhD as the difference between inspecting how existing pocket 
watches were made and making your own pocket watch. Of course, there is in 
this metaphor a loaded implication that criticism is a passive activity which does 
not itself constitute an act of production, but his point is that Creative Writing 
Research provides ‘a different set of data about the making of pocket watches, 
knowledge about their construction and creation which you could only have got 
through action’, and because of this data’s distinctiveness there is a need to justify 
to those outside of Creative Writing how this can ‘connect and add to the wider 
body of knowledge, in order to fulfil the criteria of valid academic study’ (130-1). 
Three key ideas can be located in this argument: first, Creative Writing can do 
research which is different in nature from that of other disciplines; second, that 
research must therefore be justified to others (just as, we might add, it is justified 
to the REF); third, the nature of that justification relies on an idea of knowledge. 
In ‘Creative Writing and Ph.D. Research’ Jon Cook begins by describing an 
antipathy between Creative Writing and research evaluation in which ‘the 
requirement that universities should be publicly accountable [... and] accompany 
their activity with statements about what they do and why they do it’ can create a 
‘maddening pressure to be explicit about something called creativity’ (2012: 99). 
Bracketing this as a ‘time-honored confrontation’ between creative freedoms and 
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institutional norms, Cook nonetheless employs the language of the institutionally 
normative 2001 RAE when defining research (99-100). Whilst this leads him to 
use the word ‘insight’ rather than ‘knowledge’ – the RAE passage includes the 
phrase ‘new or substantially improved insights’ – the implied meaning of the term 
appears identical to knowledge.* For instance, when Cook creates a thought 
experiment in which George Eliot has submitted Middlemarch and Daniel Deronda 
to the REF panel and asks ‘What kind of insight does this work provide?’ (100) the 
range of potential answers to that question which he goes on to suggest each, I 
would suggest, imply particular areas or types of knowledge: ‘reflection on the 
nature of the human’ implies an anthropological angle; ‘insights into how human 
beings act and behave’ implies a sociological or psychological angle; ‘how much of 
this action is shaped by forces outside [people’s] control’ implies a philosophical 
or theoretical angle; and ‘how a particular instance of Creative Writing acts in 
relation to genre and form’ implies a literary critical angle (101). Thus, Cook 
moves the conversation from an assumption that Creative Writing Research is 
Creative Writing Knowledge to a question about what kind of knowledge that 
research might constitute, but knowledge is still at the heart of the conversation. 
                                                             
 
* The REF, likewise, refers to ‘new insights’ rather than new knowledge in its 
definition of research, but the kinds of example given there (‘the invention and 
generation of ideas’; ‘new or substantially improved materials, devices, products 
and processes’) make it clear that as well as the definition of ‘insight’ suggested as 
dominant by the OED – ‘The fact of penetrating with the eyes of the 
understanding into the inner character or hidden nature of things; a glimpse or 
view beneath the surface; the faculty or power of thus seeing.’ – there is implied 
in this usage of the word ‘insight’ the earlier sense of ‘Knowledge of or skill in (a 
particular subject or department)’, in that a REF panel is not asked to agonise 
over whether a submission pertains to a ‘hidden nature’, only whether it is ‘new’. 
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This question – ‘okay, well, what knowledge?’ – is answered in a range of ways 
in the meta-Creative Writing discourse. Craig Jordan-Baker wryly turns the 
question back on meta-Creative Writing discourse itself by noting that there ‘is a 
persistent self-referentiality in discussions and the practice of Creative Writing 
research’ (2015: 244). While the nature of the meta-Creative Writing discourse 
might be useful for the present thesis, it is unusual that, as Jordan-Baker has it, 
‘the object for much Creative Writing research then is often itself; its pedagogy 
and history [in a manner analogous to] Eagleton’s The Function of Criticism or 
Russell’s A History of Western Philosophy. However, research in English and 
Philosophy is typically directed to understanding its objects of knowledge 
through analysis, argument, scholarship and the proposal of new theories and 
readings’ (244). Of course, the products of Creative Writing research might 
nonetheless be published as ‘novels’ or ‘poems’ and so on rather than as ‘research’, 
but that still leaves the fact that literary output from Creative Writing Research 
which is actually labelled as ‘research’ (outside of the purposes of the REF and 
similar exercises) appears to be the domain of graduate study rather than 
academic publication. Conversely, Creative Writing Research labelled as such 
tends to be, like Jordan-Baker’s article itself, non-literary and self-referential. A 
rare counterexample to this is Harper’s Making Up which, as mentioned, does 
present a literary text under that heading. 
In an article, Harper summarises what he sees as the available modes of 
Creative Writing Research by saying that it might be ‘research through the 
undertaking of creative writing, research about creative writing, or even research 
using creative writing. Or it can refer to a combination of these’ (‘Creative 
Writing Research’ 278). Within each of these modes, he further suggests that the 
knowledge which Creative Writing Research produces might fall within a few 
more specific brackets, which he lists via four subtitles: ‘Critical Understanding’ 
(i.e., knowledge akin to traditional English research); ‘Reflection, Reflexivity, 
Response’ (i.e., knowledge about the writer’s own creative practice which might 
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be transmittable and transferable), ‘Research about Creative Writing’ (i.e., the 
self-referential work Jordan-Baker describes, potentially expanded to knowledge 
about non-academic creative writings), and ‘Research Using Creative Writing’ 
(i.e., Creative Writing ‘as a method of unearthing knowledge’ which falls within 
the domain of other disciplines.) (282-7). Again, the suggestion is that Creative 
Writing Research might fall under any or all of these categories, just as it might 
employ a combination of modes. Cook takes a similar view when he suggests that 
the research process at play in Creative Writing might be ‘broken down into 
three components: research into a content, research into a form and research into 
the relation between them’, all of which ‘are always in play’ and ‘overlap with 
established research methods’ (102). Likewise, while writing specifically on 
Creative Writing Research in doctoral degrees, Jeri Kroll argues for the necessity 
of ‘flexible guidelines that allow myriad forms of knowledge production’ in terms 
of both methodology and content (150). Amongst all of this there is both an urge 
to typologise Creative Writing Research and a developed consensus in favour of 
an idea that Creative Writing need not pin itself down to one particular type of 
knowledge – and, indeed, an optimistic sense that an ability to operate within 
such a state of flux is in fact a strength of Creative Writing. However, because 
these lists of research outcomes are always non-bounded (which is to say, they are 
presented as a subset of the kinds of knowledge Creative Writing might be able 
to bring about and not a complete list), this broad church school of Creative 
Writing Research does not answer in a strong way the main question Jordan-
Baker raises by bringing up Creative Writing’s self-referentiality: what, besides 
itself, are Creative Writing’s ‘objects of knowledge’? 
Other responses to the question of what kind of knowledge Creative Writing 
contains might usefully be categorised in terms of Harper’s four subheadings 
mentioned earlier, partly because they are sufficiently broad, partly because they 
are focussed on content rather than methodology (which I will discuss in a 
moment), and partly because the most interesting thing is not what these 
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responses are saying but their non-consensus. The chapter on Creative Writing 
Research in Diane Donnelly’s Establishing Creative Writing Studies as an Academic 
Discipline, as the title of the monograph suggests, falls under ‘Research about 
Creative Writing’, saying that ‘research leads to creative writing as knowledge 
and, as teachers, we should want, at the least, to be informed about our pedagogy’ 
(124). She does later move beyond the purely internal issues of academic pedagogy 
by suggesting that creative writing studies ‘can encourage practitioners to link 
theory with practice and to form its own creative writing theory’, but here too 
the knowledge created – a hypothetical theory of Creative Writing – seems to be 
about the discipline itself (125). 
Simon Holloway’s article falls squarely within ‘Reflection, Reflexivity, 
Response’, asking whether his ‘novel was exactly as it would have been had it been 
composed under other circumstances’ and seeking ‘to address in critical terms the 
actions of my own creativity’ (129). As well as reflecting upon the experience of 
doing a PhD, this article has a reflexive quality in that it engages in the form of 
knowledge-generation it is itself advocating for: Holloway’s ‘explication of 
research’ in Creative Writing as ‘an explanation of how something so esoteric and 
private as an individual’s creative process can speak to others’ itself emerges from 
an attempt to explain his own esoteric process to others (131). 
Jeri Kroll spends time focussing on the notion of ‘originality’ as a defining 
characteristic of research, which is to say that research must be not just 
knowledge, but new knowledge (150-65). This leads to a discussion about the 
kinds of ‘Critical Understanding’ which Creative Writing might generate, in 
terms of a comparison made between ‘publishable’ work and ‘high quality’ work 
and the implications that this might have for ‘disciplinary or critical knowledge’ 
about the historical contexts of the production of literature (158-9). Kroll’s focus 
on originality also finesses the category of ‘Critical Understanding’, in that the 
necessity for originality in critical research underlines its inherent lowercase-c 
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creative quality, and so loosens an implication about form that the term ‘Critical 
Understanding’ might make. 
Graeme Harper’s own Making Up perhaps unsurprisingly has elements of all of 
these. Notably, however, even while he explicitly describes his work as ‘practice-
led research’, there is relatively little focus on reflexive or personal knowledge, 
stressing instead ‘Critical Understanding’ and ‘Research using Creative Writing’. 
For instance, he summarises the behind-the-scenes graft of research which went 
into the novel in an endnote which reads ‘This research involved empirical 
research in and around prisons in the USA, Europe and Australia, together with 
journeys to Algeria, theoretical investigation of the literature of incarceration 
and the history and style of prison texts, and the consideration of such things as 
the modes of metaphor’, suggesting a generation of knowledge both about the 
subject matter and about the way in which that subject matter might be 
presented (166). As we will see, this identification of research ‘graft’ – travel and 
archive work – is also common in REF submissions. As has been mentioned, he 
also spends time making observations regarding ‘Research about Creative 
Writing’, including a list of seven recommendations for the advancement of 
Creative Writing Research including publication ‘of both creative and critical 
aspects of Creative Writing research’, greater emphasis on ‘project-based work’ 
alongside ‘blue skies research’, and the ‘need to more publically value [...] the 
artefacts of Creative Writing that are not final works’ (164-5). 
Of course, there is a degree to which these four categories – or any other 
categories of subject knowledge which might be drawn up – do not actually 
matter. After all, if research is indeed equivalent to knowledge production, then 
as long as new knowledge of some kind is being produced, research is taking 
place. However, the arena of knowledge which a given piece of Creative Writing 
research claims to inhabit does make a difference, both to the authorities 
surveilling research activity (who may turn out to take brighter or dimmer views 
of various approaches) and for the sake of Creative Writing’s relationship with 
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other disciplines. Jordan-Baker suggests that the reason for Creative Writing 
Research’s ‘persistent self-referentiality’ is precisely its anxious need for a place of 
its own in the academy, in that knowledge about Creative Writing itself is the 
type of knowledge which is least likely to bring Creative Writing into conflict 
with other disciplines, and which therefore ‘minimise[s] conflict with its claims to 
distinctiveness’ (244). Ironically, this approach simultaneously threatens to 
diminish Creative Writing’s specificity and displace its position in the academy if 
its research output becomes dominated by Creative Writing-history or Creative 
Writing-pedagogy rather than Creative Writing-itself. On the other hand, 
‘Critical Understanding’ and ‘Research using Creative Writing’ may be areas of 
knowledge sufficiently covered and mapped by other disciplines to the point that 
Creative Writing’s offerings risk going beyond interdisciplinarity into superfluity. 
The question here is one of whether or not it makes a difference to the research 
that the new knowledge in a given piece of work is being generated within a 
discipline of and labelled as ‘Creative Writing’. If it does not, the work may as 
well happen in the form of English or Comparative Literature (in the case of 
‘Critical Understanding’); or of History, Sociology, Politics, Philosophy, ad 
infinitum (in the case of ‘Research using Creative Writing’). If it does make a 
difference, then an account of the knowledge in a work of Creative Writing must 
go beyond simply stating that there is new understanding or insight at play and 
account for the origin of that knowledge. ‘Reflection, Reflexivity, Response’, 
meanwhile, relies on a potentially difficult notion that the knowledge produced 
about the writer’s own experience of writing is effectively shareable – with the 
implication that it is both understandable by and useful to others. The problem 
that Jordan-Baker identifies regarding the distinctiveness of Creative Writing 
Research – and which I am attempting to flesh out here – are not thoroughly 
responded to in terms of content in the meta-Creative Writing discourse I have 
surveyed. 
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However, alongside the issue of content is the issue of methodology, and here 
there is a greater sense of consensus in the meta-Creative Writing discourse. 
Holloway’s metaphor of building a pocket watch is a way of pointing towards the 
idea of practice-led research, and whilst other methodological elements (such as 
Harper’s first-hand data collection in prisons) are often mentioned, practice-led 
research is generally and uncontroversially taken to be Creative Writing 
Research’s institutionally distinctive characteristic. Which is not to say that 
practice-led research is a methodology unique to Creative Writing; indeed, the 
term emerged in the more general context of the creative arts, and works such as 
Hazel Smith and Roger T. Dean’s Practice-led Research, Research-led Practice in the 
Creative Arts explore the concept in the contexts of dance, performance, music, 
and visual arts as well as that of writing. The reason why practice-led research is 
nonetheless distinctive for Creative Writing might be identified when Smith and 
Dean observe that in certain definitions of research (they are here referring to the 
OECD’s definition) there is an ‘unstated implication […] that knowledge is 
normally verbal or numerical’, which clearly disadvantages research activity 
taking place in the contexts on which their book focusses (3). Creative Writing, of 
course, is absolutely verbal and suffers no such handicap, but this in itself may be 
a disadvantage in that it places Creative Writing Research in position to be read 
alongside traditional forms of research, even while it has to take place in a 
different way to that research and needs to find a way to be read differently in 
order to identify its place within the institution. 
In the introduction to Special Issue 14 of TEXT, which focuses on practice-led 
research, Scott Brook explains that the stimulus for the special issue came from 
the fact that a ‘notion of practice-led research had achieved something like a 
‘practical consensus’ within university creative arts programs’, suggesting that 
practice-led research is so entrenched as the default mode in Creative Writing 
Research that it must be re-interrogated afresh – though the articles in that issue 
consist of permutations of and reflections on the methodology rather than 
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rebellions or polemics against it. Likewise, Diane Donnelly begins an article on 
Creative Writing as knowledge with some predicates, beginning with ‘(1) If we 
agree that creative writing is a practice-led research discipline – an area of study 
that is focused on the nature of practice and the ways in which this practice leads 
to new understanding and knowledge’, apparently taking it as read that we will, 
in fact, agree (222). 
This general acceptance of practice-led research is repeated throughout the 
meta-Creative Writing discourse, often together with a suggestion that it might 
be combined with other methodologies with the same kind of broad church 
mentality seen in discussions of knowledge content. However, the question raised 
by all of this is how far it gets us in terms of understanding how Creative Writing 
constitutes research activity. Practice-led research does offer a marker of 
difference for Creative Writing’s approach to objects of knowledge typically 
found elsewhere in the academy. But there are questions: is a methodology in 
itself a sufficient distinguishing factor if and when the research is not primarily 
about the methodology? Conversely, if the research does not fall within Harper’s 
category of ‘Research about Creative Writing’, what kind of difference does the 
fact that the research is practice-based make? Or: if a historical novel set in 
Victorian England re-produces knowledge already well established in History, 
but through a different route and into a different format, is it new knowledge, 
regardless of how effectively it is shared? Moreover, isn’t the term itself self-
evident, in the sense that Creative Writing students are obviously engaged in a 
practice of writing literature? And does the fact of being practice-led necessarily 
mean that knowledge is being produced? 
One major issue, then, is the idea of knowledge itself. It would be easy to draw 
up some lines of demarcation from the outset: on the one hand, literary texts 
inherently contain knowledge because they are constituted of the thought 
processes of their authors; on the other, such knowledge is not identifiable and 
transferable in the way in which we expect from academic research; and so on. 
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However, there is running through much of the above discussed work a spectre, 
which (perhaps due to being slightly seedier in nature than the high-minded 
concept of ‘knowledge’) is mostly only inferred and implicit, and yet which might 
be a self-sufficient alternative to the formulation in which research equals 
knowledge. 
In fact, as much might be signified by an invisible elision: works of meta-
Creative Writing discourse will often move from the stated subject of ‘research’ to 
a discussion of where the ‘knowledge’ is in Creative Writing without a bridging 
analysis of how research and knowledge are related – and will often smooth that 
path via reference to institutional frameworks. Moreover, the institutions 
referenced are more often than not either bodies which directly provide 
university funding such as the REF or bodies which are fundamentally economic 
rather than academic. For instance, Jeri Kroll goes about making the case for the 
importance of ‘originality’ in a definition of research by referencing, first, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (as Smith and Dean 
did), and then the US Patent and Trademark Office, and then two academic 
research organisations, and then Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA; 
Australia’s equivalent of the REF), and then the RAE, and then the REF itself 
(152-3). While she goes on to discuss sources such as Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi’s 
theory of creativity, it seems significant that in the first instance the ideas of 
research which are most important are drawn in from sources with an interest in 
the connection between research and funding. Of course, these documents do 
make reference to ideas of research, knowledge, and originality – that is why 
Kroll references them in the first place – but it is worth asking whether the object 
of meta-Creative Writing’s affections is really the status of research, or whether it 
is the status of having been rubber-stamped by the guardians of funding, and the 
gainful employment which ensues. 
Whilst Kroll is an extreme example, similar references, most often to the REF 
and ERA, can be found throughout the meta-Creative Writing discourse, and 
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some have already been mentioned. Gerry Turcotte and Robyn Morris approach 
the issue more directly, exploring how fit for purpose national research 
evaluations are for research in the creative arts and introduce the Freudian idea of 
the Uncanny as a way of exploring how authority interacts with creativity (72-4). 
However, it is notable that the theme here is one of how research evaluations 
impact upon the creative arts, rather than one of how the creative arts in fact 
measure up nicely to the demands of research evaluations. This is precisely the 
opposite of the general theme in other meta-Creative Writing discourse works on 
the topic, where the argument is one of how Creative Writing can and does work 
as a research discipline, rather than one of how the demand to ‘do research’ 
weighs down upon Creative Writing. What this counter-example brings out is a 
certain lack of interrogation of national research evaluations in this work; whilst 
numerous ways of ‘doing’ Creative Writing Research are identified, the tendency 
is to identify rather than analyse the fact of evaluation and the effect that it has 
on research. 
Mike Harris takes a view which is both broader and more nuanced when he 
asks ‘was there ever a ‘socio-political climate’ in which the processes we loosely 
term ‘creativity’ weren’t in some way trivialised, commodified or commercialised?’ 
before giving examples from Ancient Rome to Angus Wilson (120-3). From there 
he describes the developmental history of a play he wrote with a narrative which 
oscillates between his creative process and the funding processes which drove it. 
Perhaps what is most interesting here is that, in Harris’s case, the funding issue is 
an acknowledged demon, but this funding is coming not from the REF or other 
academic funding bodies, and not with the proviso that he is doing ‘research’, but 
from charities and foundations trying to create art with a social impact. In 
Creative Writing Research it isn’t at all clear that there is a well-developed line of 
thinking regarding the relationship between funding and research-status which 
might be analogous to Harris’s account of his own ‘funding devil’.
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The anecdotal example Harris gives shows how the ultimate nature of the 
work was to some degree predetermined by the contextual events which allowed 
the work to come to be, as against his original vision. In the present context we 
might thus identify a certain lack in the meta-Creative Writing discourse when it 
comes to interrogating the institutional character of both research evaluations 
and the concept of research itself. In tandem with the ongoing elision of a 
distinction between ‘research’ and ‘knowledge’ there is an omission of any 
suggestion that the nature of Creative Writing Research might be a product of 
those evaluators institutions as much as it is a product of Creative Writing 
academics consciously writing towards an institutionally-approved formulation. 
Creative Writing Research, then, involves an entanglement of various problems, 
and the meta-Creative Writing discourse does not strongly indicate where the 
heart of the matter might be. Before beginning the work of some form of 
theoretical disentanglement, therefore, we will turn to an alternative body of 
evidence. 
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3.2: A REF Guide to Creative Writing Research 
I began this chapter by pointing out that there is another kind of supplementary 
discourse which is found alongside submissions to the REF. They were not 
explicitly considered in the previous chapter because, unlike a typical student 
supplementary discourse, they are not presented alongside, before, or after a 
creative text, but are instead stored in the output details for a particular 
submission alongside its title, publication details, and other technical 
information, under the heading of ‘additional information’. Kept aside from the 
output itself, this additional information is thus presented as a preliminary detail 
which merely aids the reader in accessing the thing which is actually to be 
assessed. In this space, Creative Writing academics have an opportunity to 
directly express how their work responds to or corresponds with the idea of 
research – or, at least, the definition of research as set out by the REF. 
This is not a special dispensation for the sake of work which might fit 
awkwardly with an established idea of what research is or can be. All submissions 
have the opportunity to include additional information, although the ways in 
which the space might be used depends on which panel of the REF the work is 
being submitted to, with each Main Panel issuing distinct guidelines. Main Panel 
D, of which English is a part, shares with the other panels allowances for 
information which might be termed bibliographical: identification of work which 
includes substantial elements written before the current REF period; further 
details regarding co-authored and co-produced submissions; summaries of work 
published in languages other than English; and requests to double-weight a 
submission. However, Main Panel D differs from the other panels in its rules 
regarding factual information about the significance of an output and contextual 
information about the research process. Whilst the factual is entirely disallowed 
(whereas it is allowed in about half of other subject areas), the contextual is given 
a much broader remit than in other panels, with space provided for the specific 
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issues regarding contributions to anthologies and grouping of multiple smaller 
works as well as a more permissive allowance for the explication of ‘any output 
where the research imperatives and process might further be made evident’ (97-8). 
This last suggestion goes well beyond the language from panels A through C 
where such additional information may only be included when the research 
process ‘is not evident’ within the output itself. While one can only speculate as to 
whether the REF would consider the ‘imperatives and process’ in any given 
Creative Writing output to be ‘not evident’, it is probably always the case that the 
research process ‘might further be made evident’, and as such this is an open 
invitation to Creative Writing academics to offer a personal insight into their 
research process.  
Thankfully, we need not speculate as to whether Creative Writers do indeed 
take up that invitation, nor speculate as to how they do so. Like the many 
guidelines, policy documents and memoranda involved in conducting the REF, 
the details of outputs are all published on the REF website, including any 
supplied additional information. In order to explore how that additional 
information field was employed, I extracted the Creative Writing outputs from 
fifteen universities which had five or more Creative Writing outputs each. This is 
not a comprehensive survey for two reasons. Firstly, there are certainly 
universities with Creative Writing outputs which are not included here; an 
exhaustive survey risked becoming unmanageable, and so I chose universities 
know from personal experience to have significant involvement with Creative 
Writing. Secondly, Creative Writing is categorised under English and its outputs 
are usually not explicitly identified as ‘Creative Writing’, and so some may have 
been missed. Likewise, I may have included some outputs which their authors 
would not consider to be wholly Creative Writing; while novels, poems and plays 
are unmistakably Creative Writing works, there are a number of creative-critical 
and experimental works where the line is not so clear. As such, I attempted to 
include any output which might reasonably be considered to be primarily 
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Creative Writing in nature, including meta-Creative Writing works. The survey 
resulted in details of 235 outputs from 105 academics across 15 universities, 
including their additional information when present, an assessment of whether or 
not they are meta-Creative Writing in nature, and what type of output they are 
listed as (e.g., book, chapter, article, and so on). 
The first conclusion to draw from this is that, amongst non-meta outputs, the 
overwhelming majority do supply additional information. While 18% of such 
outputs had no additional information, most of these exceptions came from the 
University of St Andrews, where no output had additional information, and the 
universities of Warwick and Sussex, where 66% of outputs have no additional 
information and the remainder consist entirely of one-sentence descriptions of 
prizes and publications. Amongst the rest of the outputs, the tendency is to 
provide, with a few exceptions, additional information which approaches the 300-
word limit imposed by the REF. This institutional demarcation is unsurprising, 
as all universities will have introduced local policies on submitting to the REF, 
but the trend towards providing additional information is clear. This trend is 
emphasised by the fact that meta-Creative Writing work from the same 
institutions, which is non-creative by its nature, rarely employs additional 
information. While this sample is much smaller - comprising 13 of the 235 outputs 
- just three of those supply additional information, one of which merely explains 
the author’s contribution to an edited collection. Overall, the rate of submissions 
supplying additional information, regardless of length, is 55 percentage points 
higher amongst creative works. 
It also seems clear that these academics are taking advantage of the relatively 
permissive rules for Main Panel D: while the relevant guidelines suggest that 
information other than that about ‘the research process and/or content’ carries a 
100-word limit, 86% of additional information in Creative Writing goes over that 
word limit, and 45% gets within fifty words of the overall 300-word limit, 
suggesting that these academics see their additional information as doing 
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something more than providing plainly factual information. It is likewise the case 
that, while it is not always clear exactly how the additional information for an 
output explicates its research process, the information given is only rarely 
bibliographical. In fact, the only entirely bibliographical additional information 
in the survey is from the University of Warwick’s submission, for David Morley’s 
The Cambridge Companion to Creative Writing, which reads, in full, ’50% edited. To 
be included as part of this submission is the solo-authored essay, “Serious play: 
creative writing and science”’. 
So, it is de rigueur in Creative Writing to supply additional information for 
the sake of explaining its nature as research – but more important is the question 
of how that explanation tends to function. There are two comparisons we might 
make here. The first is against the REF’s own definition of research:  
1.  For the purposes of the REF, research is defined as a process of 
investigation leading to new insights, effectively shared. 
2.  It includes work of direct relevance to the needs of commerce, 
industry, and to the public and voluntary sectors; scholarship; the 
invention and generation of ideas, images, performances, artefacts 
including design, where these lead to new or substantially improved 
insights; and the use of existing knowledge in experimental development 
to produce new or substantially improved materials, devices, products 
and processes, including design and construction. It excludes routine 
testing and routine analysis of materials, components and processes such 
as for the maintenance of national standards, as distinct from the 
development of new analytical techniques. It also excludes the 
development of teaching materials that do not embody original research. 
3.  It includes research that is published, disseminated or made 
publicly available in the form of assessable research outputs, and 
confidential reports (as defined at paragraph 115 in Part 3, Section 2). (48; 
emphasis in original) 
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For much of this definition, it is hard to see how a Creative Writing output 
might want or need to respond to it. Some parts, such as the ideas of ‘invention 
and generation’ and ‘research that is published, disseminated or made publicly 
available’, seem to be inherently fulfilled by creative work, assuming that they are 
published and found not to be plagiaristic. Others, such as ‘the maintenance of 
national standards’ and ‘confidential reports’, are almost certainly irrelevant to 
creative work. Whilst phrases such as ‘the use of existing knowledge in 
experimental development’ might be construed as having an artistic or literary 
meaning as well as the industrial one which seems to be the primary implication, 
the main, repeated, key concept which Creative Writing might respond to here is 
that of newness: ‘new insights, effectively shared’, ‘new or substantially improved 
insights’. Taken in an artistic or qualitative and not a pedantic sense, this quality 
of newness is something which could be both not obvious within the text and 
usefully explicated by the author.* 
However, the additional information provided often goes above and beyond 
the simple message that ‘this is new’. For instance, when the additional 
information for Samantha Harvey’s All is Song (Bath Spa University) begins by 
stating that it ‘is a novel that loosely reinterprets and modernises part of the story 
of Socrates’, the claims of reinterpretation and modernisation neatly bring to 
bear a sense of newness; as something old is made new, and presumably 
effectively shared, we have in one phrase the image of point 1 of the REF 
definition. As the text continues, the nature of this newness is complicated: 
                                                             
 
* By a pedantic sense of newness I here mean simply that it could be said that any 
non-plagiaristic work is ‘new’ due to the fact that the precise sequence of words 
it contains have not been recorded prior to that text’s creation. However, this is 
clearly not what most people would mean when suggesting that there is 
something ‘new’ about the writing in a novel or poem. 
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listing the problems which her research sought to respond to, some turn out to be 
interdisciplinary (‘How tolerant is modern society to philosophical scrutiny?’), 
some essentially literary (‘How might philosophical discourse, a non-narrative 
form, be housed in the narrative and dramatic form of a realist novel’), and some 
deal with specifically Creative Writing issues (the novel is ‘an exploration of how 
to go about working philosophical discourse into a realist novel’). These distinct 
strands are summarised by Harvey when she suggests that this last ‘is a question 
that has persisted, unresolved, in philosophy, literary theory, and amongst 
novelists for decades’. 
All is Song neatly summarises a pattern in which the newness that the REF 
holds as definitional to research is presented as occupying Creative Writing 
outputs multiply rather than in a single, empirically new quality. Toby Litt’s King 
Death (Birkbeck), for instance, has an additional information which begins with a 
precis and ends with a claim of something intellectually new. Along the way, one 
paragraph is spent exploring a particular meta-Creative Writing quality, 
explaining how Litt’s Creative Writing students ‘become obsessed with (and 
oppressed by) the American minimalism of Raymond Carver’, and another views 
the novel from a traditional critical position, explaining the novel’s relationship 
with Christopher Isherwood, Graham Greene, Banana Yoshimoto, Haruki 
Murakami, and John Keats. Litt’s conclusion that ‘I hope I have demonstrated 
that minimalism is neither exclusively American nor exclusively about one easily 
teachable brand of exclusion’ brings these strands together whilst underlining, 
with the implication that what is ‘demonstrated’ has not been demonstrated 
before, the output’s newness. 
The additional information for Edgelands (Lancaster University), by Paul 
Farley and Michael Symmons Roberts, begins by describing it as ‘an original and 
experimental work of non-fiction in both research methodology and approach’; 
‘original’, especially, is a keyword which recurs in these texts as a signifier for 
newness, appearing 31 times in the sample, whilst 7 outputs are similarly branded 
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as ‘experimental’. However, perhaps more interesting here is the phrase ‘both 
research methodology and approach’, in that methodology and approach seem 
like they should mean the same thing in the context of academic research. What is 
perhaps implied by this phrase is, again, a multiplicity in how the output 
constitutes research: a mention of being ‘co-written and co-edited by writers 
working in tandem’ suggests an innovation in the Creative Writing process, 
whilst being ‘both part of a tradition of ‘nature writing’ and a critique of that 
tradition’ makes the work an innovation in terms of literary genre; the former, 
perhaps, is ‘methodology’, and the latter ‘approach’. Mention of ‘radical naturalists 
such as Richard Mabey and environmentalist Marion Shoard’ gives the output a 
further interdisciplinary quality. Being co-authored, Edgelands appears again in 
the REF as part of Manchester Metropolitan University’s submission, and 
interestingly the MMU submission has different additional information. This one 
begins by directly describing the work as ‘an attempt to break new ground in 
British landscape writing’, and while some of the reference points are similar, 
such as ‘wilderness literature’, Marion Shoard, and co-authorship ‘conducted on 
an entirely shared basis’, this one also presents the first-hand research work of  
‘extensive travel to the English edgelands of - in particular - the post-industrial 
north-west, on the fringes of Liverpool, Manchester and Lancaster, the midlands 
belt around Birmingham and Wolverhampton, and the end of the so-called M4 
corridor around Swindon’ - which goes beyond the exclusively textual content of 
the first additional information and, like Harper’s Making Up, attempts to show 
an investment of effort beyond that of sitting behind a keyboard. 
The usage of words which explicitly claim a certain newness is not always tied, 
as it is in Edgelands, to the work as a whole, but serves to emphasise the variety in 
kinds of newness on show. In her additional information for The Village (Oxford 
Brookes University), Nikita Lalwani says that her research for the book’s location 
includes ‘original interviews with female inmates, obtained by working closely 
with Penal Reform International’. The additional information for Fay Weldon’s 
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The Stepmother’s Diary (Bath Spa University) concludes that it ‘proved to be an 
original ‘literary novel’ not true to the genre, deadly serious with laughs’. For 
Trezza Azzopardi, The Song House (University of East Anglia) ‘is innovative in 
form and content, rendering in prose form the effect of music on memory’. Kate 
Clanchy’s What is She Doing Here (Oxford Brookes University) is glossed as being 
‘innovative and inventive in style, using poetic lists, short essays and imaginative 
storytelling’. Paul Farley, explicating his poetry collection The Dark Film 
(Lancaster University), explains that some of the poems ‘were written as the result 
of innovative collaboration, for example with the Royal Philharmonic Society and 
Classic FM’. For Journey Into Space (Birkbeck), Toby Litt explains that his work 
attempts ‘to find something new by investigating a familiar narrative set-up more 
patiently, deeply and in a more philosophically grounded way’. In each example 
from this parade the emphasis is mine (the REF database having no provision for 
formatting), and the words picked out relate the work’s newness in terms of 
background research, genre, form, style, working method, and content, 
respectively. Moreover, in each of these examples an implication of newness is 
anyway already present – we would assume that any interviews conducted are the 
person’s original work, that a novel written in a genre but ‘not true to the genre’ 
must be inventive – but the newness is nonetheless stressed. 
These examples were chosen because they all contain language which responds 
to the quality of ‘newness’. This is not always the case: often when the research 
content is made further evident, the newness of that research is inferred rather 
than explicitly claimed. However, it is generally true that across all of these 
additional information texts, there is no shared sense of what knowledge or 
insight a Creative Writing output might or should hold – and more often than 
not, this sense is not even univocal within one particular additional information. 
Whilst the texts being provided here might respond to the REF definition of 
research and the panel’s stipulations for additional information, neither of those 
criteria are suggesting or providing for how the additional information field 
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should be filled out or what kind of research content Creative Writing outputs 
should present themselves as containing. 
There is, however, a striking echo between the kinds of knowledge in Creative 
Writing being presented in these texts and the themes of Creative Writing 
Research which Graeme Harper identifies in ‘Creative Writing Research’. In that 
chapter he surveyed the field via the subheadings  ‘Critical Understanding’, 
‘Reflection, Reflexivity, Response’, ‘Research about Creative Writing’, and 
‘Research Using Creative Writing’ (282-7). To again take Harvey’s All is Song as an 
initial example, the question ‘How tolerant is modern society to philosophical 
scrutiny?’ suggests a sense of research using creative writing, in that the subject 
matter here is non-literary. The issue of ‘How might philosophical discourse, a 
non-narrative form, be housed in the narrative and dramatic form of a realist 
novel’ suggests a sense of research as critical understanding, in that the same 
problem might be approached through an exclusively critical lens. And the 
description of the novel as ‘an exploration of how to go about working 
philosophical discourse into a realist novel’ suggests reflective, reflexive, 
responsive research, in that the insight there imparted relies on sharing the 
author’s own experience of writing.  
This, then, is the other key point of comparison for this additional 
information. A broad consensus that something like practice-based research helps 
distinguish Creative Writing from English does not supply an understanding of 
what Creative Writing Research itself actually is or what it seeks to understand; 
in just the same way, ‘new insights effectively shared’ might clearly signal a 
particular kind of response, but does not provide a definition strong enough to 
unify the natures of those responses. At the same time, there are themes in the 
additional information clear enough that (a) the currency of the meta-Creative 
Writing discourse is underlined, and (b) we might usefully consider that the 
broad conversation which informs the meta-Creative Writing discourse also 
informs these academics’ responses to the REF. 
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This identification of statements echoing Harper’s themes might be played 
out across the additional information I collected from the REF, but it is often 
clearest in those examples which attribute research questions to their work. For 
instance, the additional information for Luke A Williams’ The Echo Chamber 
(Birkbeck) begins with three research questions: ‘How can I interrogate and 
reinvigorate the form of the novel?’, operating on a first-hand experience of 
writing, is a reflective question; ‘How can I explore, through fiction, the silences 
and insterstices that exist in the historical record relating to a specific period in 
Britain’s colonial history?’, referring to historical, non-literary knowledge, would 
be ‘Research Using Creative Writing’; and ‘What are the confluences and 
contradictions that exist between language, meaning and sound?’ seems to be a 
critical question. Likewise, the research questions for Kate Pullinger and Chris 
Joseph’s Inanimate Alice (Bath Spa University) – ‘What new creative possibilities 
for writing and teaching are offered by the new technologies? How can 
multimodal online forms contribute to the development of a canon of electronic 
literature? How can traditional forms of narrative be integrated with the new 
narrative forms produced by the digital technologies?’ – exhibit a shift from 
‘Research About Creative Writing’ to ‘Critical Understanding’, whilst those for 
Steve Voake’s Dark Woods (Bath Spa University) – ‘1 Can one successfully combine 
metaphysical reflection with a narrative written in the thriller genre in a way that 
is accessible to a modern teenage readership? 2 What are the relationships in the 
thriller between the interior mental state of an individual, their intentions, and 
the exterior world?’ – are reflective and critical, respectively. 
What do these research questions demonstrate about Creative Writing 
Research? First, that there is a tendency in REF additional information which is 
symptomatic of something which Harper’s categories – and the meta-Creative 
Writing discourse on Creative Writing Research more broadly – is also 
symptomatic of. Although the ways in which research content is here presented 
could not be described as approaching anything like a consensus, there does seem 
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to be a fairly reliable set of concerns which occupy this space. Second, and 
perhaps ironically, they demonstrate that Creative Writing academics are 
responding to concerns besides the criteria of the REF itself. Those criteria to do 
not explicate what an insight is or should be, and the question of why these 
categories arise finds no response in the REF definition of research. Indeed, what 
these research questions do not demonstrate, in concordance with the meta-
Creative Writing discourse, is an analysis of why these kinds of knowledge are 
highlighted, what their relationship is with the idea of research, and why Creative 
Writing is distinctly positioned to produce them. Working within the terms 
prescribed by that discourse, we have for some time been speaking in terms of 
what Creative Writing work can know and how it arrives at that knowledge, 
rather than in terms of Creative Writing as ‘research’ per se. In order to better 
bridge that gap, we will now turn back to approach the idea of research. 
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3.3: The question of research 
This move from the research question to the question of research has an 
antecedent in Jacques Derrida’s 1984 lecture ‘Psyche: Invention of the Other’. It 
even begins with a question – ‘What else am I going to be able to invent?’ – which 
fulfils the designation of ‘research question’ more thoroughly than any REF-
inspired Research Question (1). This question, this ‘inventive incipit for a lecture’ 
(1), announces the lecture as a ‘discourse on invention [...] presented as an 
invention’ (4); the question both introduces a topic – invention and, in due time, 
newness, originality, research – and, being spoken to an audience, marks the 
lecture itself as an invention, and as something apparently being invented as it is 
spoken by a speaker ‘setting out to improvise’ (1). As such the question is a 
‘breaking with convention’ (because a lecturer is expected to prepare his words), 
but at the same time this is typical for the topic, as an ‘invention always 
presupposes some illegality, the breaking of an implicit contract; it inserts a 
disorder into the peaceful ordering of things, it disregards the proprieties’ (1). In 
‘Creative Writing and Ph.D. Research’ Jon Cook invites us to imagine George 
Eliot presenting her work to an assessment panel via research questions. In an 
opening sentence, Derrida presents us with both a research question, as 
traditionally understood, and a research-question: a research question about 
research, or the question of research, which he promises to explore.  
The very word ‘invention’ immediately recalls that list of words which 
Creative Writing academics use to respond to the REF’s demand for newness: 
‘experiment’, ‘innovation’, ‘original’. Of course, ‘Creative’ itself fulfils something of 
the same function, and a literary Creative Writing output casts two shadows in 
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the light of Derrida’s exploration of invention.* Let us again take Samantha 
Harvey’s All is Song as an example: first it must, like Derrida’s lecture, ‘put forth 
something brand new – in its words or its contents, in its utterance or its 
enunciation’ (4) as against other novels; and second it must (and Derrida also 
discusses this angle explicitly) put forth brand new as against the corpus of 
existing research.  
This doubling has already been alluded to, but in ‘Psyche: Invention of the 
Other’ both come under a more general problem of invention, which is also a 
problem for the lecture being given. On the one hand, one ‘expects of [an 
invention] that it will say the unexpected’ and it ‘should make come about or 
allow the coming of what is new in a “first time ever”’ (4, 5). This is invention’s 
‘illegality’, in that it cannot entirely repeat what has come before and so must 
contradict some known rule, and as with the REF respondents’ concerted 
collective effort to state that ‘this is new’, Derrida finds that ‘the enigma is borne 
in every word used here – “new,” “event,” “coming,” “singularity,” “first time”’ (5). 
On the other hand, this unexpected, disordering invention ‘will also need the 
signature or the countersignature of the other’ (5) in order to be understood as an 
invention, as new. This other hand has its own collection of words: ‘as we speak of 
invention [...] we ought to see this very speech granted a patent, the title of 
invention – and that presupposes a contract, consensus, promise, commitment, 
                                                             
 
* Derrida later draws a distinction between the terms ‘invention’ and ‘creation’, 
saying that, unlike creation, ‘invention does not [...] have the theological meaning 
of a veritable creation of existence ex nihilo’, it cannot begin God-like from 
nothing, and instead starts ‘with a stock of existing and available elements, in a 
given configuration’ (24). However, he does also supply ‘create’ in a list of ‘other 
neighbouring words’ to ‘invention’ (23). The (in)appropriateness of this 
theological dimension of the word ‘creative’ in ‘Creative Writing’ 
notwithstanding, both terms at the very least respond to a sense of newness. 
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institution, law, legality, legitimation’ (5). This lecture’s status as invention 
depends on being unexpected, brand-new, and therefore never before cognised, 
but simultaneously it must be ‘evaluated, recognized, and legitimized by someone 
else, by an other’ (5) and so the tension of invention lies in its need to be 
recognised without having been cognised (by someone other than the inventor) in 
the first place. 
All of which might be said of All is Song, regardless of where one places the 
onus of newness. Considering its status outside of academia is instructive: while it 
is obliged to invent and to some greater or lesser extent be new, that obligation 
has the constraint of being not just new, but a new novel, and, as ‘an invention 
can never be private once its status as invention [...] has to be certified and 
conferred’ (5), it must be legitimated by ‘the other as member of a social 
community and of an institution’ (5) (e.g., by members of an institution of 
literature) as novelistic, and therefore as generically recognisable, legal, expected, 
and so on. When Harvey suggests that her central research question is one that 
‘has persisted, unresolved, in philosophy, literary theory, and amongst novelists 
for decades’ she is in part positioning the novel in a context which, regardless of 
the outcome of the REF, must already have verified it; whether it is a novelistic 
work amongst the work of novelists is not for the REF to judge, and to already 
present it as such suggests that that moment of recognition has already taken 
place. A similar structure is in play for research generally, only substituting for 
‘institution of literature’ the phrase ‘institution of research’ (i.e., the academy) and 
for ‘novelistic’ something like ‘research-istic’; Derrida in fact closes his lecture 
with a section on the ‘Politics of Research’. However, for literature-which-is-also-
research, which is already responding to this problem as a piece of literature (with 
the possible addition of some explanatory text like a supplementary discourse or 
additional information), a text already in some way ratified by some kind of 
literary institution has to be ratified again by an academic one. Interestingly, 
Derrida says of invention that no ‘preface announces it; no horizon of expectation 
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prefaces its reception’ (4), which is of course precisely counter to the nature of 
additional information generated in REF submissions. Whilst Derrida suggests 
that for a discourse on invention one ‘expects that it will say the unexpected’, the 
typical additional information as examined earlier instead identifies and pre-
cognises that unexpected, unsettling the structure and making it expected. For 
now, though, we will suspend that issue to ask how the output itself, caught 
between literary-invention and research-invention, might be situated in this 
general problem of invention. 
Reading ‘Psyche: Invention of the Other’ in this light involves an experience of 
being offered surprisingly germane categorisations into which the Creative 
Writing output might fit only to have them destabilised as being not so simple 
after all. The first of these comes after the introduction into Derrida’s discourse 
of another text, Francis Ponge’s poem ‘Fable’. After a brief reading of that text, 
Derrida hypothesizes that in the contemporary era 
There are only two major types of authorized examples for invention [...] 
Someone may invent by fabulation, by producing narratives to which 
there is no corresponding reality outside the narrative (an alibi, for 
example), or else one may invent by producing a new operational 
possibility (10) 
where ‘operational possibility’ indicates technologies ‘such as printing or nuclear 
weaponry’ which generate real situations which could not have come about 
without that technology’s existence. The pertinence of the division seems self-
evident. It is not just that Creative Writing outputs would so obviously be 
considered ‘fabulation’ (as even non-narrative or non-fictional creative texts could 
be seen as productions which function in indifference to reality), but more 
importantly this seems to indicate a disjunct which separates Creative Writing 
from a broader sense of research. Where the REF definition of research ‘excludes 
routine testing and routine analysis of materials, components and processes’, it 
might equally exclude research which produces no new operational possibilities; 
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where it stipulates that ‘ideas, images, performances, artefacts including design’ 
must ‘lead to new or substantially improved insights’ in order to be counted as 
research, it might equally stipulate the importance of a correspondence with 
reality, in that an insight observes ‘the inner character or hidden nature of things’ 
(OED). Using Derrida’s broader terms for these categories, the fact that Creative 
Writing invents ‘stories’ in a system which expects the invention of ‘machines’ 
provides a locus for Creative Writing’s difficult relationship with research – 
albeit briefly, as the same paragraph closes by saying that the ‘aim here is to grasp 
the unity or invisible harmony of these two registers’ (10). 
Derrida’s identification of that invisible harmony emerges from his reading of 
‘Fable’. In order to avoid reproducing his reading in full, we will focus on the 
poem’s first line: ‘Par le mot par commence donc ce texte’; ‘With the word with begins 
then this text’ (8). Derrida’s critical attention here is on the fact that by ‘its very 
typography, the second occurrence of the word par reminds us that the first par – 
the absolute incipit of the fable – is being quoted’, which is to say that the first 
line is quoting and referring back to itself even whilst it is under way (11). Taken 
as a whole, this first line is an absolute example of narrative fabulation: not only 
does its fictional status mean that it does not rely on a reference to external 
reality, but all reference is neatly self-contained within the line, without 
(ostensible) analepsis or prolepsis, such that it doesn’t even rely on the external 
reality of the rest of the text. Its quality of invention in this context thus seems 
simple, but for Derrida the auto-quotation which makes that simplicity possible 
also complicates matters, for ‘the first par is used, the second quoted or 
mentioned’. On the basis of this distinction between ‘use’ and ‘mention’, which 
operates on the grounds of speech-act theory, Derrida argues that ‘on the same 
divided line, the event of an utterance mixes up two absolutely heterogenous 
functions’ (12). In terms we will shortly return to, the first with is performative: in 
referring to nothing beyond itself, it institutes itself as it is read, actively 
producing the poem. The second with is constative: referring to something which 
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is already the case, it points out rather than producing. However, at the same 
time, the constative with is itself performing, and that which the performative 
with instantiates only comes about due to its constative echo. Two withs with two 
heterogenous functions, and each only functioning with regards to the other: the 
‘infinitely rapid oscillation’ which this sets into motion is, for Derrida, beyond the 
ability of speech-act theory to account for, and beyond that of other theories of 
literature and language. 
On these grounds Derrida suggests that ‘Fable’, before it is a fable or ‘an 
apparently fictional story’, is ‘the inauguration of a discourse or of a textual 
mechanism’ (10), or a ‘sentence that invents itself while inventing the tale of its 
invention’ (11), or, after some further analysis and most explicitly, ‘a machine, a 
technical mechanism that one must be able, under certain conditions and 
limitations, to reproduce, repeat, reuse, transpose, set within a public tradition 
and heritage’ (20). Or, in its unsettling of something previously thought to be 
understood, it creates a new ‘operational possibility’, ‘a rule-governed or 
regulating mechanism capable of generating other poetic utterances of the same 
type, a sort of printing matrix’ (20-1). Hence, there is an implication of unity 
between the two registers earlier hypothesised, in that while fabulation demands 
no corresponding reality outside of the narrative, it nonetheless produces new 
possibilities, and for having been done there is knowledge of how to do that 
work. 
The other germane categorisation which arises in the process of Derrida’s 
reading relates to the performative/constative division itself. He asserts that  
the concept of invention distributes its two essential values between 
these two poles: the constative – discovering or unveiling, pointing out 
or saying what is – and the performative – producing, instituting, 
transforming. (12) 
Unlike the division of two modes of invention, we are here thinking in terms of a 
distribution across poles, of two terms co-implicated from the start. Because of 
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this, and because we are at this point already in the full flow of analysis of Ponge, 
there is no need for a warning bell that things are not so simple. We might, 
however, raise a question of whether this distribution is even, or of whether an 
invention is predisposed to one pole over the other. To again take the division at 
face value before following Derrida’s argument, it is tempting to imagine or 
suggest that our hypothetical Creative Writing output would be performative in 
the first instance and only secondarily constative, that its essential quality is of a 
production which institutes its own reality and any discovery of ‘what is’ would 
be only incidental, or at the very least up for debate. We have already seen how, 
in both the meta-Creative Writing discourse and the REF additional information, 
there is a great deal of variance in the kinds of constative content Creative 
Writing academics ascribe to their work as compared to a relatively high degree 
of agreement regarding that work’s performative (or practice-based) character. 
In his reading of ‘Fable’, Derrida’s very ‘sticking point here has to do with the 
figure of co-implication, with the configuration of these two values’ (12). As we 
have seen, Ponge’s text ‘performs and describes, operates and states’ (12), and as 
well as instantiating a ‘technical mechanism’ which is iterable in other literary 
texts, or which might itself produce other texts, this co-implication 
‘spontaneously deconstructs the oppositional logic that relies on an untouchable 
distinction between the performative and the constative’ (13). Moving once more 
past his analysis of the remaining seven lines of ‘Fable’, Derrida concludes that the 
‘hybrid of the performative and constative’ in the text is at once ‘a unique event’ 
and ‘a machine and a general truth’ (20). This machine operates in the first 
instance as the aforementioned ‘printing matrix’, but is extended in the next 
section of the lecture. Whilst speaking of the difference between an invention and 
‘a veritable creation of existence ex nihilo’ he argues that 
‘Ponge’s “Fable” creates nothing, in the theological sense of the word (at 
least this is apparently the case); it invents only by having recourse to a 
lexicon and to syntactical rules […] But it gives rise to an event, tells a 
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fictional story, and produces a machine by introducing a disparity or gap 
into the customary use of discourse […] it forms a beginning and it speaks 
of that beginning, and in this double, indivisible movement, it 
inaugurates. This double movement harbors the singularity and novelty 
without which there would be no invention. (24) 
A double movement without which there would be no invention? To briefly 
unpack this idea: there is a subtle inversion here from the previous statement that 
invention co-implicates performative and constative poles, to a statement that 
the co-implication of those poles is what produces the conditions for invention. 
The implication of this is itself double. First, literary-inventions, which seemed to 
be aligned with fabulation and performance (an inventive text is ‘truth that is 
nothing other than its own truth producing itself’ (20)), must be constative in 
order to function as inventions – and what a text perhaps constates is itself, 
which is also a machine to produce further texts (‘but it is also a machine and a 
general truth’ (20)). Second, those inventions which seemed to be aligned with the 
constative, with operational possibilities, are themselves also performative – one 
imagines a patent which describes, tells the story of, the process necessary to 
create the object it refers to, as when later in the lecture Derrida says that ‘in all 
cases [inventions] are “stories”: a certain sequentiality must be able to take a 
narrative form, which is to be repeated, cited, re-cited’ (34). From here, there is no 
question of a tendency towards performativity or constativity, for these have 
shifted from incidental to fundamental qualities of invention. 
Up until this last point, we have for some time been speaking in terms of 
fictional, literary texts as inventions, of how a Creative Writing output might 
invent given the terms of Derrida’s account of invention. The text as machine as 
well as fabulation, the text as something which creates the conditions of 
possibility for future texts, and the anxiety of the text’s need to differentiate itself 
from and align itself with its generic context are a lot to work with in that regard, 
but this is not all that Derrida is discussing in ‘Psyche’. 
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He mentions an interesting possibility whilst analysing the deconstruction of 
the oppositional logic of performative and constative utterances in ‘Fable’ by 
asking ‘does the deconstructive effect depend on the force of a literary event?’ (14). 
His response is to say that not only is this effect not exclusively literary, but ‘the 
same structure, however paradoxical it may seem, also turns up in scientific and 
especially in judicial utterances, and indeed can be found in the most 
foundational or institutive of these utterances, thus in the most inventive ones’ 
(14). As such, he suggests that not only does the deconstructive effect of ‘Fable’ 
arise in non-literary texts, but its qualities which pertain to invention – its co-
implication of story and machine, of performance and constatation – are 
generalisable to all invention. The performative/constative structure of fictional 
invention is constitutive of all invention. Here Derrida merely says that he is 
‘convinced’ of this and then moves on, but we can follow the development of this 
train of thought with one eye on the REF.  
There is something similar identified in his discussion of René Descartes’s 
project for a universal language; he quotes a letter of Descartes’s saying that this 
language would make it possible to 
enumerate the thoughts of all men, and to record them in order, or even 
to distinguish them so that they are clear and simple, which in my 
opinion is the great secret one must have in order to acquire correct 
knowledge…. Now I hold that this language is possible, and that one can 
find the knowledge on which it depends, by means of which peasants 
could better judge the truth of things than philosophers do now’ (35; 
emphasis Derrida’s). 
The invention of such a language would surely, if actually performed, be the most 
‘foundational or institutive’ of utterances, but Derrida observes that not only is 
this language fundamentally inventive in character, but it also ‘presupposes and 
produces science’ (35). Likewise, a similar proposal by Leibniz ‘is not only located 
at the arrival point of an invention from which it would proceed, it also proceeds 
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to invent, its invention serves to invent’ (36). For both of these (hypothetical) 
inventions, what is invented is not just invention-as-product, not even just 
inventions as iterable things (whether in terms of being reproduced or making 
possible further production), but inventions which ‘anticipate the development 
and precede the completion of philosophical knowledge’ (36); further inventions 
are thus not only anticipated but also formulated by the instituting language-
invention. Derrida’s choice of example here clarifies the argument, in that a work 
of philosophy conducted in a universal/philosophical language would only be able 
to operate in terms of that language. Following the logic whereby the 
performative/constative structure of literature is applicable to invention per se, 
we might draw from this that that quality of making-possible future inventions is 
also a quality of determination, such that invention generally both opens up and 
restricts the field of possibility for future invention. 
Later still, discussing property rights to inventions, he raises the issue of the 
1883 Convention of Paris, ‘the first great international convention legislating 
industrial property rights’ (37). For us the key moment is his initial observation: 
its ‘juridical mechanisms are themselves inventions, conventions instituted by 
performative acts’ (37). Here we are picking up on the earlier mention of ‘judicial 
utterances’, which ‘especially’ display the inventive structure found in ‘Fable’. 
Again the example is apt: not only does the Convention (like other law regarding 
intellectual property) display a relatively clear impact upon subsequent 
invention,* but it is also dateable, traceable to a particular document (though the 
                                                             
 
* In the Convention’s terms only invention sensitive to ‘exploitation of the 
industrial type’ may claim a patent, thus (in Derrida’s analysis) sidelining both 
‘literary or artistic invention’ and ‘theoretical discoveries’ which 
‘technoindustrial mechanisms’ may not easily be derived from; such inventions 
nonetheless persist, of course, but the Convention is ‘the advent of [a] new 
regime of invention’ which impacts the field of invention generally (37). 
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document may have received significant amendation since) and so its moment of 
invention is reified. The performative quality of judicial invention is thus brought 
out: a seemingly constative document, referring out to international patent law, 
simultaneously performs the establishment of that body of law. 
Throughout this movement beyond the literary invention there is an echo of 
the REF, and in all of the ways so far discussed in this section the REF itself can 
be viewed as an invention. First, it is an invention in the sense of non-
preexistence: when the guidelines and surrounding documents for the REF were 
published, it was for the first time, creating something both new and iterable. 
Second, its invention set into reverberation the performative/constative 
opposition in the same manner as Ponge’s ‘Fable’, in that its documents 
performatively inaugurate the REF even as they constatively refer to the 
institution still being inaugurated. Third, it did so by means of something 
already-established in order to be recognised, exploiting the common stock of the 
RAE, previous debates around funding, previous definitions of research, among 
other things which could each be considered as a regime of invention. Fourth, to 
the same extent that it was produced via prior invention, it is a ‘machine’ for 
invention, creating the conditions of possibility for the inventions it claims only 
to assess after-the-fact; as with Descartes’s invented language, it presupposes the 
knowledge or kinds of knowledge which may now be produced and be ‘counted’ 
as research. 
While discussing the patent system, Derrida says that, compared to the past, 
‘what is called a patentable “invention” is now programmed, that is, subjected to 
powerful movements of authoritarian prescription and anticipation […] 
Everywhere the enterprise of knowledge and research is first of all a 
programmatics of inventions’ (27). In the contemporary British scene of academia, 
that programmatics might well be the REF, not directly by means of disallowing 
certain kinds of research, but as a regime of invention, as a machine generating 
what gets to be research at all. Thus, the condition of Creative Writing research is 
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still double: working through ‘Psyche’ we have, on the one hand, graduated from a 
sense of research-invention versus literary-invention to a general sense of 
invention, but on the other hand we have arrived at a situation where a Creative 
Writing output is both inherently research – an invention ne plus ultra – and 
apparently predetermined in its research capacity, if it is research at all, by a 
prior institutional invention the prescriptions of which it cannot avoid. 
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3.4: The invention of research 
What research does the REF then invent? What type and degree of 
predetermination is put into place by its utterance? Or, how did this now-
identified regime of invention affect the writing of Harvey’s All is Song? 
This is of course a question for which a truly satisfying answer would be 
impossible to give. One could take that novel – or any of the other texts in the 
2014 REF, or any which will be prepared for the next REF exercise, or any other 
literary text which is otherwise bound by some decree to ‘be research’ – and 
attempt to divine how it was conditioned by the idea of research, by means of 
interviewing those present during its invention, or by analysing it through the 
lens of discourses on research, or by attempting to comparatively demonstrate 
certain trends amongst literature written under this regime (as Mark McGurl 
does with the American MFA system in The Program Era), but all such responses 
could only ever be a kind of divination. Whilst the trends might be verifiable and 
the interviews conducted sincerely, there would still be something invisible and 
inaccessible about a text’s inheritance from the idea of research, as the thought 
processes which were involved are ultimately lost, and the idea of the same text 
being written outside of the regime of research is as impossible a what-if as that 
of Jorge Luis Borges’ Pierre Menard (65-6). 
It is nonetheless tempting to hypothesise that the answer to that last question 
would be ‘not very much’. While much could and has been written about the 
impact of Creative Writing as a whole on literature – particularly in terms of its 
pedagogy – it is easiest to imagine a novel being written with its quality as 
research an incidental, secondary consideration, or even an afterthought. After 
all, and as has been mentioned, literature is written anyway, regardless of the 
REF, and for all of the research questions being asserted, the surveyed additional 
information gives us little sense that literature is being written for the sake of its 
research-status. Indeed, even though there was no allowance for ‘factual 
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information about the significance of the output’ as part of submissions to the 
REF’s Main Panel D, which dealt with English, it is common to find in the 
additional information mentions of audience figures (for instance, A Country 
Diary, Paul Evans, Bath Spa University), financial grants (The Wizard the Goat and 
the Man Who Won the War, DJ Britton, Swansea University), literary awards (The 
Bees, Carol Ann Duffy, Manchester Metropolitan University), media reviews (The 
Salt Harvest, Eoghan Walls, Lancaster University), radio serialisation (The Son, 
Carrie Etter, Bath Spa University) and other such signifiers of verification and 
validation which fall outside of the remit of the REF and outside of the idea of 
research. 
It therefore seems that, although research-validation might place impositions 
upon Creative Writing academics, a controlling effect on the literature which 
they produce is not one of them. Of course, an institutional body which exists for 
the purpose of funding or not funding a large group of other institutions is bound 
to produce certain social effects, impacting upon the interpersonal culture of a 
university department, which might induce changes to a literary production just 
as much as any other significant social factor, such as personal relationship status 
and national political environment, but this implies a different form of opening-
up and foreclosure of possibility to that of a regime of invention. It is therefore 
problematic for an assertion that the REF is both an invention and a regime of 
invention if, despite having the capacity to function in that way, that capacity is 
not reified in the texts it refers to. As a point of comparison, Derrida suggests 
that the Convention of Paris established a regime of invention, but this is only 
worth discussing because ‘it is the advent of this new regime of invention, which 
launches techno-scientific or technoindustrial “modernity”’ (37), from which we 
might observe that (a) such regimes are not total, in that the Convention 
inaugurates a particular scene of invention which much invention, including 
artistic invention, does not necessarily operate within, and (b) whilst all 
invention might have the capacity to act in this way, it is not necessarily the case 
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that an invention must have such an identifiable consequence – and it may in fact 
be notable when it does.  
In order to assess whether or not the REF is acting in this way vis a vis the 
work of Creative Writing, whether it has a hand in producing the work of 
Creative Writing, it might be useful to briefly look again at how invention and 
production are related in ‘Psyche’, and particularly in Ponge’s ‘Fable’. Early in his 
analysis Derrida states that ‘first “Fable” is the tale of an invention, [...] the 
inauguration of a discourse or of a textual mechanism’ (10). The latter term we 
have already discussed somewhat, but the word ‘discourse’ is also interesting here. 
When one is in the middle of reading an essay which is about to speak in terms of 
Speech Act Theory, it is easy to take this noun in terms of its specialised meaning 
in Linguistics: ‘A connected series of utterances by which meaning is 
communicated, esp. one forming a unit for analysis’ (OED). ‘Fable’ is, in common 
with any poem, a perfect example of this kind of discourse. However, because it is 
analogous to ‘textual mechanism’ we are invited to also take this ‘discourse’ in the 
same sense as ‘meta-Creative Writing discourse’ or as, in the OED’s terms, ‘The 
body of statements, analysis, opinions, etc., relating to a particular domain of 
intellectual or social activity, esp. as characterized by recurring themes, concepts, 
or values’. 
It is not clear how a ‘discourse’ in the former sense would function as a ‘textual 
mechanism’, in that what it indicates is a strong specificity: if the discourse of 
‘Fable’ is this specific set of words in this specific order offered up in such a way 
as to be available to analysis, what advance in understanding could the phrase 
‘textual mechanism’ offer which the word ‘text’ does not already capture? In the 
latter sense the situation is clearer, but with the caveat that the mechanism 
operates in terms of a recurrence, that what is produced iterates as it invents. As 
Derrida further explains whilst concluding his analysis of ‘Fable’, although it is 
appealing to a preexistent linguistic background (syntactic rules and the 
fabulous treasure of language), it furnishes a rule-governed or regulating 
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mechanism capable of generating other poetic utterances of the same 
type, a sort of printing matrix. So we can propose the following example: 
“Avec le mot avec s’inaugure donc cette fable,” that is, with the word 
“with” begins then this fable; there are other regular variants, more or 
less distant from the model, that I do not have the time to list here. (19-
20) 
The utterance is here given permission to travel some distance from the model, to 
be a more radical variant of the model than the substitution of a single word, but 
nonetheless must be regulated and governed according to that model. We might 
thus better understand how Descartes’s philosophical language and the 
Convention of Paris are to be considered regimes of invention; what Descartes’s 
language predetermines or programs is not philosophical enquiry, but 
philosophical enquiry conducted in that language, governed by its rules and 
regulated by its mechanisms. 
In ‘Psyche’, after furnishing this image of ‘Fable’ as printing matrix, Derrida 
immediately opens a counterpoint by suggesting that ‘there will be invention only 
on the condition that the invention transgresses [...] indeed, it ought to overstep 
the space in which that status itself takes on its meaning and its legitimacy’ (20-1). 
However, we might suspend that objection in order to ask how, or whether, the 
invention of the REF could act as a printing matrix for a work of literature in the 
first place. Could the themes, concepts and values of the REF’s definition of 
research, or of the body of REF publications as a whole, or of any similarly 
bureaucratic account of research, act as the regulating mechanism for linguistic 
expression in a novel? 
In the previous section I highlighted Derrida’s claim that ‘no preface 
announces’ invention (4), only to set it aside in order to focus on the literary text 
itself – that being the ‘Research Output’, the object which the juridical 
mechanism of the REF claims to act upon. In doing so, setting aside the 
additional information as an object of analysis if not as a body of evidence, the 
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argument shifted the status of the literary text in a way which left a problem 
unresolved: a sense of tension between the text as literary-invention and as 
research-invention might be mediated by considering invention per se, but this 
invention must be ‘recognized, legitimized, countersigned by a social consensus 
according to a system of conventions’, and even if the sense of invention in these 
Creative Writing Research Outputs is singular, it must nonetheless be recognised 
by two such systems. How this operates in terms of literary social conventions – 
recognition as a novel, recognition as a collection of poetry – is itself a major 
question which is beyond the scope of this thesis to answer, but the case of 
recognition as research is what is at hand, and ‘Psyche’ does not provide that 
bridge. As we will see, for a literary text to invent under the regime of the REF 
would probably require it to inhabit a meta-fictional space in that the question of 
the text’s ontology must be in play in order to bring the discourse of the REF into 
a fictional locus. There is no sign, at least in the submissions collected from the 
2014 REF, of that kind of writing being a significant trend. 
However, there is no such issue for the additional information itself. 
Additional information was already a problem for the invention-status of the 
Creative Writing Research Output when viewed in Derrida’s terms, precisely 
because it announces the invention ahead of the invention: 
Every invention supposes that something or someone comes a first time, 
something or someone comes to someone, to someone else. But for an 
invention to be an invention, in other words, unique (even if the 
uniqueness has to be repeatable), it is also necessary for this first time to 
be a last time: archaeology and eschatology acknowledge each other here 
in the irony of the one and only instant. (6; emphasis in original) 
Or, to speak in the plainest terms, an invention can only be invented once, and 
once invented can no more be invented again than I can claim to have invented 
the wheel. For those Research Outputs which have it, additional information is 
thus severely disruptive, and for reasons which recall the problems of the 
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supplementary discourse: either it represents what is inventive about the 
Research Output, and thus anticipates the advent of invention in a way which 
negates the Research Output’s own inventiveness, or it is invented (for surely this 
text too is an invention) without regard for the Research Output’s invention, and 
thus fails to be additional, fails to aid the reader’s access to the text. 
But maybe both of these conditions are to some degree true of additional 
information where it is present, and are in fact the condition of additional 
information in a relatively non-problematic way. A piece of additional 
information can be, and often is, regulated by the mechanisms of the REF: we 
have already seen how the language and meaning of the REF’s definition of 
research is recouped in additional information. Simultaneously, the additional 
information’s need to contravene that mechanism (an ‘invention always 
presupposes some illegality, the breaking of an implicit contract’ (1)), its 
relationship with its Research Output, and the fact that it is never limited by the 
bounds of the REF but always proceeds towards the same external territories are 
all explicated by relocating it as the invention, for if it invents in the terms of the 
REF it must also invent in the terms of the literary text which it accompanies. 
Each Research Output is itself here functioning as a printing matrix – and this 
must be the case, for the additional information is bound to replicate and 
reiterate the Research Output if it is to function at all. 
This analysis, then, has formulated an answer to the question of why it might 
be that Creative Writing’s engagement with the REF entails such an extensive 
usage of the opportunity to provide additional information: by its nature, the 
additional information can successfully invent in response to both its Research 
Output and the REF itself at the same time. Conversely, and as I suggested 
earlier, the Research Output itself has only a relatively limited scope to respond 
to both the REF and its literary regime of invention. This is in contrast to (using 
its nearest neighbour as an example) the way in which literary criticism might 
engage with the REF. There, the Research Output can directly iterate upon the 
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discourse of the REF within the text itself: if, for instance, the REF’s definition of 
research were to change such that it indicates ‘original thinking’ rather than ‘new 
insights’ as its key term, it is easy to imagine a critical article framing its 
argument by saying that ‘…the importance of this original thinking on the matter 
is…’, or ‘…an injection of originality is required if our thinking about this is to 
proceed towards…’, or ‘…if this text is a true original, then our thinking as readers 
must respond accordingly so that…’ – or, in Derrida’s terms, they might use any 
‘other regular variants, more or less distant from the model’ (20). The equivalent 
operation in Creative Writing would, it seems to me, be to have one character 
turn to another and say ‘your stance on this issue certainly evinces a great deal of 
original thought, indebted as it may be to prior art regarding the subject’ – or, 
even if it is more subtly written than that, would be to have the writing break its 
own ontological frame in order to incorporate a discourse foreign to the text’s 
matter, and therefore become metafictional. The additional information, 
unembroiled as it is in the problems of literary ontology, suffers no such 
hampering. 
However, the model upon which we have thus predicated the functioning of 
the additional information offers an alternative possibility for the Creative 
Writing Research Output itself. Thinking via an algebraic metaphor, there are 
three terms in our additional information model: we have the REF, the Research 
Output, and the additional information itself, and they are arranged as ‘REF + 
RO = AI’. Which is to say, some combination or other of the regime of invention 
instantiated by the REF and the regime of invention instantiated by the Research 
Output results in the invention of the additional information. The equivalent 
equation for the model concerning Creative Writing Research Outputs proposed 
in the previous paragraph would replace the term ‘AI’ with the literary regime of 
invention which that text happens to be operating under, arranged as ‘REF + LRI 
= RO’. Or, the invention of the Research Output occurs under the regimes of 
both the REF and the output’s literary context. As a final equation, I will propose 
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that the scope for a Research Output to be both research-invention and literary-
invention at the same time would be significantly broadened if we were instead 
to think in terms of ‘LRI + AI = RO’, replacing the role of the REF with 
something like the additional information. 
To unpack this, recall the fact that the survey of REF 2014 found many 
instances in which the additional information was being used as a site for 
research questions, as with Kate Pullinger and Chris Joseph’s Inanimate Alice (Bath 
Spa University), in which the authors ask ‘What new creative possibilities for 
writing and teaching are offered by the new technologies? How can multimodal 
online forms contribute to the development of a canon of electronic literature? 
How can traditional forms of narrative be integrated with the new narrative 
forms produced by the digital technologies?’. These research questions are 
unambiguously responsive to the discourse of the REF: each features a sense of 
newness; the word ‘online’ indicates a specific method of effectively sharing the 
work; and the third question might even equate to the REF’s allowance for ‘the 
use of existing knowledge in experimental development to produce new or 
substantially improved materials’. While it seems, prima facie, that this particular 
text was almost certainly composed after the writing of Inanimate Alice for the 
sole purpose of its submission to the REF, there is no reason to assume that 
something very like this list of REF-conditioned research questions did not pre-
exist the writing process. Which is to say, we could read the additional 
information as though it were prior to the text it accompanies, historically as well 
as (for the REF auditor) chronologically. Or, we might consider the invention of 
the Creative Writing Research Output as taking place, alongside that text’s 
literary context, under the regime of invention instantiated by the additional 
information, rather than that of the REF directly: ‘LRI + AI = RO’. 
In this way, with this effort of bridging between the REF and Creative 
Writing via the work of research questions, we can start to see how the invention 
of a literary text might take place in terms of an idea of research without 
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necessarily having to find a way to incorporate the discourse of research itself. 
For, as well as clearly reciprocating the language of the REF, these research 
questions feature language which makes itself available to literary response: while 
we might not find a term like ‘multimodal online forms’ iterated directly in the 
text of Inanimate Alice, it is easy to see how Inanimate Alice might recognisably 
invent within the regime which a term like this instantiates. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I discussed how the meta-Creative Writing 
discourse puts forward an idea that ‘research’ effectively equates to ‘knowledge’; 
the possibility was floated that ‘if research is indeed equivalent to knowledge 
production, then as long as new knowledge of some kind is being produced, 
research is taking place’. There is in this possibility a position of great safety for 
the Creative Writing academic. More so than for any other discipline, Creative 
Writing (the production of novels, plays, poems, life writing, scripts, etc.) 
inherently constitutes new knowledge in that, in contrast with a scientific result, 
the necessarily original ordering of its words creates space for the argument that 
its knowledge-content was previously unknown. More so than for any other 
discipline, the fact that this knowledge is effectively shared is part of the very 
condition of the outputs being produced. In short, there is a persuasive 
tautological position to be held in which the work of Creative Writing is obviously 
research, because it is creative, and because it is writing. 
The ensuing analysis of Creative Writing’s relationship with the idea of 
research does not actually unsettle or disrupt this equation of knowledge and 
research. Instead, it shifts the locus of the problem. The issue now is not ‘does 
Creative Writing produce knowledge’ – and nor is it ‘what kind of knowledge 
does Creative Writing produce’, as those categories in Harper’s and Cook’s 
explorations of the issue are now no less valent. The issue is one of how Creative 
Writing conceives of its own research: there is now a clear route towards a 
Creative Writing academic inventing their literary text in terms of research, but 
to do so depends on placing research questions at a prior, originary point with 
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regards to that literary text. Likewise, the work of Creative Writing might equally 
occur in a way which holds research quality – whether that be submitting to the 
REF, applying for external funding, or teaching doctoral candidates – as being an 
afterthought to the writing of literature, with texts like the additional 
information being incidental and secondary productions. Any other analysis of 
Creative Writing Research – into its methodologies, into what ‘kind’ of 
knowledge it makes, into maximising its institutional and bureaucratic 
effectiveness – depends first of all on an implicit answer to the question of where 
this work falls in the dynamic between literary-invention and research-invention. 
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Chapter 4: Remainders – fragments 
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4.1: So with the word ‘so’ begins then the final chapter of this thesis 
3.3: which is to say that the first line is quoting and referring back to itself even whilst it is 
under way – expanding into a self-reference to the temporality of this section 
and then to the work it is a section of, before quotation collapses that bubble, 
tightening our scene of reference onto a moment from the thesis, which scene 
this sentence then shifts onto the text which follows it. 
The structure of Derrida’s printing matrix is found on display everywhere in the 
form of wordplay. The Author is Not Dead, Merely Somewhere Else. ‘1967: The Birth 
of ‘The Death of the Author’’. The Death and Return of the Author. ‘The Resurrected 
Author: Creative Writers in 21st-century Higher Education’. ‘A subheading 
involving some kind of pun referring to ‘The Death of the Author’’. The birth of 
‘Derrida’ was ransomed by the Death of ‘Deauthor’. Plagiarists cannot use online 
banking because their accounts are ‘deauthorised’. In Vienna Central Cemetery 
you may hear Beethoven’s Fifth played backwards; he is ‘decomposing’, you see? 
 
Wordplay, even when spoken, is a domain of inverted commas – so to speak, if 
you catch my drift. ‘Nudge nudge’ opens a double quotation mark which is closed 
by ‘wink wink’. It operates on a horizon of quotation, in a double bind where to 
quote is impossible, for a difference must be marked from its source, but 
awareness of that source is indispensable, and so the quotation is nonetheless 
performed. If a poem really were to start with Derrida’s ‘with the word “with” 
begins then this fable’ (‘Psyche’ 20), what status of quotation, citation or grafting 
would that line hold? 
 
To speak of intertextuality is nothing new, but we might consider what happens 
when a literary printing matrix makes its mark on a critical discourse – and, 
worse, when it does so without inverted commas, without even a suggestion of air 
quotes. Is its literary quality suddenly neutered, collapsing under the weight of 
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this ontologically alien context like a thing forced deep underwater? Does it sit in 
the text like an organ transplant or foreign body, threatening to cause, but for 
careful, diligent management, rejection or infection? Or does it inaugurate 
something new which is survived by neither source nor target? 
 
Creative Writing, criticism, theory: the three terms circle one another on orbits 
both carefully maintained and managed, not by any single hand, but by collective 
attention. In this thesis I have been handling Creative Writing rapidly, at the 
speed of survey, trying to pull chorus from discord, and theory slowly, trying to 
indulge the response in flowing any distance from its source, and doing so via 
whatever authorisation my position as critic grants me. Cosmologically, nothing 
moves save by reference to a given fixity; to occupy a position gives it a stillness 
around which all other discourse seems to sweep. 
 
‘Fictocriticism’, he tells her, ‘exercises traditionally literary forms in the interest 
of critical truth’. She nods. ‘This conversation, for instance. Laid out on a page, 
bracketed by narration, it would take on a quality of literary realism, even while 
losing, ironically, its reality, and so, properly framed, would tell us something 
important about realism. In fact, I’m writing something at the moment, in which I 
think I might do that…’. She gets the impression, as she often does when talking 
to a particular brand of academic, both confident and desperate, seemingly 
always male, that this is meant to impress her. 
 
The thinking of intertextuality is now an old thinking, and so too is that of 
binarism. It now hardly needs to be stated that to consider criticism and Creative 
Writing as opposite terms, to consider any pair of opposite terms, is to invite 
each into the other, to at least raise the possibility of rapprochement between 
them. For Creative Writing, the research-invention is really that which criticism 
invents; the matter of the supplementary discourse’s being-read is also that of its 
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criticality; the authorship problem, ultimately, comes down to whether one 
emphasises the first or third syllable in ‘speaking of literature’. 
 
‘The prevailing trope of fictocritical discourse is that of a ‘space between’ the 
categories of fiction and criticism created by the epistemological collapse of 
critical distance in postmodern theory’ (Dawson 166). This ‘creative criticism 
exploits, distorts, works over, hyperbolises, erases or plays with the conventions 
of academic critical prose’ (Benson and Connors 15). ‘The role of the term 
“postcritical,” then, is neither to prescribe the forms that reading should take nor 
to dictate the attitudes that critics must adopt; it is to steer us away from the 
kinds of arguments we know how to do in our sleep’ (Felski 173). 
 
Tempting, here, to translate the contemporary parlance of being unmastered as 
being ‘woke’ into a practice of wakefully reading awoken texts. We may be able to 
perform certain arguments in our sleep (intertextuality, binarism, that one 
Roland Barthes essay about authorship) but perhaps could beget only sleep by 
doing so. Unmastered, without control from above, still in the process of being 
learnt, as yet unfinalised into its polished form. The problem is that to make 
being-awake into an ideological point of control is potentially to establish finality 
or foreclosure: how many times can a text, or can we, be awoken? 
 
The structure of wordplay is found on display everywhere in the study of 
literature, and is the truly shared practice between writers of literature and 
writers of theory. To write a word sur erasure is to introduce undecidability; is it, 
or is it not, present? And, for that matter, who is Josef K. (Kafka)? (Even that 
citation generates the undecidable.) Thinking of, about, in language seems always 
to generate a play with words. Who could resist, having written a book on literary 
theory after structuralism, giving it the title Not Saussure? Is to wake a text to risk 
its funeral? 
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This thesis occupies its terms multiply and in turn. First it speaks with the 
authority of the critic, manipulating Creative Writing and theory into dialogue, 
as every critical work does between some given x and y. Then it plays out from its 
theoretical concerns a soft mastery, speaking of criticism and Creative Writing’s 
entanglement in an unfinished sentence. In each, the position spoken from is also 
at stake, in a second-order binarism against its objects. I now feel called to 
complete the tripartite and occupy, to the extent that I am able, a creative 
position which survives Creative Writing’s institutionalisation. 
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4.2: italics 
0.1: This afterword begins self-reflexively – But what does it mean to follow the desire 
to begin with an afterword? 
Let’s imagine that there is a novel, the title of which is the same as the title of this 
fragment, and the title of which, its author insists, must be written in italics. In 
this novel, there is a writer who has written an eponymous book, the title of 
which also, it is very important, must be rendered in italics. This writer, at a 
certain point in the novel, attempts to justify to another character the 
importance of the book’s title and its formatting. My book, says the writer, is 
going to be discussed by academic literary critics. I know this because the book’s 
title is exactly the kind of thing that literary-critical academics like to write 
about. In academic writing, continues the writer, there are as you know certain 
formatting conventions. Being relatively short, Tennyson’s ‘Ulysses’ is written in 
inverted commas; being relatively long, Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre is written in 
italics; and thus we may see at a stroke the difference between Jane Eyre and Jane 
Eyre, or between ‘Ulysses’, Ulysses and Ulysses. But, the palette of textual 
formatting is limited: inverted commas are also often used to, so to speak, ‘cast 
aspersions’, and if an academic wants to emphasise something – I mean, really 
emphasise something – they use italics. At some point, inevitably, and more often 
than one might expect, an academic will end up wanting to italicise a phrase in 
which certain words, for whatever reason, already demand italicisation. For a 
quote within a quote – and I know that you know all of this, the writer reassures 
us – for a quote within a quote there is the double quotation mark, which serves 
rather well, but for italicisation within italicisation the letters can lean no harder. 
So, the solution is to switch those pre-italicised words back to the standard 
roman glyphs. Evidently, this is done for fear of being unable to distinguish 
between I love Jane Eyre so much and I love Jane Eyre so much. Therefore, the title of 
my book, written in italics, which is also the book’s title, must be written in 
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italics, but, being already written in italics, cannot be written in italics. A choice 
is met to write italics italicised, and so fail to place it in its title-identifying 
formatting, or to accurately write italics de-italicised, leading to constructions 
like ‘in italics, there is a character who writes a book’, or ‘italics, the text, involves 
a writer’s discourse on italics, the type’, or ‘the writer in italics, written in italics, 
writes in italics their book’s title, italics’. 
Obviously, we want to reply, and, who knows, perhaps the writer’s addressee 
does reply, obviously academics will simply write italics in italics. Obviously 
formatting conventions are a matter not of slavish dedication, but of making ones 
meaning as clear as possible. Obviously, if we’re feeling optimistic, academic 
literary critics won’t actually find the writer’s little game very interesting. And 
yet, there is something vulnerable about our visible markers of textual distinction: 
it is a realm of ingenious affordances, where titling underlines become link-
signifiers, where quotation marks indicate fearful distance, where acronym-
identifying small caps can be THE VERY VOICE OF DEATH, each member of this 
small team doing the work of hundreds, as quick to context as once only words 
were. 
The answer to a riddle, realised in a flash, Federer Jr. voyages twice in one day, 
Ulysses! 
174 
 
4.3: Parlour game 
3.4: Each Research Output is itself here functioning as a printing matrix – And must be, 
for as soon as it is instantiated locally, the printing matrix is instantly 
operative globally. 
A statement of intent for the fragmentary chapter currently being written: recall 
an idea which the thesis generated but could not grasp; find a moment in the 
existent text from which to begin; derive a direction from one and a momentum 
from the other in order to identify a trajectory which might produce, however 
partial, some value; invent a way to write out along that trajectory. 
Not only is each fragment cut off from its neighbours, but even within 
each fragment parataxis reigns. This is clear if you make an index of 
these little pieces; for each of them, the assemblage of referents is 
heteroclite; it is like a parlor game: “Take the words: fragment, circle, Gide, 
wrestling match, asyndeton, painting, discourse, Zen, intermezzo; make up a 
discourse which can link them together.” (Roland Barthes by Roland 
Barthes 93) 
Following the desire to abstract: is Barthes’s ‘the assemblage of referents is 
heteroclite’ a necessary, sufficient, or exclusive factor of the fragment? Is Barthes 
here speaking of a domain peculiar to the fragment, or merely of a general 
capacity of writing which that form particularly embodies? That this might be a 
general capacity is a possibility recommended by a hypothetical: 
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Please select one of the following 
questions. You should write on at 
least two of the texts studied on this 
module. Your essay should pay 
attention to the formal and stylistic 
aspects of the texts, particularly with 
regards to the qualities of nostalgia 
and rebellion as discussed this 
semester. Your essay will be marked 
with reference to both the Senate 
Scale and the module’s learning 
outcomes.  
 
4. ‘To find a form that accommodates 
the mess, that is the task of the artist 
now’ (Samuel Beckett). 
To what extent do your texts frame 
modernity as a ‘mess’, and how do 
they accommodate it? 
Take the words: texts, module, essay, 
formal, stylistic, nostalgia, rebellion, 
[Senate Scale: understanding, analysis, 
argument, writing, referencing], [learning 
outcomes: contemporary, innovative, 
digital, complex], mess, artist, frame, 
modernity, accommodate; make up a 
discourse which can link them 
together. 
 
An uncouth reading: anything written in terms of a rubric is constructed 
according to a law not of internal necessity but of inventing a discourse which 
maps onto an index. Its success is not its self-actualisation (as of the poetic well-
wrought urn) or its consequence (as of a political discourse) or its insight (as of a 
philosophical treatise) but the degree to which its index indexes it. For Barthes an 
index, of which this heteroclite assemblage is an example, ‘is itself a text, a second 
text which is the relief (remainder and asperity) of the first’ (93). To write towards 
a rubric is therefore a perverse inversion of writing: with the index as the first 
176 
 
text, the now-second text is a relief of a relief. Or, it is writing conducted in 
accordance with a fundamental innovation of mass production: the mould.  
Please attach to your application an 
outline of how this project will 
enhance the university’s knowledge 
sharing capacity. We anticipate that 
successful applications will 
contribute to the current Research 
Excellence Framework cycle and the 
University’s 2025 Excellence 
Roadmap. Although the project 
should feature its own success 
metrics, you should indicate how 
they relate to these broader projects. 
Opportunities for collaboration with 
existing initiatives and the 
enablement of future social and 
public revenue are also anticipated 
during the project’s span. 
Take the words: application, outline, 
project, knowledge, capacity, excellence, 
success, metrics, opportunities, 
collaboration, initiatives, enablement, 
social, revenue; make up a discourse 
which can link them together. 
 
 
Derrida got there first, of course: the literal denotation of the term ‘printing 
matrix’ is the mould used to cast a letter for a movable type printing press; the 
generative original from which any number of iterations might be derived. The 
mould makes creation possible, both immediately, by forming the product of 
which it is a relief, and at a remove, by producing products at sufficient speed and 
consistency that they might be recombined, repurposed, and reworked. Consider 
a roman majuscule twelve-point Garamond Q which formed the Queen of France 
in one novel, a Quality Street wrapper in another, a question from an interview in 
a third, ad inf
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matrix – ‘matrix’ meaning, etymologically, its mater, its mother, its womb (OED). 
How many novels have been stamped by the printing matrices of Virginia Woolf 
or Franz Kafka?  
Write a critical commentary on your 
portfolio. The commentary should 
include reflection on the processes of 
composition and revision which you 
undertook during this module. You 
may refer to the writing diary 
submitted as formative work earlier 
in the semester, as well as any 
workshop feedback you may have 
received. 
Take the words: critical, commentary, 
[portfolio: modernist, confessional, 
psychological, sincere, recuperative], 
reflection, composition, revision, diary, 
workshop; make up a discourse which 
can link them together. 
 
Writing to an index: in the weakest possible formulation, a writer writes to 
the index of their own psyche. Even (especially) automatic writing reflects an 
index which preceded it. Even (especially) the most avant-garde poet attempts the 
parlour game, though perhaps with a more heteroclite index. To write in a 
modernist form today would be to add certain items to the index which precedes 
the act of writing: ensure the discourse encompasses a sense of life as ‘a luminous 
halo, a semi-transparent envelope surrounding us from the beginning of 
consciousness to the end’ (Woolf 9). 
Write a novel. 
Take some words; add to them the 
word novel; make up a discourse 
which can link them together. 
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Barthes’s heteroclite fragment: it might be that this adjective is not at all a 
positive definition of the fragment – it does not indicate the fragment as 
something which has this quality – but is instead a negative definition, in that it 
indicates the fragment’s refusal to feign being anything other than or more than 
the parlour game at hand. Far more pragmatic than an involved thinking of 
regimes of invention, though without the same theoretical weight, would be to 
reassert the agency of the Creative Writer by assessing what sort of an index they 
were writing towards, and how successful they were in doing so. 
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4.4: Statements of Intent 
2.4: At the same time, however, in the very term ‘statement of intent’ there is a clear echo 
of academic practice. In PhD applications and official documents, in research 
proposals, in the initial stages of taught-degree dissertations, and in (as we will see in 
the next chapter) Research Excellence Framework submissions, there are statements of 
intent (and cognate terms) wherein the student or academic must account for their 
literary output in much the same way. – Or for their critical output. 
After my first year of working on this thesis, I was institutionally obliged to write 
a Statement of Intent for it, as part of the transfer-up process which designates 
research students as fully-fledged PhD candidates. 
In preparing to write my statement of intent I began by browsing the 
sample documents hosted on the UEA Faculty of Arts and Humanities 
Graduate School pages. There, alongside statements of intent from past 
candidates in various other schools, the text currently being held up as 
an example of success in Literature, Drama and Creative Writing is 
Philip Langeskov’s statement from September 2010. Because Langeskov’s 
PhD was in Creative and Critical Writing, his statement (uniquely 
amongst those on the webpage) comes with two titles: ‘Creative: Eli Eli: 
Stories’ and ‘Critical: Great Reckonings in Small Spaces: Time, Structure 
and Form in the Short Fiction of David Means’. The first thing that this 
statement of intent states, then, is the intention to deliver - as is usual 
for Creative Writing - the final thesis as two separate texts, though the 
statement itself must cover both at once. Langeskov achieves this by 
offering a section entitled ‘II - On the selection of a form’, which 
contextualises both parts of his work, before moving on to sections 
which focus on the creative and critical elements in turn. 
As a group, Statements of Intent like Langeskov’s – and mine was no different 
– are written with an eye to their own redundancy. They open up space for 
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subsequent texts whose arrival they cannot survive. They are not just disposable, 
as a note to self or a shopping list might be, but deeply invested in their own, 
personal eschatology. The ideal which the Statement of Intent works towards is 
to be read by its audience precisely once in order that it may be never read again. 
Unlike the prefatory text which puts forward an authorial statement of intent, for 
the PhD Statement of Intent there is never any ambiguity around its relationship 
with its thesis: upon completion of the thesis (at the absolute latest), any 
scaffolding provided by the Statement falls away, readable only as an echo in the 
thesis (at the absolute most), and for a reader to then return to the text of the 
Statement itself would be perverse. 
However, before the work of the statement proper begins, Langeskov 
includes a short prefatory section entitled ‘I - On intent and writing’ 
which concerns the very act of writing a statement of intent for a 
Creative Writing PhD and the ‘ways in which a Creative Writing PhD 
can affect the activity it is designed to encourage’ (2). Quoting David 
Means and Flannery O’Connor, he raises a spectre of doubt over whether 
intent and creativity are compatible concepts and goes on to give 
examples from two of his own stories, commenting that in ‘neither case 
did I know anything beyond the fact that I had come upon a storyable 
incident; the story itself emerged/is emerging in the writing’ (3). This 
unknowing sits awkwardly with ‘the proposed requirements of the PhD 
to attempt to know the entire story […] before setting out to write a 
single word’, and this tension between process and requirement is 
presented in terms of ‘struggling’ and feeling ‘constrained’ (3). 
Indeed, the requirement to state one’s intention is probably always responded 
to in tension. Even outside the sphere of Creative Writing – in how my own 
Statement of Intent was written, for instance – ‘the proposed requirements of the 
PhD to attempt to know’ what will be written before it is written is problematic, 
and this tension is compounded at least twice. The first stressor is that the 
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intention stated in the Statement will be at odds with its writer’s actual 
intention. At some points it may overstate the strength of intent (in a 
speculatively-written list of chapter titles, for instance); at others it might 
understate the strength of intent (perhaps when the writer has an intellectually 
insupportable good feeling about a particular avenue of inquiry); in either case, 
and most importantly, this occurs because the function of the Statement is not to 
accurately represent the writer’s intent, but to permit its audience to give its 
writer permission to continue. The second stressor is the widely circulated fact 
that even the most faithfully written Statement of Intent will likely bear little 
resemblance to the finished thesis – the process of doing the research changes the 
research – and so rather than attempt to speak to the thesis, the impetus is to 
speak to the success criteria of the Statement of Intent as a genre of writing. The 
third stressor is the surety that even the miraculous Statement which faithfully 
reflects both the writer’s actual intention and, ultimately, the content of the 
finished thesis nonetheless aims at its own non-existence, is on the side of death.* 
Of course, he goes on in spite of all this to write a perfectly successful 
statement of intent: indeed, it eventually became, literally, an exemplary 
piece of academic writing. This is also in spite of the fact that although 
he begins by calling the problem of intent ‘a piece of rubble to clear 
away’, Langeskov is really just raising it; rather than resolving the 
tension, the first section closes by simply stating that ‘When thinking 
about the purpose of a CW PhD, these are consequences worth reflecting 
on’ (2, 4). In other words, what these opening words belie, apart from 
                                                             
 
* The only exception to this fate is when the Statement of Intent is rescued by an 
act of recontextualisation – perhaps as a usefully readable text for an analysis of 
Statements of Intent, like Langeskov’s, as an exemplary model for future 
Statements of Intent. Langeskov’s Statement is, my Statement was, and upon 
submission of this thesis my Statement will be once more. 
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being a smart rhetorical move setting up the statement’s talk of ‘pre-
occupations’ instead of intention, is an unresolved, yet non-debilitating, 
anxiety about the process of writing literature for the sake of attaining a 
degree. 
Statements of Intent, for PhDs of all hues, and in spite of everything, 
nonetheless get written. What’s striking to me now about calling the problem of 
intent ‘a piece of rubble to clear away’ is its echo of Bill Readings’ term ‘the 
University in Ruins’. When Langeskov identifies the problem of intent as rubble, 
this metaphor of clearing the demolition site such that the new edifice might be 
erceted is not aimed at ‘intent’ as a literary critic might initially understand it; 
while he draws the word ‘rubble’ from an interview with Flannery O’Connor, and 
quotes David Means on the inadvisability of writing ‘fiction out of an intention’, 
his discourse as a whole is disinterested in hermeneutic issues, in the dynamic 
between intent and reading (Langeskov 2). He finds himself ‘struggling against 
that practice’ of writing with intent because of the ‘requirements of the PhD’, not 
because of any literary-critical problematisation (3). What the word ‘rubble’ 
signifies, therefore, is the work’s academic dimension, or – more boldly – all the 
elements of his work which make its production an academic act. To illustrate, 
we might here propose that, for both the creative and the critical portions of a 
PhD like Langeskov’s, the context of being produced in a university is a necessary 
condition of it being academic work. Clearly, the projected Eli Eli: Stories, 
regardless of its ultimate nature, would in principle be constructible outside the 
university – but if this is the case, then what could make ‘Great Reckonings in 
Small Spaces’ impossible outside of the university, and can we say that, freed of 
the spectre of thesis submission and the pursuant processes of publication, it 
would necessarily be ‘academic’ outside of that sphere? The anxiety at hand is 
conjured in the interface between literary invention and the rubble of academia – 
which is to say, the location of the anxiety is identical to that of Creative Writing 
as a discipline. This schema also demonstrates a Statement of Intent’s distance 
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from its thesis in its difference from my earlier construction of this zone of 
anxiety, in which 
Langeskov’s opening gambit neatly captures the zone in which my thesis 
will reside: a zone of anxiety found at the point of contact between the 
academic discipline of Creative Writing and the rest of the academy, and 
a zone which is experienced by the student of the subject in the interim 
between the contemplation and the enactment of CW work. In this 
example that zone is thrown into relief at the moment when a Creative 
Writing thesis is subjected to demands which are placed upon all PhD 
work - the student needing to demonstrate their fitness to transfer their 
enrolment as an MPhil student to an enrolment as a PhD student, with 
that transfer’s attendant rubric of viability and originality. However, this 
is not the only point at which this anxiety is (or might be) felt. Part of 
the nature of an academic discipline is that it defines itself against and 
justifies itself to other disciplines, in the first instance to those which it 
is most closely aligned to, and second to the academy more broadly. 
However, this idea – of defining against and justifying to other disciplines – 
was written under an assumption about the nature of the ‘rest of the academy’ 
which is broken down, made rubble, by The University in Ruins. Readings’ thesis, 
the ruined aspect of the university as he sees it, is that the university’s status as a 
site of cultural generation and preservation has been replaced by an adherence to 
an ideologically-empty concept of ‘excellence’. The former is presented as an 
atavistic view inherited from Humboldt’s University of Berlin, in which the 
university supports the national culture of a state via a ‘simultaneous search for 
its objective cultural meaning as a historical entity and the subjective moral 
training of its subjects as potential bearers of that identity’ (68). Against this, he 
suggests that ‘the idea of national culture no longer functions as an external 
referent toward which all of the efforts of research and teaching are directed’; 
instead, that external referent is now an ‘excellence’ which ‘has no content […] does 
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not carry with it an automatic political or cultural orientation’ (13). This 
emptiness presents a distinct problem for any attempt to analyse the disciplinary 
structure of the university as a network of mutually antagonistic actors 
discovering markers of differentiation by comparing themselves to one another. 
Whereas in the Humboldt-influenced model two disciplines might have the 
capacity to compare their assays at ‘objective cultural meaning’ and find that their 
results are different in kind, having as external referent the principle of excellence 
means that their results can only possibly be different in degree – that is, more or 
less excellent – which offers a relative ranking but no mutual distinction. Of 
course, Creative Writing is, without uncertainty, a discipline concerned with the 
production of culture. It is the disciplinary ne plus ultra of searching for cultural 
meaning and providing subjective moral training. That the spread and 
prominence of the discipline appears to correlate positively with the spread and 
prominence of ‘excellence’, and with the concomitant decline of Humboldt’s 
ideal, is not necessarily coincidental, but nonetheless poses an obvious challenge 
to one attempting to speak to the academic dimension of Creative Writing, 
whether that be in terms of the discipline as a whole or in terms of an individual 
project. 
The fact that Creative Writing experiences this anxiety at a disciplinary 
level is marked by the relatively recent profusion of academic output 
which attempts to work through it. Here there is a distinction to be 
made between two different kinds of work currently being produced by 
the discipline. First, there is CW’s nominal product: novels, short stories, 
poetry, drama, and other creative works of literature. Second, there is 
work which is produced by CW practitioners about the discipline of CW 
without itself necessarily falling under the heading of ‘creative’. This 
category has long included handbooks and how-to guides aimed at the 
student, or at both student and teacher. However, increasingly over the 
last two decades it has also included a rapidly growing body of work 
aimed at other CW practitioners which offers to self-reflexively analyse 
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the discipline; it is this body of work which I will be referring to as 
‘meta-CW discourse’. 
Speculatively, it is tempting to suggest that, in the face of the university’s 
dwindling cultural valency, and having cultural production as one’s only tool, 
Creative Writing turned to the meta as a safe haven in which texts may be 
written in reaction to personal publish-or-perish paranoia without risking the 
unpalatable, difficult task of having to justify them as research – academically, an 
essay on assessment rubrics for TEXT may be easier to sell as ‘research’ than a 
sonnet cycle. However, questions of how far this is true and why Creative Writing 
chose this particular safe haven are rather undercut by that of whether this is a 
safe haven at all. Is it any easier for the English academic to state an intention to 
produce excellence? This fragment, at least, is not a product of any stronger 
intention than that in Langeskov’s creative work. The personal brief: (a) to write a 
fragment analysing my own Statement of Intent, which in turn analysed Philip 
Langeskov’s Statement of Intent, which in turn analysed the idea of the 
Statement of Intent; (b) to alternate between paragraphs of the Statement and 
paragraphs of commentary in such a way that, if all formatting were removed, it 
would be readable as continuous prose; (c) to leverage (a) and (b) to blur the 
disciplinary distinction between English and Creative Writing. Beyond this, I did 
not know anything beyond the fact that I had come upon a form which might 
generate criticism; the argument itself emerged/is emerging in the writing. 
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4.5: Sui generis 
2.1: This effectively dispenses with any idea that this text need follow in the formal 
footsteps of, say, literary theory or cultural studies, even while demanding that it do 
academic work – And if ‘academic work’ is therefore a signifier for something 
other than form, then a kind of wilful, desirous writing is suddenly 
legitimated. 
A negative journalistic review. 
A critical biography of the author, by the author, in the third person. 
An extended dedication to the author’s biographical source material. 
A keynote address to a fictional conference. 
A letter from the main character to the marker. 
A critical commentary on the assessment’s rubric. 
An autointerview. 
An essay in which the author feigns unawareness of their own characters’ 
fictionality. 
An apology from the author to an unidentified second person. 
A literature review of psychological research on the coping strategies of 
people who have a loved one with dementia. 
A critical essay written in the future tense. 
Just a big bibliography. 
Whatever writing overflowed the word count of the creative portion. 
A linguistic analysis tracking the prevalence of profanity over successive edits. 
A coursebook for Creative Writers structured around writing exercises which 
help one understand and employ the stylistic features of various literary theorists. 
An account of the dynamics of writing prose fiction when the mantra ‘show 
don’t tell’ is replaced with ‘don’t ask don’t tell’. 
A 1:1 scale map of the text, rendered as an electrocardiogram. 
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A history of the light bulb, with particular attention to its role in world-
historical events. 
A piece of sociological research analysing fieldwork in which a poem was 
workshopped first with adults, and then with children. 
Multiple versions of the same writing journal entry, in pastiche of Raymond 
Queneau’s Exercises in Style. 
Three accounts of an interview with a notable literary figure, in which the 
interviewer is variously cast as idolising, hostile and indifferent. 
A photocopied personal diary. 
The writer’s Twitter history, circa the module’s start and end dates. 
An anagram of the accompanying short story. 
A short story in which an undergraduate literature seminar discusses a 
recently-written poetry collection on the theme of the precariat. 
A short story in which a seminar leader reads a daring, formally innovative 
critical reflection. 
A painstaking close reading of the accompanying short story’s first word. 
A meditation on the importance of jokes in literary fiction, incorporating an 
analysis of Freud’s relief theory of laughter, which turns out to be an unusually 
long shaggy dog story. 
A polemic urging a return to metre. 
A graphic sex scene, seemingly edited out of the creative component, in which 
the author is unaccountably stood in the corner of the room, watching. 
The full, unedited text of Jorge Luis Borges’ ‘Pierre Menard, Author of the 
Quixote’. 
An extended collection of footnotes, elevated from paratext to text. 
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4.6: Genette’s usefulness (1930-2018) 
2.3: To reconstitute the history and typology of the preface and other paratextual devices, 
and pursue those questions of genre and grouping, is precisely Genette’s project in 
Paratexts, albeit in a modest form which does not claim to be rigorous or complete. – 
And what is there worth reading in an unrigorous, incomplete project? 
On the one hand, the satisfaction of clear analytical schemata: there is a 
confidence generated when we are able to say, in spite of all complication and 
subtlety, ‘this is an actorial allographic preface’. In The Mezzanine, Nicholson 
Baker praises footnoting’s usefulness as ‘a rough protective bark of citations’ 
which reassures us that ‘the pursuit of truth doesn’t have clear outer boundaries’, 
but is instead composed of ‘self-disagreement’ and attachment to ‘the wider 
reality of the library’ (122-3). Jargon like Genette’s provides an analogous shield, 
signifying that the new thought is authorised by its debt to the old. At the same 
time, the jargon is not itself the goal: that a preface is ‘apocryphal’ and ‘later’ tells 
us nothing about its function, about how it affects one’s reading of the text it 
prefaces. 
And so, on the other hand, the eminent sensibleness of Genette, who is 
willing to say, of the perfectly sensible claim that knowledge of Marcel Proust’s 
homosexuality and Jewishness affects ones reading of À la recherche du temps perdu, 
that ‘anyone who denies the difference is pulling our leg’ (8). Or, the sensibleness 
of Genette who, having provided the following ‘cumbersome typology’ of preface-
senders, first announces that it ‘calls for some observations, additions, and 
perhaps corrections’, and then, in the long exposition of those corrections, refers 
to the potential concerns of ‘diehard classifiers, of which I am certainly not one’ 
(185, 186, 193). 
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Here, the asterisked examples are Genette’s own hypothetical creations – 
categories for which ‘I know of no real example, but some such must certainly 
exist’ – and throughout he disavows the completist stance of the diehard classifier 
(180). His key insight in all of this seems to me to be that to make a typology 
inexhaustive is also to make it inexhaustible. The inevitable instance of deviation 
from Genette’s typology does not destroy it, but, through the notability of its 
differentness, only strengthens the scheme’s fundamental usefulness. The 
inevitable deviation from a supposedly exhaustive typology undoes it entirely and 
at once. 
This sensibleness should warn us off from taking Genette’s approach as a 
universal analyser of complex textual situations. For even a precisely demarcated 
issue with relatively separable subdivisions (the apparent identity of a preface-
writer) leaves gaps and ambiguities, as when he suggests that the status of the 
preface to Diderot’s Entretiens sur le fits naturel in the above typology ‘would be A2 
+ D/F’ (191). To what extent might I have figured Creative Writing as a site of 
such derivable schemata? If Creative Writing academics are embroiled in a 
tension between two articulations of the author-function, could we not map out 
the various identities such an academic might inhabit at any given moment and 
from there discuss which is most likely to be the default status? Andrew Cowan 
has gestured towards something similar with regards to the workshop. 
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The workshop is a key identifying and differentiating mark for the discipline, 
ascribed by Michelene Wandor as ‘the sine qua non for creative writing itself’ (120), 
and is also, like so much in Creative Writing, subject to no more rigorous a 
popular definition than Justice Potter Stewart’s of hardcore pornography: ‘I know 
it when I see it’ (Jacobellis v. Ohio). Any attempt to go beyond this tends to devolve 
into describing particular features of the thing, not its nature as a whole. Diane 
Donnelly, for one, gives a list of varying emotional and intellectual stances on the 
workshop: it is a place to ‘teach craft’ and ‘enhance students’ understanding’; it is 
analogous to the ‘academic practice of peer-reviewing’ but also ‘a wonderful place 
where people’s lives open up’; it is a place with ‘heavy reading list[s]’ or ‘invention 
strategies’ or ‘a process-based story workshop’ or none of the above (5-6). 
In another such assay, for an article in TEXT, Cowan accounts for the range of 
potential workshop definitions with a somewhat Genettean gesture, suggesting 
that workshop might ‘be arranged along a horizontal axis that has as one pole the 
wholly taught, exercise-based class for beginners and at the other pole the wholly 
discursive workshop for advanced (perhaps already published) writers, with a 
vertical axis that begins with recreational or high-school-level classes and ascends 
through the BA to the MA and MFA’. In the interest of comparison, one could 
decompose this into four categories over two rows and two columns: the more 
likely workshop situations would be top-down teaching aimed at less-experienced 
writers (let’s go with neuf-pedagogic) and conversation-based teaching aimed at 
more-experienced writers (or ancien-discursive); the complementary less likely 
situations would accordingly be termed neuf-discursive and ancien-pedagogic. 
Cowan goes on, however, to suggest that a ‘third axis, were such a thing 
imaginable, might calibrate the extent to which a programme is vocationally 
oriented’, bringing our number of potential situations to eight and leaving us 
with a difficult-to-draw table, and an ‘impossible fourth axis might register the 
extent to which the pedagogy is premised on a formalist or a sociological poetics’, 
at which point we’d probably want to call the typology a bust, even before 
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considering Michelene Wandor’s analogous suggestion that the workshop is 
suspended along a ‘Romantic/therapy axis’ (which would bring us to thirty-two 
distinct configurations), or speculating about the in principle unlimited potential 
for further dichotomies (119). 
And that’s just the workshop – but is there nonetheless a way in which this 
thesis could have been written in mimicry of Genette’s method? The possibilities 
at play in a preface are formally generated, even if the choices actually made are 
semantic and meaningful; the problem with the workshop example, conversely, is 
that it lacks such delimitation. While the neuf/ancien and pedagogic/discursive 
dichotomies identify an audience, vocational/non-vocational identifies learning 
outcome, formalist/sociological an ideological concern, and Romantic/therapy 
something like an emotional or interpersonal resonance – to which we could 
quickly add an activity-focus reading/writing, a teaching-attitude theory/craft, a 
literary-critical form/genre, and any number of other ways in which people’s lives 
might be wonderfully opened up. 
However, if Genette’s is a method in search of delimitation, one thing we do 
have is the textual fact of this thesis’s three chapters about Creative Writing, on 
three distinct issues, each of which presents a pair of superimposed alternatives, 
which might be temporarily disentangled into oppositional binaries: from 
Chapter 1, literary author-function/academic author-function; from Chapter 2, 
erased paratext/persistent paratext; from Chapter 3, research invention/literary 
invention. Contra Cowan, the construction of a three-axis system is imaginable, 
and even drawable: 
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A few notes of explication regarding this diagram are worth mentioning. 
First, while Cowan is thinking in terms of continuous axes – a given workshop is 
more likely to be to-some-degree discursive and to-some-degree pedagogic than it 
is to be entirely one or the other – this account, for ease, assumes that the 
categories are absolutely binary. Just as some prefaces in Genette’s analyses 
occupy multiple categories, this typology too is available to multiplicity and 
ambiguity. Second, the naming scheme here is reminiscent more of the Myers-
Briggs Type Indicator than it is of Genette’s habit of giving local definitions to 
existing adjectives (Myers & Briggs). The presence of two ‘Literary’s in particular 
made this form more workable – the letter sequences are to be read as x-y-z 
according to the respective axes – but, being concerned with people’s opinions, 
the following analysis will also be evocative of a personality-types model. Finally, 
the diagram is to be viewed as a three-dimensional representation in which a cube 
is subdivided into eight smaller cubes, each of which corresponds to one possible 
combination of our three binary pairings, resulting in a strictly exhaustive 
possibility space. In practice, this meant drawing eight Necker cubes aligned into 
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one larger Necker cube, the orientation of each of which is visually ambiguous, 
and may shift during observation. This is, frankly, difficult to look at: take it as a 
visual representation of the tenuousness of this typology and of the broader 
danger inherent in typologising. Nonetheless, certain useful comments might be 
made, first on the basis of the categories here outlined, and then on the basis of 
this diagram as a whole. 
 
L-L-E: The figure in this category identifies primarily as an author whose 
work circulates as literature in the public sphere, and presents that work as 
fulfilling the demands of research rubrics. As such, text is produced in a manner 
no different to how it would be if the figure were writing without having a role in 
the academy, but because it is born of the academy it might also be submitted to 
the REF, or subjected to analogous validators of research. Any text produced 
alongside or in the process of that literary writing is broadly seen as secondary or 
dispensable – the literary work is unproblematically taken to be the raison d’être 
of the figure’s labour. This category perhaps specifies the smallest possible 
disjoint between the idea of being an author and that of being an author-
academic; as such, the figure’s pedagogy is likely to favour writer’s journals and 
writing exercises over critical essays and theoretical work. 
 
L-L-P: This figure’s assumption that literary work necessarily enjoys research-
status is complicated by the production of paratexts which are shareable and 
consumable in and of themselves. This is most likely to be in the spirit of author 
interviews, personal essays, public meditations and similar epitexts, where an 
epitext is ‘any paratextual element not materially appended to the text within the 
same volume but circulating, as it were, freely’ (Genette 344). If the figure in L-L-
E represents the smallest deviation from the ‘traditional’ author role, L-L-P is 
perhaps in line with a more contemporary author-as-media-figure role, 
simultaneously producing literature and public commentary in a symbiotic 
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relationship. This category therefore encompasses what, as previously discussed, 
Paul Dawson’s Creative Writing and the New Humanities sees as the forward 
trajectory for Creative Writing, in which the academy is a platform from which 
to speak more broadly: 
If the forum of the public intellectual is the media, the form is non-
fiction – reviews, essays, newspaper columns, public lectures, panel 
sessions, television and radio interviews. A writer of novels and stage or 
screenplays, and less commonly of poetry, can command a presence as a 
public intellectual, but only by stepping outside the realms of fiction and 
operating in the forms mentioned above. That is, writers’ fictional work 
may get them noticed in the public sphere, but they can only operate and 
be acknowledged as public intellectuals if they write columns, give 
lectures or provide interviews. (202) 
Just as Dawson’s account of the ‘public intellectual’ is formulated via discourses of 
the ‘the perennial crisis in English’ and ‘the post-Theory academy’ (205), this 
category ironically includes not only people from Creative Writing who speak on 
the public value of literature, but also those whose public engagements with 
Creative Writing are, despite any teaching or research activity they may perform, 
largely antagonistic (Flood; Murray). 
 
L-R-E: This category is of a figure who self-conceives as a literary author 
whose textual production is informed by the fact of its framing in terms of 
academic research. Whilst whatever literary work this figure produces stands 
alone as the product of their intellectual labour, and is designated as something 
which will ultimately circulate on the terms of the publishing industry at large, it 
is not taken as read that any literary work must also be a work of research. Two 
models of labour therefore particularly suggest themselves here. The first is of an 
interdisciplinary writer, whose work is produced in reaction to or alongside non-
Creative Writing research in a way which is specifically enabled by a university 
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context; hypothetical examples would be a play about climate change, a novel 
developed from a newly-uncovered historical source, or a poetry collection which 
encodes and responds to certain specific learning difficulties. The second is of a 
writer whose literary work is economically risky and laborious to a degree which 
make its production outside the academy untenable; formally innovative and 
avant-garde work of this sort might also draw on the intellectual atmosphere of 
the English department. As such, a figure in this category is more likely than that 
in L-L-E to emphasise processes of reading and theorising in their pedagogical 
practices. 
 
L-R-P: In taking the research-content of their work to be located beyond the 
literary work which they identify as their ‘main’ labour, the figure in this category 
is likely to produce formally academic work which operates at some greater or 
lesser distance from their literary output. The obvious example of this is the 
figure who produces work which the present thesis has termed the meta-Creative 
Writing discourse: research work, for this figure, designates something non-
literary which nonetheless draws upon the experience of writing literature and 
teaching literary writing. If the figure in this category conceives of academic 
writing as something wholly other to authorship, this might only serve to 
explicate the fundamental badness of a lot of the writing in the meta-Creative 
Writing discourse. 
 
A-L-E: For the figure in this category, the invention at hand is literary, and so 
taken to be constituted according to the codes of the publishing industry and 
literary culture at large, and this invention neither wants nor needs the addition 
of non-literary texts in order for the figure in this category to fully conceive their 
own academic identity, and yet that identity is aligned with an academic form of 
authority rather than that of a novelist, poet, or similar. The most probable 
seeming upshot of this category is therefore a figure who, like that in L-L-E, 
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writes in much the same way as they would from without the academy, but with 
the additional aspect that their status as an academic gives their work particular 
currency in the public sphere. Occupation of this category may provide secondary 
weight to the suggestion that Creative Writing, as typified by D. G. Myers,  
‘seems to give every impression of being an interlocking coast-to-coast system of 
patronage – a network of cash subsidies and allotments of time for writers just 
starting out, a quilt of academic sinecures for older, more established authors’, in 
that as well as directly funding its patronees it also propels sales and acclaim via a 
cachet that traditional marketing cannot grant (5). Alternatively, the figure in A-
L-E may simply be drunk with internal contradiction. 
 
A-L-P: Temporarily erasing the middle term of this category makes its figure 
largely unproblematic. Work located in a paratextual position originating from 
an academic author is a straightforward, if unusual, description of the status of 
literary criticism. The slight expansion of the term ‘paratext’ here is predicated 
upon, first, Genette’s own account, in which a preface (to take that paratext as an 
example) might be written allographically (by another hand than that of the text) 
and exist epitextually (bound in a separate volume to the text), and, second, the 
fact that criticism is to be read alongside a text, or takes place on the threshold 
between it and the world at large – though, like any paratext, it is easily divorced 
from its text. What, then, are we to make of a literary critic whose invention 
takes place in terms of literary work, rather than the academic writing which 
would seem to be its natural site? The clear example which suggests itself is the 
emergent figure of the creative critic, for whom the literary qualities latent in any 
text – voice, style, form, etc. – are explicitly worked and mediated, and for whom 
any sense of intellectual distance and objectivity – whether mimed or sincerely 
believed – is substituted with a personal stake in the act of criticism. Of the 
fourteen writers featured in the closest thing currently available to a canonical 
list of creative critics – Creative Criticism: An Anthology and Guide – nine of them 
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(by my rough reckoning) have or had significant academic careers, and only two 
of those were heavily involved in Creative Writing. Creative criticism’s place, 
within or without the academy, within or without Creative Writing, is therefore 
unsettled, but this category shows the potential for it to be constructed in terms 
of Creative Writing’s felt pressures. 
 
A-R-E: Work circulating on the grounds of academic authoriality, positioned 
as a having a quality of newness in academic rather than (or as well as) literary 
terms, which doesn’t necessitate a paratext in order to make it available and 
readable: this seems, in terms of this typology, a relatively unlikely situation. The 
figure indicated by this category is perhaps an extreme formulation of the avant-
garde writer mentioned in L-R-E, in that the innovation being performed is not 
just enabled by the academy, but distinctly of the academy. Models for this figure 
might be found in certain Twentieth-Century poetry movements: the Black 
Mountain poets and the Language poets both constitute self-consciously avant-
garde inventions in poetry which were incubated in and delivered from the 
academy. Although positioning these as being situated within Creative Writing 
in and of themselves is potentially contentious, we may consider, in this context 
of Creative Writing’s mass adoption, other exponents of this Avant-gaRdE. 
 
A-R-P: If the typological challenge in A-L-P was to consider how literary 
criticism might itself be literary, this category presents no such problem: an 
academic author producing paratextual research-inventions is, directly, a 
university-based literary critic. The issue here is instead the fact that the figure of 
the literary critic is not inherently a figure of Creative Writing. Two potential 
solutions are clear. The first, tempting route out is to designate that particular 
corner of the typology our site of ‘traditional’ English academia, which the other 
seven categories deviate from to greater or lesser degrees. Certainly this would 
make present the fact that, even for L-L-E, which is both the negation of this 
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category and also the category closest to the extra-academic creative writer, 
English is always part of Creative Writing’s disciplinary context, at least in British 
academia. However, to designate this category as such would be to miss the 
chance to encapsulate that significant subset of English academics who, despite 
not formally identifying as Creative Writers, practice creative writing alongside 
their academic role. It is true that placing that figure under this category does not 
quite bring it under the aegis of Creative Writing, but with the current state of 
the British university system, in which ever fewer employees are progressively 
undertaking ever more job roles, it seems reasonable to speculate that this 
boundary might not hold. No longer is there room for Philip Larkin’s indulgent 
position as a university’s brightest star who chooses – or rather, does not choose – 
his engagement with academic literary culture. 
 
This final category of A-R-P raises the first observation which might be made 
regarding the diagram as a whole: physical proximity in the space of the graph 
also implies intellectual proximity in the nature of the categories, for the simple 
reason that categories which share a face only have one disparate term, categories 
sharing only an edge have two disparities, and categories sharing only a vertex 
have no terms in common. While this is in essence an accident of geometry, it 
does create the potential for interesting exercises in contrast, as with the figure in 
A-R-P who is potentially indistinguishable from a ‘straight’ English academic 
versus the figure in L-L-E who is potentially indistinguishable from a ‘straight’ 
novelist. Likewise, the figure in L-R-P, the writer of meta-Creative Writing 
discourse, feels particularly distinct from that in A-L-E, the writer who places the 
greatest weight on the university benefitting their literary career. This also means 
that we could consider ambiguous denotation in way unavailable to Genette’s 
cumbersome typology of preface-senders. While that typology leads to 
constructions on the order of ‘A2 + D/F’, here it is unlikely that an academic 
would vacillate between, say, the avant-garde research of A-R-E and the public 
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intellectualising of L-L-P. Rather, we might consider this typology as a means of 
identifying where a given academic largely resides, with the proviso that – like an 
electron – their actual location upon observation is unpredictable, but more 
likely to be close to their category than far away from it. It may be speculated, for 
instance, that the academic who seems to meet the criteria of L-R-E, in that they 
produce literature informed by their academic context, is more likely to cross 
over into L-L-E and produce literature indifferent to an academic context than 
they are into A-R-P and produce strictly critical work. 
The other general observation is to introduce one further three letter 
abbreviation by pointing out the deep faultiness of this diagram’s implicit QED, 
in that it effectively converts an a posteriori analysis (that is, the reasoning of the 
thesis thus far) into an a priori one which rests upon the predicate that these 
binaries faithfully reflect the nature and dynamics and tensions of Creative 
Writing. It then gallops away on the assumption that this predicate holds, such 
that its QED places Descartes before the horse. It is obviously the case (and this is 
also the fatal condition of personality typologies) that if you categorise everyone 
in a given population according to certain demarcations then everyone in that 
population will have a place within the scheme of categorisation, but to do so 
doesn’t inherently prove anything. Moreover, it is hard to imagine how a typology 
such as this might achieve significant resonance within the sphere it purports to 
categorise. An author writing a preface need not consult Genette to discover their 
form, and a Creative Writer submitting to the REF need not know what kind of 
author they are or what kind of research they do. 
Nonetheless, this typology of Creative Writing figures does seem to hold a 
certain predictive power. It is generative of analyses which are germane to 
Creative Writing, which did not feature in the discourse which led to its 
construction, and anyone who denies as much is pulling our leg. The literary 
critic publishing poetry pamphlets on the side does exist. The Creative Writer 
leveraging the work of their colleagues in Biology, Astronomy and Maths does 
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exist. The creative critic’s existence is demonstrated, at least as an aspiration if 
not as an achievement, by dint of the words currently appearing on the screen I 
am staring at. 
Is it worth reading and considering this inexhaustive typology? Nicholson 
Baker celebrates the footnote in (what else?) a footnote; in fact, he does it in a late 
entry in the series of excessively long footnotes which permeate The Mezzanine to 
the point that they, at times, almost occlude the main text entirely. In this 
excessively long fragment, in this form which effectively outlaws a sense of 
completion, I am celebrating the act of criticism which does not complete, but 
which merely makes possible the next. 
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4.7: Nonetheless 
1.5: It might come as some relief to all concerned (if mutually assured destruction is 
comforting) to hear that if the author is dead, then so too is the critic. – But 
nonetheless, critics and authors continue to write. 
Writing criticism after Barthes is at least as unproblematic as writing literature 
after him. The critic, it turns out, gets along quite well without the Author-God, 
in indifference to intent, faithful only to the text. Closing down an avenue 
wherein the author-function is taken to authorise and legitimise a particular 
reception of a text, and not just its transmission, serves only to highlight 
alternative avenues which were anyway available. 
But even if we imagine an alternative history in which ‘The Death of the 
Author’ had taken on its most fatal possible form, in which Barthes’s dissolution 
of author and critic had led to a total shutting down of any alternative avenue, 
poisoning with a textual flourish any more suspicious hermeneutics, critics and 
authors would nonetheless have continued to write. Any work of analysis or 
theory, no matter how suasive, how undeniable, must at some point meet with a 
nonetheless: postmodernism has unpicked the grand narrative (but authors still 
puppeteer the hand of history); we cannot now read Jane Eyre without feeling the 
shadow of the plantation (unless we do); the traditional literary canon is 
exclusionary, insulting, unhelpful (and thoroughly alive); the novel is dying, 
poetry goes unread, television has supplanted film has supplanted theatre – yet 
novels, poetry, and theatre are still at the heart of literary thinking; and in spite 
of the last fifty years, literary biography is still a core genre of academic criticism. 
When I browse the internet (too often) any reference to my academic discipline is 
disconcertingly likely to be the following image (Brecheen): 
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The present thesis is also full of nonetheless moments. The preface, it turns 
out, is an imperfect theoretical model for the supplementary discourse, but is 
nonetheless a perfectly good practical model. Teachers of literary criticism will be 
at pains to highlight the issues around authorial intention, but can nonetheless 
make hay of the opportunities presented by having published authors in the 
department. The REF is irreconcilably at odds with Creative Writing research, 
but nonetheless functions perfectly well as an assessment framework for it. The 
profusion of names for the supplementary discourse makes the identification of it 
as an object for analysis near-impossible, but everyone nonetheless understands 
which object is meant by those names. Creative Writing holds both students and 
academics at the crux of cross-purposed, star-crossed axes – pinned between two 
author-functions, two textual productions, two types of knowledge – but they 
nonetheless learn and graduate, publish and teach, quite happily. 
The present work could not in any good faith have made recommendations or 
prescribed the medicine which would lead Creative Writing to greater health. It 
is too partial, too abstract, too insufficiently authorised. It is also, however, a 
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repeated failure to reach any truly useful abstraction. Creative Writing refuses to 
be mapped, at least in this attempt, as either Genettean typology or Derridean 
aporia. Nonetheless, it might serve to make some trouble in and with the 
discipline. 
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4.8: It must all be considered as if spoken by a character in a novel.  
0.1: the problems of authorship float through the afterword – Spoken as though there is 
any text through which the problems of authorship do not float. 
The title of this fragment is also the incipit of Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes by 
Roland Barthes, the title of which neatly captures the spiegel am spiegel of Creative 
Writing’s disciplinary condition of writers writing where writing is written about 
writing, and a book which I’ve often thought might serve as a wholesale and 
superior replacement for this entire thesis (1). 
For one thing, it is a supplementary discourse in an absolute way. No one 
piece of it might be pulled out as primary, as the piece which the rest of the text 
serves to support – not even Barthes’s own previous work, which he refers to 
constantly. Sometimes he does this in the abstract, as in the first words of the 
first fragment: ‘In what he writes, there are two texts’ (43). Sometimes he refers to 
his previous books explicitly, like when he says on page 87 that ‘This began with 
Writing Degree Zero, in which is imagined “the absence of every sign”’. That explicit 
referencing goes as far, on page 145, as setting out his own work in a table: 
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In this table I’m struck by the reference, in the bottom right, to the text currently 
being read. This, too, occurs throughout the book. When Barthes announces that 
the ‘vital effort of this book is to stage an image-system’, there is a sense of it 
being a supplementary discourse both on and within the discourse it is 
supplementary to (105). 
From that table I also get an idea here that Barthes is, in part, ventriloquising 
the structuralist mode which Genette continued after Barthes moved on to the 
phase he identifies as ‘morality’. Barthes’s voice, while always being unmistakably 
Barthes, shifts around alarmingly in this text, most notably between first-person 
(‘can I write today like Balzac?’) and third-person (‘he translates himself, doubles 
one phrase by another’), but either way referring to himself (118, 58). Sometimes 
this happens mid-fragment: during in the fragment ‘The natural’ he switches from 
third-person to first-person, then back to third-person, before finishing in first-
person (130-1); the fragment ‘The image-system of solitude’ gradually descends 
from third- through second- to first-person. This switching is accompanied by 
various modes of analysis too numerous to exhaustively list: from autobiography 
(as with ‘The rib chop’ on page 61); to cultural criticism (‘Paradoxa’, 140); to 
pastiche (‘Academic exercise’, 158); to anecdote (‘Pause: anamneses’, 117-20); and so 
on. In short, because all unities are scattered, the problem of authorship achieves 
an astonishing prominence in this book – and yet, I never mistake the voice as 
being anyone but Barthes.  
All unities except, of course, for the name which is used to sign the book. In 
what I keep wanting to present as a dramatisation of the author-function, the 
only thing to make this text (these texts?) cohere is the name itself; ‘this book’, as 
Barthes puts it, ‘is not the book of his ideas; it is the book of the Self, the book of 
my resistances to my own ideas’ (119). This is also why it is not an autobiography: 
there is no story being told amongst its many partial narratives. Which all leads 
me to wonder what kind of text this is. It is criticism, I think, of the critic’s own 
work, but for the fact that rather than respecting and reproducing the meaning of 
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that work, it probes and upsets it and rewrites it. It is creative, I think, but for the 
fact that I cannot read it like a novel: at every turn, and for all its pleasure, it 
offers itself up as an object of study. When I ask it what it means, I am asking 
after constatives, not performatives, even while it tells me that the ‘substance of 
this book, ultimately, is therefore totally fictive’ (120). 
I have read and re-read Roland Barthes by Roland Barthes, trying to find a way 
to work with what has always felt to me like a text which is too apt. I have 
annotated every moment of self-reference, every comment on the writing of this 
book, every comment on the writing of other books, every comment on writing 
itself, every shift in grammatical person. ‘All this’, writes Barthes, ‘must be 
considered as if spoken by a character in a novel – or rather by several characters’ 
(119). But only ‘as if’, not ‘as’, and on that count I’m still not sure what it is that 
Barthes has invented. 
It is awkward to now attempt to write as I have been doing here, in a naive 
first-person, as though I’m composing a supplementary discourse out of first-
order journal work. Without personae and polyvocality (save that of Barthes-in-
quotation), critical writing feels no more possible than creative writing would. 
Even to replicate my own verbal tics would have an effect of persona in its 
inevitable non-identity with reality, which leaves me with only the simple 
statement to work with. Hence even in the first sentence of this fragment 
wordplay asserts itself over direct address. Hence this thesis’s pronoun profusion 
of ‘I’, ‘we’, ‘one’, ‘this thesis’; its adoption of theory-voice, survey-voice, 
conversational-voice, whatever-voice. There is a general truth in Barthes’s incipit 
which upsets any notion of absolutely distinguishing Creative Writing from 
English. 
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Chapter 5: Foreword 
5.1: In and With 
If modernism’s mantra was ‘make it new’, and if the slogans for Creative Writing 
are ‘“write what you know”; “show don’t tell”; “find your voice”’, then the 
equivalent dictum for theory might be double your prepositions (McGurl 4, 34). To 
always already be in a state of language, for instance, or to make trouble in and 
with. 
There is little, of course, which does not exceed the mantra, slogan, or dictum 
applied to it. To write a PhD thesis in English, for instance, bears to the same 
extent as Creative Writing the demand to write what you know – or at least, to 
write what you now know, having done the research, and to hope that nobody 
notices any points at which you’re writing what you don’t know. But to write what 
you don’t know is also the condition of Creative Writing, to leap by a force of 
imagination across the synapse which separates one’s self from the world and so 
represent in writing something of the other. 
That to make it new is presented as modernism’s goal is made ironic by The 
Waste Land’s employment of Ovid and Dante and Shakespeare and all that 
Western letters had to offer Eliot, or by the extended intertext with Homer’s 
Odyssey in Joyce’s Ulysses. To make it new is, much less questionably, the demand 
placed on academic research, overseen at every turn by officiators of originality, 
but here too it is hard to say full-throated that ‘this has never been done before’, 
pendent as a work of research is on the million man-hours of work it references. 
It is perhaps, then, unsurprising that the discipline of Creative Writing too 
doubles its prepositions, in its status in and with the academy. Or rather, to recall 
the move which began the introduction of this thesis, it is creative writing which 
208 
 
doubles its prepositions, in and with the academy, for the other half of Nicholas 
Royle’s ‘ubiquitous programme’, from which ‘Reality Literature’ hopes to save the 
novel, is ‘the inexorable machine of the publishing industry’ (154). Today, creative 
writing is in the academy, and is (to make a more contentious statement) in 
English, but there will always be a part of it which exceeds the academy, such 
that, even in a hypothetical future where Creative Writing has taken its strongest, 
most hegemonic form, creative writing will always also be something which 
accompanies the academy, runs alongside it, is with it. Literature, it seems almost 
tautological to say, is a necessary consequence of human existence which will 
always be produced and published outside the university – a fact which is reified 
in the machinery of the publishing industry. 
To speculate, perhaps it is the slight gap thus formed between creative writing 
and the university which generates the endless stream of questions which seems 
to emerge from and flow around its very existence. Most significantly, that 
publicly chewed over question which this thesis has, until this final moment, 
avoided mentioning: can it be taught? There is something unmanageably 
unprogrammatic about an entity which can be cleaved by capitalising two of its 
letters, and so it is hardly surprising that it makes such trouble in the literary 
world. 
Creative Writing, meanwhile, is certainly in the academy, but it has the 
potential to make trouble (and I believe it already has made trouble) in and with 
the academy, in its impact on the study of literature, on how literary criticism 
considers its object, on how theory develops new and better understandings of 
what happens when people read books. That Creative Writing is changing the 
shape of English around it is a difficult position to justify with anything like 
evidence or substantiation. Much like asking whether a novel would have been 
written differently if it weren’t for the REF, to try and assess what Creative 
Writing has done to English is to invite yourself into a realm of counterfactuals. 
How can we possibly say how things would be if things were otherwise? 
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However, the author essay ‘Reality Literature’, and not uniquely, functions as 
a product of that interaction: critical, reflective, supplementary, concerned with 
its authorship, stating its originality, playing across the disciplinary threshold and 
performing that play in order to make the threshold visible. Noting his term’s 
echo of ‘reality TV’, which is ‘a fiction […] constructed, programmed and 
ethnocentric’, Royle assures us that ‘Reality literature invites us, on the contrary, to 
be wary of such constructions’, that it ‘seeks to question and complicate, to 
dislocate and interfere’, that it ‘is something that happens, perhaps, when the 
novel is operating at top speed, gone before you can say’. If, as Royle says, reality 
literature is ‘not a genre but something more ghostly and fleeting’, perhaps it is a 
tendency, an attitude, or a possibility of language – but suddenly the language he 
is using dislocates reality literature itself (157-8). It is ‘fleeting’. It is in action 
while the novel is ‘operating’, but also when it is ‘gone’. It is something cast 
forward from but uncontained by the novel. 
It seems to me now, reading ‘Reality Literature’ one more time, that what the 
essay institutes, makes possible as in a printing matrix, is not more writing like 
Quilt, but more writing like itself. There is a temptation to add ‘Author essay’ to 
our list of names for the supplementary discourse, as the problems of fictionality, 
problems of supplementarity, and problems of authorship which float through 
this afterword now seem to constitute so much of the scene of Creative Writing. 
It is a confluence of writing and reading, where both of those gerunds are raised, 
nonhierarchically, from the level of activity to the level of profession. It steps 
forward, past the conversations which this thesis used it to set into motion, past 
any programmatics of authorship, assessment, or research, and invents something 
new. 
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